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ABSTRACT 
The traditional public health model for mass vaccination, which is based on the 
assumption that workforce will be sufficient to mount a campaign, is flawed.  Funding 
initiatives by Congress, while addressing certain inadequacies, have failed to consider 
workforce capacity that continued to decline resulting from state and local budget cuts. 
Thus, as the nation prepared for its first pandemic in 40 years and first of the twenty-first 
century, it found itself unprepared for a mass vaccination campaign. 
This thesis explores pandemic vaccine distribution, contrasting Department of 
Health and Human Service guidance with pandemic gap analyses and the recent H1N1 
vaccination campaign. An analysis of the literature revealed that unresolved state and 
federal distribution issues contributed to distribution delays during the H1N1 call for 
mass vaccination. 
Policy analysis was used to evaluate public health and private sector vaccine 
distribution models, and a third hybrid model was proposed to improve support for public 
health emergencies. Adoption of the hybrid model will enhance the vaccination process 
from production through distribution along with administration to support U.S national 
security interest in biosecurity. The hybrid model offers a strategic solution for pandemic 
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The traditional public health model for mass vaccination, which is based on the 
assumption that workforce will be sufficient to mount a campaign, is flawed.  Funding 
initiatives by Congress while addressing certain inadequacies, have failed to consider 
workforce capacity that continued to decline resulting from state and local budget cuts. 
Thus, as the nation prepared for its first pandemic in 40 years and first of the twenty-first 
century, it found itself unprepared for a mass vaccination campaign.  
Two questions guide the research methodology for this thesis: What criteria 
should be used to evaluate a model to support pandemic vaccine distribution and drive 
policy development? How could a new model be designed to support pandemic vaccine 
distribution for a public health emergency of national significance?  
Policy analysis was used to examine weaknesses in the current models, identify 
strengths and develop a hybrid model that could contribute to achieving the policy goal.  
Each model contains methods, technologies and outcomes that may likely be essential in 
support of mass vaccination for a public health emergency.  Subject matter expertise was 
used to identify, shape and validate evaluation criteria (see Figure 1, introduced in 
Chapter IV) that were used to evaluate existing models and the proposed hybrid model. 
Subject matter experts represented stakeholders involved in vaccine distribution for either 
and/or both non-emergency (seasonal) and for emergency (pandemic).  
Two current models of vaccine distribution were evaluated. A new hybrid model 
for pandemic distribution (depicted in Figure 1) was developed that addresses 
implementation difficulties that came to light during the nation’s response to the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic. Limitations of the two existing distribution models were found during 
the analysis. The findings that resulted from the evaluation and analysis of the existing 
models are threefold: 
1. The Department of Health and Human Service pandemic vaccination 
distribution plan (PVD) is not executable. 
2. There exists statutory, regulatory and licensure barriers to the use of 
alternative healthcare professionals as vaccinators 
 xviii 
3. The nation lacks a comprehensive pandemic policy for pandemic vaccine 
distribution during public health emergencies of national significance.  
 
Figure 1.   Criteria & Enablers that Influence Pandemic Vaccine Distribution 
Three recommendations resulted from the analysis support development of a new 
hybrid model for PVD that leverages the use of a public private partnership.  The first 
recommendation, change scope of practice restrictions that prohibit disciplines from 
serving as vaccinators in declared public health emergencies where vaccination is the 
mitigation strategy, targets the pre-pandemic period. Its aim is to extend the scope of 
practice among those disciplines whose professionals could also serve as vaccinators 
during a public health emergency for vaccination services. The second recommendation 
would be used during the inter-pandemic period and advocates the use of a single, 
integrated vaccination distribution system in which pandemic response is exercised 
 xix
through each seasonal flu campaign. The third recommendation proposes the adoption of 
a policy for pandemic vaccine distribution during public health emergencies. A 
framework for the development of such a policy is outlined and comparable to the United 
States established policy of vaccine production self-sufficiency. A distribution policy 
brings congruence to the process of vaccination from production through distribution and 
includes administration. Pandemic response should not stop at vaccine production self-
sufficiency but conclude with a distribution policy that supports the vaccine supply chain 
from production through administration and offers a comprehensive strategic solution for 
pandemic vaccine distribution. 
Finally, the sudden emergence of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic tested the nation’s 
pandemic preparedness plans. The genesis for this thesis emerged in the early summer of 
2009 as the nation announced plans for a mass vaccination campaign, the first in nearly 
40 years.  Planning efforts were not without confusion as conveyed by state and federal 
public health authorities as they debated strategies for vaccine distribution.  Discussions 
between state and federal public health authorities proposed an alternative model of 
distribution that was unfamiliar to planners. This alternative model departs from the flu 
model used each season by the private sector and also departs from the public health 
model documented in federal planning guidance, which is used by planners to develop 
mass vaccination scenarios. The new hybrid model for pandemic distribution offers a 
new approach for efficient, rapid distribution of biological countermeasures.  
 xx
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I. THE NEED FOR AN IMPROVED PANDEMIC VACCINE 
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The United States has invested billions of dollars in pandemic preparedness 
including twenty-first century cell-based vaccine production, disease surveillance 
systems, laboratory facilities and planning at all levels of government; however, efforts to 
improve vaccine distribution had been sidelined and remained insufficient to meet the 
Department of Health and Human Service’s goal (HHS) of vaccinating 300 million 
Americans in six months. A United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
report in 2004, underscored the limitations of the DHS (Department of Homeland 
Security) Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan in regards to the lack of 
guidance for vaccine distribution and administration. It states, “The draft plan does not 
establish a definitive federal role in the purchasing and distribution of vaccine” (United 
States Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2004, p. 10). A recent gap analysis by 
the GAO of the nation’s pandemic preparedness in 2009 point to continued gaps with 
vaccine distribution (GAO, 2009b, p. 7). 
The HHS mass vaccination goal for a public health emergency is to vaccinate the 
population (300 million) in six months (HHS, 2005b). The implication is that vaccine 
supply is sufficient throughout that six month interim. A critical infrastructure protection 
analysis of the U.S. vaccine supply and distribution priorities by George Mason 
University (GMU) wrote:  
Under the currently existing capabilities for manufacturing vaccine, it is 
likely that more than 90% of the U.S. population will not be vaccinated in 
the first year” (2007, p. 16). The GMU analysis described the current 
pandemic vaccine distribution in the U.S. as “the inescapability of 
rationing. (GMU, 2007, p. 16)   
Even as the nation works toward vaccine production self-sufficiency (Congress of 
the States Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 2008), the issues of distribution remain 
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unclear. The interest directed toward production capacity has overlooked and limited 
attention to the attrition of public health mass vaccination distribution capacity.  
The current pandemic plan for mass vaccination revealed its weaknesses when the 
nation responded to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Public health did not have the 
infrastructure1 to support mass vaccination as called for in federal planning guidance to 
support the HHS goal. As a result, staffing limitations of state and local departments of 
health (DoH) were supplemented through the Public Health Emergency Response grants 
to hire personnel to fulfill vaccinator roles and logistical support. The federal response 
depended upon state and local jurisdictions for pandemic vaccine distribution as a state-
managed process. The assumption underlying federal mass prophylaxis plans is that state 
and local DoH staffing will be adequate for executing mass vaccination campaigns.   
To understand the limited capacity of public health agencies in vaccine 
distribution, a useful distinction is to contrast seasonal influenza vaccine response by the 
private sector with the pandemic vaccine distribution by the public health sector during a 
national emergency such as the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Public health2 distributes and 
administers seven percent of seasonal influenza (flu) vaccine  (Department of Health and 
Human Services [HHS], 2005, p. 4), but in a national emergency, such as the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic, it distributes 100 percent of the volume or approximately 150 million doses.  
Distribution is dependent on the mass vaccination clinic using public health facilities, 
public schools and community centers. In contrast, the private sector3 manages flu 
vaccine distribution for tens of thousands of frontline providers using its business process 
of centralized distribution, a portion of which was adopted for the H1N1 2009 pandemic.  
                                                 
1
 Public health infrastructure refers to workforce capacity including nurse vaccinators, personnel for 
logistical support and management team for command and control functions. In its broadest scope, it also 
includes federal and state laboratory system.  
2
 Public Health refers to the system of state and local departments of health and the U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).  
3
 The private sector is defined as the five pharmaceutical companies that produce vaccine for the U.S. 
market, wholesalers and distributors along with their business processes of distribution.  
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This mix of distribution models deployed for a national emergency lacks a 
systematic, coordinated approach to pandemic vaccine distribution. Three problems 
persist and contribute to the current complexities of pandemic vaccine distribution: 
1. Public health capacity has shrunk in terms of manpower and 
infrastructure. 
2. The federal response targets priority groups for vaccination versus the 
mass prophylaxis guidance model used in planning and exercise scenarios. 
This causes a preoccupation with vaccine administration and retards 
distribution planning and logistical support requirements.   
3. The private sector distribution model used for seasonal vaccine is 
sidelined when there is a public health emergency of national significance. 
As a result, private sector core competencies are not included in pandemic 
planning and exercise preparedness. 
After years of pandemic preparedness, the nation in a public health emergency 
does not have a well defined, tested and exercised vaccine distribution system that will 
achieve the HHS goal and facilitate a rapid response.  Each year, the private sector 
distributes vaccine to a broad network of healthcare providers, retail pharmacies and 
department stores, including state and local departments of health. Yet, this network is 
not used in a public health emergency. Each model has strengths that could be used in the 
development of a new model for emergency vaccine distribution.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What criteria should be used to evaluate a model to support pandemic vaccine 
distribution and drive policy development? How could a new model be designed to 
support pandemic vaccine distribution for a public health emergency of national 
significance?  
C. ARGUMENT 
The current public health infrastructure cannot adequately manage emergency 
vaccine distribution, and the public health distribution model is flawed. Effective public 
health programs have shifted vaccine distribution roles to the private sector while 
dismantling logistical support capacities such as vaccine refrigeration.  HHS has 
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depended upon the mass vaccination clinic using public health facilities, public schools 
and community centers as the primary method of pandemic vaccine distribution. Yet, the 
public health sector has lost capacity over past decades. In contrast, the private sector 
manages seasonal vaccine distribution for tens of thousands of frontline providers using 
the business process of centralized distribution. 
HHS should change the pandemic vaccine distribution strategy to incorporate a 
public private partnership. It should build upon the private sector seasonal influenza 
distribution system for public health emergencies of national significance. Furthermore, 
this strategy should consolidate distribution applications and publish doctrine that can 
serve as planning guidance for state and local public health jurisdictions.  
The application of centralized distribution technologies demonstrates the ability 
of the private sector to manage vaccine distribution. This is witnessed annually as it 
distributes over 140 million doses to healthcare providers and retail outlets, both 
pharmacy and “big box” department stores (Health Industry Distributors Association 
[HIDA], (2009a).  The feasibility for such a partnership exists technologically and 
financially as well. The public sector has partnered with the pharmaceutical industry over 
the last 50 years to produce critical vaccines. In this decade, the federal government has 
supported cell-based vaccine production technologies through countermeasure research 
and development authorizations. 
After years of pandemic preparedness, the nation in a public health emergency of 
national significance does not have a defined, tested and exercised vaccine distribution 
model.  The current public health infrastructure cannot adequately support emergency 
vaccine distribution and the distribution model is flawed. HHS must establish a strategic 
solution for pandemic vaccine distribution built upon a public private partnership for 
public health emergencies. This model should consolidate distribution applications and 
publish doctrine that can serve as planning guidance for public health jurisdictions.  
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The literature defines the limitations of current vaccine distribution models but 
stops at providing suggestions for improving vaccine distribution during public health 
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emergencies of national significance. This research will look at current models and make 
recommendations, given the assumption that current problems due to vaccine production 
issues will be solved, and describe what a future distribution model should look like. In 
addition, the first decade of the twenty-first century has witnessed the nexus of 
biosecurity and public health as a focal point of national security policy discourse. This 
research will add to the literature of strategic solutions for pandemic vaccine distribution 
and seek to help protect the nation from public health emergencies; this requires a new 
approach to efficient, rapid distribution of biological countermeasures. 
Future research efforts should revisit policy analysis research into countermeasure 
distribution given new technologies and an environment of public-private partnerships. 
Specifically, this research should inspire the development of planning guidance for state 
and local jurisdictions with the operational responsibility to distribute countermeasures to 
healthcare partners, high-risk groups, critical infrastructure sectors as well as the general 
public. The immediate consumer/customer of this research is policy makers responsible 
for public health emergencies including both federal and state practitioners.  
Furthermore, the emerging role of biosecurity as a national security topic and the 
role of public health in the national security policy debate will grow as an area of interest 
for homeland security practitioners and national leaders. This research will describe the 
history of vaccine distribution under emergency conditions, the limitation of current 
distribution models and recommend a new model to support a nation where biosecurity 
takes a prominent role in the national security debate.  
E. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter I outlines the need for an improved pandemic vaccine distribution system 
in the United States. Chapter II reviews the literature that supports Chapter I, including an 
overview of related public health emergency response legislation, federal agencies and 
the public health infrastructure. It also introduces the limitations of current mass 
vaccination models. Chapter III describes the policy analysis methodology used to 
develop the model evaluation criteria and then used to evaluate current vaccination 
models presented in Chapters V and VI.  
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Chapter IV presents the results of stakeholder interviews used to identify, shape 
and validate the criteria used for the evaluation of the two models of vaccine distribution 
discussed in Chapters V and VI. The purpose of the survey was to use public health and 
private sector expertise to identify the desired outcomes of a mass vaccination strategy, 
whether pandemic or seasonal, and the strengths, weaknesses and the policies that drive 
each strategy.  
Chapters V and VI are assessments of the respective models using the criteria 
presented in Chapter IV. Chapter V evaluates the current U.S. policy and implementation 
strategy for public health emergencies defined as the public health model. The chapter 
traces the historical basis for this model that has its roots in the polio and smallpox mass 
vaccination campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s. The chapter also describes the limitations 
of this model for public health emergencies where mass vaccination is the response 
strategy. Finally, the chapter explores the issue of limited vaccine production in the U.S., 
and the consequences for distribution options. 
Chapter VI defines the vaccination strategy the U.S. uses each flu season as the 
private sector model. Approximately 90 percent of seasonal flu vaccine is distributed 
through the private sector and is a for-profit venture. The model is contrasted with the 
public health model, to show how the strengths of both should be blended into a new 
policy strategy for public health emergencies. 
A new strategy for a public health emergency of national significance emerges in 
Chapter VII based on the criteria identified in Chapter IV and the analysis of the public 
health and private sector models reviewed in Chapters V and VI. This policy strategy is 
the public private partnership distribution for pandemic vaccine distribution model 
(PPP4PVD) and blends the strengths of the public health model and the private sector 
model. This chapter also shows how this strategy and the public private partnership 
model leverage the experiences learned from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic vaccine 
distribution campaign, outlines six goals to support this model and provides a framework 
for development of a pandemic vaccine distribution policy.  
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Finally, Chapter VIII explores strategic innovations essential to develop, support 
and implement PPP4PVD and lists three recommendations to sustain this model for 
vaccination distribution. This thesis will depict the limitations of current U.S. vaccine 
production, describe the U.S. policy of vaccine production self-sufficiency and advocate 
support for a policy of pandemic vaccine distribution. The premise of this thesis is that 
vaccine supply problems will improve and that policymakers and planners should begin 
to address vaccination distribution.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The nation’s interest in biosecurity and bioterrorism in the twenty-first century 
has broadened the literature base as it relates to medical countermeasures,4 mass 
prophylaxis, public health infrastructure and the role of public health in medical 
emergency response. Less represented in the discourse for vaccination distribution is the 
introduction of new methodologies, technology use or infrastructure expansion for 
addressing the vaccination goal of HHS.  
This literature review incorporates Congressional legislation and testimony, 
government reports and studies, scholarly works both current and historical and 
documents representing the private sector who participate in vaccine distribution. It is 
divided into four major sections and several sub-literatures. The first section, Legal 
Authorities, provides an overview of Congressional legislation and its recent history to 
prepare the nation for a public health emergency of national significance. Sub-literatures 
within this section are public health preparedness legislation and the federal agencies and 
departments responsible for vaccine development, approval, procurement and 
distribution. It also includes an overview of vaccine program advisory groups.   
The second section, Public Health Infrastructure, describes the public health 
system in the context of emergency preparedness and limits the discussion to federal, 
state and local government structures. The section reviews public health’s capacity for 
mass vaccine distribution, manpower and, specifically, a review of those charged with 
vaccination, public health nurses. It explores the literature from government studies, 
testimony, scholarly works and professional associations that represent the disciplines of 
public health. Subsequent chapters consider the role of other public health partners, 
                                                 
4
 Countermeasures generically describe medical devices used to prevent and or protect individuals 
from chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear threats. Countermeasures in this thesis refer to vaccine 
and antivirals used to neutralize biological threats.  
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hospitals, healthcare providers and volunteer organizations, such as the American Red 
Cross (Congressional Research Service [CRS], 2005), during pandemic response. 
B. LEGAL AUTHORITIES 
1. Public Health Preparedness Legislation 
Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, biosecurity topics became 
a major contributor to the discourse of national security. Public health legislation shaped 
the ability of the nation to respond to not only bioterrorism threats but emerging 
infectious disease outbreaks, producing a synergistic, dual-purpose benefit of investments 
and necessitating partnership with the private sector. Legislation has defined these 
relationships and how federal agencies managed the process in cooperation with the 
private sector pharmaceutical industry.  Ironically, this is the same industry whose 
production capacity on United States soil has contracted over the last two decades of the 
twentieth century.  
Legislation has addressed the limitations of the U.S. market economy and 
pharmaceutical countermeasure production, such as facilities, stockpiles or inventories, 
and the modernization of production processes in preparation for a public health 
emergency.5 It is significant because it directs spending to incentivize pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to conduct research and produce pharmaceuticals of relatively small 
quantities in the event of biological threats with little market other than the U.S. 
government. U.S. national security interests have served as the basis for this legislation 
and resulted in contractual arrangements between the business sector and the federal 
government with public-private partnerships (PPP) being the end result.   
Public health preparedness was the domain of state and local jurisdictions until 
The Public Health Improvement Act, was passed in 2000 by the Clinton Administration 
(Public Law 106–505). The 2000 Act expanded the federal role in state and local public 
health preparedness and response. A series of legislative acts throughout the first decade 
                                                 
5
 The Project Bioshield Act Public Law 108-276 of 2004 authorized the FDA to move forward with 
development and deployment of “unapproved medical products” or biological countermeasures. 
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of the twenty-first century continued this expansion of federal authority in state and local 
issues of health protection (Public Law 107-188, 2002; Public Law 108–276, 2004; 
Public Law 109-148, 2005; Public Law 109-417, 2006).  
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002 (Public Law 107-188), referred to as “The Bioterrorism Act,” followed and 
established the public health infrastructure as critical to the nation’s security (Frist, 2002). 
It worked to rebuild infrastructure and listed four primary provisions:  
• preparedness for bioterrorism and other public health emergencies;  
• control biologic agents;  
• protect the food safety and water supplies;  
• secure drinking water; and other provisions.  
The 2002 Act legislated numerous changes to public health and medical response 
from the national level to local level. It established the office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) whose role was to coordinate response with other 
federal agencies. It resurrected development of the smallpox vaccine and readied 
healthcare workers around the nation by organizing smallpox response teams and 
vaccinating its members. It expanded the Strategic National Stockpile along with the 
national disaster medical system response system. The Act touched not only HHS but the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Countermeasures were developed and stockpiled, such as potassium iodide, anthrax 
vaccine and smallpox vaccine.  
In 2004, the Project Bioshield Act of 2004 (Public law 108-276) was passed, 
amending section 564 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C 360bbb-3). 
This legislation authorized the FDA to move forward with development and deployment 
of “unapproved medical products” or biological countermeasures during a declared 
public emergency under Emergency Use Authorization (EUA). The H1N1 vaccine was 
developed and produced under the EUA. The Bioterrorism Act was followed by the 
Project BioShield Act. 
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The limitations of the BioShield Act were soon realized and in 2005, a BioShield 
Two or the Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2005 was 
introduced and passed by the Senate. It failed the journey through the House, but its 
provisions to address the limitations of BioShield Act found their way into P.L. 109-417, 
Title IV of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act.  It established the 
“Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Agency (BARDA) within the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)…to coordinate and oversee activities 
that support and accelerate advanced research and development of qualified 
countermeasures” (Gronvall, 2006, p. 175). Its scope was broad and targeted hazardous 
agents such as chemical and biological agents including bioterrorism as well as infectious 
diseases. It also included pharmaceutical products that may be required to combat either a 
“qualified” epidemic or pandemic. The act refers to not only vaccines, but antivirals and 
antibiotics, both those currently known as well as future products that may be required in 
the event of a new threat.  It was BARDA that secured H1N1 vaccine from five 
pharmaceutical manufacturers in response to the 2009 pandemic under EUA. 
The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) was passed 
as part of the “Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to 
address hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006” (Public 
Law 109-148, 2005). It provided liability protection and compensation for individuals 
who received a pandemic or epidemic countermeasure.  
In summary, initially legislation strengthened the nation’s public health 
capabilities to respond to bioterrorism. Subsequent legislation worked to broaden the 
scope to an all-hazards approach incorporating mass casualty and emerging infectious 
diseases. This section explored the role of legislation to shape, direct and fund the 
development, stockpiling and deployment of countermeasures in response to an act of 
bioterrorism or an emerging infectious disease. Vaccine production for the H1N1 
pandemic of 2009 demonstrated a record series of actions resulting from legislative 
mechanisms introduced during the legislative period described above. More vaccine was 
produced than ever before, expedited by departments established for precisely this 
purpose while still addressing issues of safety, efficacy and contraindications.  
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2. Federal Agencies, Departments and Centers 
Vaccine production is complex as witnessed by the myriad of federal agencies 
involved prior to application for licensure by a private sector pharmaceutical 
manufacturer. The limitations of distribution are understood by placing it in the context 
of the legal authorities over vaccine development, procurement, production and 
administration in the United States and the intricate role of federal agencies. The goal is 
safe but effective products that support the national vaccination plan.  
The roles of federal agencies their missions, objectives and activities compliments 
congressional legislation introduced in the previous section and relates specifically to 
biological countermeasures. The mechanisms that support and contribute too many 
pharmaceutical public private partnerships begin to emerge as we understand vaccine 
production (GAO, 2004).  
The Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) National Vaccine 
Program Office (NVPO) is responsible for coordinating the roles and responsibilities of 
federal agencies and partners defined in the national vaccine plan (HHS, n.d. (d)). It is the 
plan that defines the numerous roles of federal partners, which lists 24. The HHS 
Secretary also is responsible for administration of contracts with manufacturers to 
purchase pandemic vaccine when an Emergency Use Authorization is authorized by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
The National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC) is made up of federal agency 
representatives, members of academia and manufacturer representatives (HHS, n.d. (b)). 
NVAC was established to comply with Section 2105 of the Public Health Service Act (42 
U.S. Code 300aa-5), assists with development of the national vaccine plan and serves in 
an advisory capacity for vaccine development and production to HHS. Members are 
appointed by the Director of NVPO.  
The NVPO coordinates the many federal agencies tasked with vaccine and 
immunization activities and is responsible for implementation of the National Vaccine 
Plan. The goal of the plan is to prevent infectious diseases through immunization. This 
office works closely with the NVAC.   
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BARDA, also located within HHS, is responsible for “the development and 
purchase of the necessary vaccines, drugs, therapies, and diagnostic tools for public 
health medical emergencies” (Gronvall, 2009). This includes not only pandemic 
countermeasures, but all biologicals, chemical, radiological and nuclear countermeasures. 
It manages Project BioShield and the Public Health Emergency Medical 
Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE). PHEMCE coordinates communication and 
procurement between public stakeholders, stakeholders in industry and the research and 
development community and the federal government.  
A vaccine is licensed by the U.S. FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research (CBER) (FDA, n.d.). CBER administers licensing over all biologic products 
distributed in the states. Manufacturers apply for licensing through CBER and must 
comply with applicable federal laws, including the Public Health Service Act and the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.  Four of five pharmaceutical manufacturers are 
licensed to distribute vaccine for the U.S. market but produce vaccine in plants located in 
Europe. Their products must comply with U.S. Customs’ laws and therefore pass through 
the U.S. Customs Service.  
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has broad and numerous 
roles in addition to vaccine administration and distribution (The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention [CDC], n.d. (b)). Essentially, CDC is the operational unit and 
provides program implementation for the vaccination plan. Completing a restructure in 
2008 after nearly a quarter center since its last restructure, CDC’s “centers” encompass 
global health, health promotion, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
and even health marketing. This discussion is limited to those roles in which it plays a 
role in pandemic vaccine distribution (PVD) such as the use of centralized distribution 
for the H1N1 pandemic.  
A key initiative of the CDC is the Vaccine Management Business Improvement 
Project (VMBIP) begun in 2003. It represents “the first ever ‘top-to-bottom’ review of 
vaccine ordering and distribution (CDC, n.d. (e)),” and its purpose is “to improve current 
vaccine management processes at the federal, state, and local levels (CDC, n.d. (e)).” One 
major component of the VMBIP is “Centralized Distribution (CD):”  
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The centralized distribution of vaccine from two or three locations 
eliminates the need for multiple state and local depots. It reduces storage 
risk and distribution costs, while allowing more visibility into vaccine 
supply. The centralized distribution contract is held at the Federal level. 
(CDC, n.d. (e))  
The National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), 
formerly known as the National Immunization Program, is charged with administration of 
the nation’s immunization program (CDC, n.d. (f)). It is structured in the Coordinating 
Center for Infectious Diseases within CDC, which includes several companion disease 
control National Centers. It assists state and local DoHs with planning, development and 
implementation of immunization programs.   
The Advisory Council on Immunization Practices (ACIP) is a key advisory body 
of immunization experts who advise and provide guidance to HHS and CDC on the 
administration of vaccination programs. According to CDC: 
The role of the ACIP is to provide advice that will lead to a reduction in 
the incidence of vaccine preventable diseases in the United States, and an 
increase in the safe use of vaccines and related biological products. (CDC, 
n.d. (a)) 
ACIP advises CDC while the NVAC advises HHS and CDC. A third advisory 
group is the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), who 
advise the President on a wide range of science and technology issues including vaccine 
policy and practices (PCAST, n.d.). PCAST was announced by President Obama in April 
2009 to advise the President on science and engineering. Administrations have formed 
experts in science, health and engineering to advise administrative officials since 1933.   
An additional partner is the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), and it is 
grouped within the public health critical infrastructure. The mission of LRN, the network 
of federal and state laboratories is “to respond quickly to acts of chemical or biological 
terrorism, emerging infectious diseases, and other public health threats and emergencies” 




portion of the public health infrastructure. Collaboratively, they implement national 
policy and legislative actions to protect the nation against the threats of bioterrorism and 
emerging infectious diseases.  
C. PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE 
A 2000 CDC report presented to the Appropriations Committee of the United 
States Senate called for strengthening the public health infrastructure to address emerging 
new global health challenges (CDC, 2000). Those challenges would come with the 
anthrax attacks in 2001, SARS in 2003, the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
preparations for the threat of an avian influenza pandemic and, finally, the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic that surprised health authorities around the world. But what exactly is meant by 
the public health infrastructure and what makes up public health at state and local levels 
of governments? The previous section introduced the federal structure. This section takes 
up the topic and looks at state and local jurisdictions and the affects of federal legislation 
and funding have had on those structures. Figure 2 illustrates the public health 
infrastructure for emergency response and describes three basic structures that support 
response: 
• Workforce capacity and competency 
• Information and data systems 
• Organizational capacity 
Federal funding, described in the previous section, funded primarily the middle of 
the pyramid, surveillance, laboratory practice and epidemic investigation along with 
initiatives for preparedness. It also permitted CDC preparedness grants to invest in the 
information and data system structures of public health. Workforce capacity and 
competency issues were left to the states. It is this structure that is described in the 
literature, before 2000 and continuing through 2009, as inadequate to take on the new 
demands of public health emergency response while continuing to provide core public 
health services.  The CDC report provides a unique historical perspective:  
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In part, this is the cumulative result of budget cuts, lack of staff training, 
and outmoded information systems and laboratories. But the gap has 
persisted and widened because in addition to this attrition, the demands on 
the public health system have grown. For both reasons, the public health 
infrastructure has not been able to keep pace. (CDC, 2000, p. 12) 
With the exception of “outmoded information systems and laboratories” this 
statement could have been written in 2009 (CDC, 2000, p. 12). In 2008, the ASTHO 
workforce survey wrote, “a recent 2007 survey of ASTHO members confirm that little 
has changed in the past several years and that state governmental public health still faces 
a workforce crisis” (CDC, 2008, p. 3). It went on to state that the ratio of public health 
workers to 100,000 Americans had decreased by 10 percent over the past decade (CDC, 
2008, p. 5). 
 
Figure 2.   Public Health Infrastructure Pyramid (From CDC, 2008, p. 6) 
This thesis describes how legislation instituted mechanisms that expedited 
procurement of vaccine to mitigate the effects of the 2009 H1N1 virus. Other federal 
initiatives funded programs to develop capacities for pandemic preparedness and 
response to include mass vaccination. But governments at all levels were challenged by 
the complexities to deploy a workforce sufficient to support logistics and operational 
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requirements of the 2009 mass vaccination campaign called for by health authorities and 
the administration.  These challenges were compounded by the impact of the economic 
downtown and the spiraling budget reductions for state and local jurisdictions. These 
budget reductions impacted public health by perpetuating the loss of workforce capacity. 
While there are several forces that impact public health and that discussion is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, it is important to frame and define those structures relevant to the 
discussion of pandemic vaccine distribution.  
1. Workforce Capacity for Vaccine Distribution 
Testimony presented to a Congressional committee by Cleveland’s health 
commissioner illustrates the new demand on public health, such as preparedness. His 
testimony describes a city without adequate resources, a shrinking public health 
infrastructure and the lack of capacity to adequately respond to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.  
Since 2005, community funding for public health preparedness in 
Cuyahoga County, including the City of Cleveland, has dropped from a 
high of $2.2 million to the current level of $1.3 million as the public’s 
concern about a potential influenza pandemic has waned. Notably, funds 
for pandemic preparedness have been zeroed out in the coming grant year, 
which begins in August of 2009. This amounts to a 36% cut, with the 
likelihood of further cuts on the horizon. Over time, this trend is eroding 
our existing capacity and preventing us from developing the ability to 
meet our required target capabilities for local public health response. A 
compounding disadvantage emerges in the increasing list of local 
expectations in the face of these losses. Reversing this trend and sustaining 
funding levels for public health emergency preparedness must become a 
national priority. (Allan, 2009) 
While specific public health disciplines have prospered due to targeted federal 
investments, the sheer numbers of workforce has decreased dramatically as a result of 
declining budgets throughout the twenty-first century. It is this workforce that vaccinates, 
completes paperwork, provides logistical support, fills antiviral and vaccine 
pharmaceuticals in compliance with DEA requirements, staff call centers, make 
appointments, staff clinics and numerous other activities that support a nationwide 
vaccination campaign, jurisdiction by jurisdiction.  
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A series of scholarly works, professional association studies and reports, historical 
enumeration studies and government testimony, conclude that the public health 
infrastructure is inadequate. For example, a 2002 report by the Institutes of Medicine, The 
Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century, reinforced the inadequacy of the public 
health infrastructure first published in a 1988 landmark report (Institutes of Medicine 
[IOM], 1988).  The 2002 report is significant because it established a baseline prior to 
legislation introduced after the 9/11 attacks. Fourteen years after the 1988 report, the 
IOM stated the situation had not improved (IOM, 2002).  
Reports that followed the publication of the IOM 2002 report describe the 
continuing trend throughout this decade. For example, the Association of State and 
Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) reported that a loss of 1600 public health jobs 
resulted in 2008 and another 2600 loss of jobs was projected for 2009 due to declining 
state revenue budgets (Association of State and Territorial Health Officials [ASTHO], 
2009). Much of these job losses were public health nurses and administration personnel.  
Public health professional associations call for an enhanced capacity at the state 
and local levels and recommend this expansion come from an expanded federal role in 
public health (ASTHO, 2009). Absent in the literature is the role of state government to 
support public health though states have examined their public health system status and 
report a need to increase capacity (Santiago, 2006). Equally absent is the role of the 
federal government in cooperation with professional associations to support and 
incentivize local and state expansion of public health capacity.  
Limited capacity has undermined public health’s ability to mount mass 
vaccination campaigns, yet planning scenarios call for this strategy. A review of the New 
Jersey TOPOFF exercise revealed the inherent weaknesses of its planning scenarios: “In 
point of fact, NJ [New Jersey] does not have enough manpower to meet its needs as 
demonstrated by the exercise, but officials ignore this lesson as they engage new plans 
based on old assumptions” (Santiago, 2006, p. 38). After nearly a decade of public health 




essential for emergency response. However, the foundation of the public health 
workforce is the corps of nurses who symbolize public health workers and represent the 
greatest shortage of all.    
2. Public Health Nurses 
The decimation of the public health workforce is best understood when exploring 
the public health nurse corps and its declining percent representation among all public 
health workers. Public health nurses have served as vaccinators for mass vaccination 
centers, an essential component for emergency response (Association of State and 
Territorial Directors of Nursing [ASTDN], 2008, p. 22; Quad Council of Public Health 
Nursing Associations [QCPHNA] 2007, p. 4). Enumeration has been inconsistent but 
does offer insights into the vaccinator corps that are depended upon to support mass 
vaccination clinics (ASTDN, 2008, p. 4).  
Table 1 summarizes ratios of public health nurses tracked over the decades. In 
1947, there was one nurse per 10,329 Americans or a ratio of 9.6 nurses per 100,000 
populations. In 1968, the peak for mass vaccination campaigns, there was one nurse per 
4,703 or a ratio of 21.3 nurses per 100,000. Forward to 2000 and the data shows another 
high point with 17.5 nurses per 100,000 or one nurse per 5,716 populations (ASTDN, 
2008). By 2005, we see ratios begin their decline with 13.0 and 7,719 nurses per 100,000 
(ASTDN, 2008).  
Home health services delivered by public health peaked around 2000 and the 
private sector increased their involvement in home health services. As a result, public 
health nurses were siphoned off into the private sector and counts decreased. By 2005, we 
see a trend that continues through 2010 as the economy falters and public health budgets 
are cut. Table 1 shows this impact by contrasting nurse counts in South Carolina for 2000 
and 2008, reflecting a 60 percent attrition of the state public health nurse workforce (W. 
A. Hucks, personal communication July 16, 2009).   
The classic role of the public health nurse (PHN) was a trained nurse that worked 
in the community delivering a variety of patient care services such as communicable 
disease control, sexually transmitted disease control, tuberculosis control, maternity and 
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child hygiene, school hygiene and bedside care (home health for chronic diseases such as 
cancer and heart disease).  The waning decades of the twentieth century through the first 
decade of the twenty-first century saw a dramatic decrease in the public health nurse 
workforce while simultaneously their expected role expanded to support public health 
emergency response for both pandemics and bioterrorism. In emergencies, sheltering or 
vaccination clinics, it is the public health nurse that is assigned emergency duty.   
Nursing associations attempt to track numbers of public health nurses over many 
years but gaps remain. The difficulty with accurate enumeration has been all 50 states 
reporting numbers for any given survey year.  ASTHO noted that in 2000, there were 
36,000 public health nurses (ASTHO, 2007). But 16 states had not reported and ASTHO 
concluded that as of the report date, enumeration of the PHN workforce did not exist 
(2007). However, the same report writes that public health nursing experienced the most 
staffing shortages in contrast to other disciplines, with an estimated shortage of 28 
percent (ASTHO, 2007, p. 20). 
Table 1.   Public Health Nurse to Population Ratio (After ASTDN, 2008, p. 9; Gebbie 
& Merrill, 2001, p. 14; U.S. Census Bureau, 2005) 
Full-time nurses 
employed by state 
and local agencies 
for public health to 
population year  
 
Public Health 
Nurse (PHN)  
 
 






per Nurse  
1947    9.6       10, 329  
1950 15,867  150,720,000  10.5    9,500  
1957    8.9        11,199  
1960 16,341  178,729,000     9.1  10,937  
1964 17,572  190,092,000    9.2  10,818  
1968   21.3   4,703 
1970   13.7   7,322 
2000 49,232 281,422,000 17.5 5,716 
2005 38,4006 296,410,404 13.0 7,719 
  SC Population   
2000 1110 4,012,012 27.7   3,614 
2008 464 4,479,800 10.4 10,158 
                                                 
6
 Workforce enumeration referenced 160,000 with nurses making up 24 percent of the workforce 
(National Association of City and County Health Officials, 2005, p. 2).  
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Professional nurse associations maintained ratios that date back to the early 
1900s. In 1927, the recommended ratio of nurse (public health) to population was 1:2000 
(ASTDN, 2008, p. 5).  In 1943, the public health nurse to population ratio 
recommendation was changed to one public health nurse per 5000 population ASTDN 
(2008). The 1:5000 ratios were still recommended in 2008 by ASTDN (2008, p. 49). 
According to the report, the ratio is within reason of other health and medical 
professional ratios recommended by professional associations. For example, the 
recommended ratio for dentistry is 1:4000, mental health, 1:6000 and for physicians 
1:3000 (ASTDN, 2008, p. 51).  However, since the later part of the twentieth century, the 
number of nurses in public health has been reduced by 50 percent, according to ASTDN 
(2008, p. 49).  
D. SUMMARY 
Federal planning guidance for public health emergencies has emphasized the 
public health model with a decades-long planning assumption that states would have 
sufficient workforce capacity.  Yet, this past decade has seen a continued, progressive 
decline in capacity as the nation was poised to address its first pandemic in 40 years. A 
consensus views the public health infrastructure as underfunded and inadequately 
resourced. It gains attention and focus with the events of 2001 but found lacking with the 
2009 H1N1 pandemic, an incident of limited severity. Infused with $1.35 billion dollars 
of federal funds through the Public Health Emergency Response grants, state and local 
departments of health hired, contracted and supplemented existing full-time equivalent 
employees to execute the H1N1 pandemic mass vaccination campaign (Milner, 2009).  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the research methodology, sample population, data 
collection methodology and data analysis methods used to assist in answering the 
research questions posed in this study. This chapter also provides a discussion of the 
interviewee biases that emerged during the process.   
A. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1. Policy Analysis 
This thesis utilized policy analysis to evaluate two existing vaccination models 
and synthesize a new, third model for pandemic vaccine distribution.  Policy analysis was 
selected to examine policy weakness in the current models, identify strengths (criteria) of 
those models and develop a new model that will achieve the policy goal.  Each model 
contains methods, technologies and outcomes that can be essential in support of mass 
vaccination for a public health emergency.  Subject matter experts (SME) were used to 
identify desired outcomes and shape evaluation criteria expected from implementation of 
these models. These model evaluation criteria were used to evaluate two existing models.  
Three steps were used to evaluate existing models and develop the new model.  
1. The first step was to identify, shape and validate evaluation criteria using 
an interview method. SMEs were interviewed in two rounds, the initial 
round to identify criteria and a second round to validate the criteria 
identified from the first round. In the second round SMEs were asked to 
rate relative importance of each criterion, rank order all criteria and 
discuss their rationale for the ranked order of each criterion.  
2. The second step was to evaluate the two models using the model 
evaluation criteria that were identified, shaped and validated in step one. 
3. The final step was to construct a model for pandemic vaccine distribution 
on the basis of the model evaluation criteria identified in step one, the 
evaluation of two models in step two. A comparative analysis of the 
literature provided context to frame the development of the new model.  
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The two existing vaccine distribution models evaluated were: 
1. The public sector model is the policy and strategy for mass vaccination 
when a public health emergency is declared.  It is the U.S. implementation 
strategy documented by federal planning guidance. This model dates to 
the 1950s and 1960s when mass vaccination clinics were used to defeat 
childhood infectious diseases such as polio, smallpox, etc. 
2. The private sector model is represented by the seasonal influenza 
campaign and is a for-profit approach used each flu season. Vaccine is 
manufactured by the private sector, sold mostly to for-profit providers and 
distributed via the private sector. Its provider network is limited to the for 
pay sector, of which 74 percent includes physician practices (HHS, 
2005a). 
2. Delphi 
The Delphi technique was selected to develop and establish the interview strategy 
and met the four features qualifying for Delphi. These key features are anonymity, 
iteration, controlled feedback and a statistical aggregation of the group’s response (Rowe 
& Wright, 1999, p. 354). 
Two interview rounds were conducted with each interviewee and interactions 
from each round limited to the researcher ensured anonymity during both rounds. A 
questionnaire was used to guide the interviews and provided controlled feedback from 
each SME. The questionnaire was scripted to ensure iteration from one interviewee to the 
next. Prior to round two interviews, evaluation criteria were developed from round one 
responses grouped by common themes (criteria) and factors (enablers) that supported 
those themes. A worksheet for use in round two was developed and distributed to each 
interviewee; it summarized the collective responses and described criteria and related 
enablers. The worksheet guided round two interviews in which respondents were asked to 
rate the relative importance of each criteria group and then rank order those criteria. From 
the round two interviews, six criteria were ranked and a median was calculated 
representing a modest statistical aggregation. 
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B. SAMPLE POPULATION 
Sample selection consisted of individuals with vaccine distribution professional 
experience that served as the common characteristic among the interviewee group. 
Individuals selected served as subject matter experts and represented stakeholders 
involved in vaccine distribution for either and/or both non-emergency (seasonal) and for 
emergency (pandemic). SME experience represented policy, administration, academic 
(medical), state-level program operations, federal operations and national policy levels. 
SMEs represented local, state and federal levels of government, non-government 
organizations and the private sector. In addition, it included the personal experience of 
the author who serves as an emergency manager for a state public health agency and 
oversees regional and county preparedness, response and recovery efforts.  
C. DATA COLLECTION  
Subject matter expert interviews were used to answer the research question, 
“What criteria should be used to evaluate a model to support pandemic vaccine 
distribution and drive policy development?” The round one interviews were used to 
identify and shape evaluation criteria and evaluation criteria enablers. The round two 
interviews were used to validate the criteria.  
The purpose of the research project was explained to each subject matter expert 
followed by an overview of the three sections of the interview consisting of nine 
questions. At the conclusion of the round one interview, each SME was reminded that 
round two interviews would be scheduled in a few weeks and that the round two 
interviews would explore the collective responses among SMEs interviewed.  
The interviews were divided into four sections: 1) SME background information, 
2) private sector model and the SMEs involvement with seasonal influenza vaccination, 
3) pandemic influenza vaccination and the public health model, and 4) the ethics of 
vaccine distribution during public emergencies. The first segment established the SMEs 
experience and familiarity with vaccination policy, both seasonal and pandemic. It also 
offered an opportunity to understand the SMEs expertise and provide in-depth follow-up 
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in either of the subsequent sections of the interview. The second segment focused the 
discussion on knowledge, familiarity and experience with the private sector model and its 
outcomes. The third segment focused on the public health model and provided an 
opportunity to contrast strengths and weaknesses of this model with the discussion of the 
private sector model. The fourth segment solicited discussion of the ethics surrounding 
vaccine distribution. 
The survey instrument consisted of a series of 16 questions and paralleled the four 
groups described above. Table 2 maps the primary research question to one of four 
segments groups and to a question reference number. 
Table 2.   Research Question Mapping to Survey Instrument 
 
Research Question Questionnaire Segment Group Question Reference
Vaccination policy and practice background Q1, Q2a, Q2b
Seasonal influenza and the Private Sector 
Model 
Q3, Q4, Q4a, 
Q4b, Q4bi, Q4bii 
Pandemic Influenza and the Public Health 
Model 
Q5, Q5a, Q5b, 
Q5c, Q6, Q7 
The ethics of vaccine distribution Q8
What criteria should be used 
to evaluate a model to support 
pandemic vaccine distribution 
and drive policy development? 
 
The survey instrument guided in-depth interviews conducted in a conversational 
format either in-person or telephone with 45 minutes scheduled for each interview. Most 
interviews took about 60 minutes to complete with a few that further extended by 15 to 
20 minutes. Interviews consisted of two rounds. The purpose of the first round was to 
identify criteria while the second round asked interviewees to validate the relative 
importance of the criteria and rank order them from one to six. Respondents were asked 
to describe their rationale for ranking each criterion’s against the other criteria.  
An open-ended question format was used, accompanied by a script for an 
overview to describe the purpose of the research project. Interviewees were instructed 
that the objective was to identify key criteria or outcomes that should be included in a 
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pandemic vaccine distribution system. Interviewee responses served as qualitative data 
that documented each interview. Responses were coded as enablers for a particular 
criteria consideration and grouped under a criteria heading using, in most instances the 
phrases and/or words of respondents.   
Three biases became apparent during the SME selection process and subsequent 
interview process. The first bias unexpectedly occurred as a reflection of the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic experience. All respondents were steeped in H1N1 response and, as a result, 
respondents defaulted to talking about their H1N1 pandemic experience. Most shared 
personal stories that contrasted what should be happening versus what was happening on 
the front lines of public health response. Their experience and passion made the 
discussion rich and robust but also biased the discussion to one pandemic experience. The 
limitation of this discussion was that it dealt with the reality of H1N1 versus state and 
federal implementation plans. However, H1N1 brought realism to the notion of 
“pandemic” that would otherwise have been an academic exercise without the realism or 
substance of what that experience was really like. H1N1 anchored their responses in 
terms of what is needed for a better pandemic vaccine distribution model.  
The interviewer worked to adjust as it became apparent this would be the trend 
among respondents. The interviewer listened and documented the responses because they 
underscored a limitation or strength of the H1N1 vaccination model. In effect, these 
discussions revealed limitations of a public health model or equal limitations of elements 
of a private sector model that had been introduced to supplement the inherent inadequacy 
of the public health model. Eventually, the researcher would bring the respondent back to 
the target question in the context of the model being studied and reiterated the question.  
A second bias was that state-level interviewee selection was limited to one state, 
South Carolina. The state has a centralized public health system with 46 counties 
organized into eight public health regions that delivered services to a network of counties. 
State departments of health are structured in one of three ways, centralized (South 
Carolina), decentralized or hybrid. States that have a decentralized system may have 
county departments of health reporting to a municipality or county governmental unit. 
Such is the case in North Carolina.  The purpose of the survey was not to collect data on 
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state systems for responding to pandemic but to understand the mechanics and logistics 
of how those states integrated with the federal response under emergency response 
conditions. The research aim is to understand the strategic implications of pandemic 
vaccine distribution rather than the tactical decisions that direct a state-managed vaccine 
distribution process. In essence, vaccine distribution is managed 50 different ways.  
Finally, the third bias is confirmation bias (Gardner, 2008). Confirmation bias is 
when a belief is held and content, information or experience that may subsequently be 
seen or heard is screened in such a way that it supports the belief. As a result of the 
literature review, the interviewer drew certain preliminary notions based on the analysis 
of the literature. The interviewer controlled for this by following the pre-planned 
questionnaire (Appendix A) and by avoiding interjection of information that would lead 
the respondent to state something that fit the researcher’s preconceived notions. 
Rephrasing follow-up questions worked to probe a response and gain further insight into 
the significance or intent of the respondent. At the conclusion of the interview, a 
discussion ensued that shared findings from the literature review with the respondent.  
D. DATA ANALYSIS  
The objective in the first round was to identify evaluation criteria. At the 
conclusion of the first round interviews, responses were summarized and assessed for 
common phrases, words or descriptions that occurred with frequency. Key elements were 
tagged as enablers if they described how a process (the how) influenced an outcome (the 
what). Respondents described an enabler in the context of a vaccination campaign desired 
outcome. This context was preserved for subsequent coding of responses. Enablers were 
grouped and associated with a particular evaluation criterion.   
At the conclusion of the interviews and during the subsequent analysis, the 
researcher introduced relevant criteria from the literature review and included criteria 
based on personal and professional experience. The purpose was to make certain all 
desired outcomes for a pandemic vaccine distribution campaign were included for 
discussion in the second round of interviews. The objective was to ensure that the 
evaluation criteria dataset and supporting enablers were comprehensive and that 
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interviewee’s responses reconciled with the qualitative analysis of the literature. The 
results served as a standard reference point for round two interviews and analysis of 
results.  
The objective of the second round of analysis was to validate evaluation criteria 
and enablers that support each criterion. Respondents weighed the relative importance of 
each criterion and the enablers associated with that criterion. Respondents assigned the 
value of each criterion as high, medium or low. Respondents were than asked why they 
assigned a particular weight to each criterion. The discussion was comparative, as 
respondents contrasted a particular score with another criterion. Once all criteria were 
assessed, respondents rank ordered evaluation criteria from one to six.  
It became apparent to the researcher that the rating and discussion of relative 
importance had a calibration affect with each interviewee. The time lapse between the 
round one interview and the round two interviews ranged from two to six weeks. Thus, 
the discussion caused the interviewee to calibrate their focus on the topic of vaccine 
distribution and reassess both enablers and its related criterion. The outcome was a 
thoughtful, comparative and deliberative ranking of each criterion with a discussion about 
why they ranked each criterion as they did. 
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IV. SURVEY AND INTERVIEW DATA 
A. OVERVIEW  
The results from two rounds of interviews and the development of the model 
evaluation criteria are presented in this chapter. The chapter synthesizes the comments 
offered by SMEs in response to the two rounds of interviews that were used to indentify 
and validate model evaluation criteria. Section B summarizes responses for each round of 
interview by question reference and develops the model evaluation criteria. Section C 
discusses the model evaluation criteria in the context of pandemic response and 
supporting literature. Finally, Section D defines the evaluation criteria used in Chapters V 
and VI to evaluate the public health model and the private sector model respectively.  
B. DATA RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This section summarizes the results of subject matter expert interviews. The first 
sub-section describes SME responses to the round one questionnaire. The second sub-
section synthesizes the interview data into a set of model evaluation criteria and 
evaluation criteria enablers. Finally, the third sub-section describes how round two 
interviews were used to validate model evaluation criteria. 
1. Round One—Identification of Evaluation Criteria 
The survey of SMEs contributed to a comprehensive perspective on the 
limitations of current pandemic vaccine distribution models and the institutional barriers 
that prevent innovative solutions to problems inherent within distribution 
implementation.  The data collected during the interviews resulted in the identification of 
evaluation criteria that were used to evaluate current models and strategies that support 
those models. Data collection also assisted to identify desired outcomes of a vaccination 
campaign, how best to maximize vaccination uptake and achieve herd immunity for the 
U.S. population and critical infrastructures. Below is a description of the interview 
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process, possible interviewee biases and a listing of round one interview questions used 
to better understand SME perspective, accompanied by a summary of responses. 
Twelve first round interviews were completed and averaged about one hour each. 
The recent occurrence of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic colored the interviewee responses.  
As an example, when the first round the interview progressed into the second section 
where questions were directed toward the seasonal flu campaign, respondents referenced 
the H1N1 experience because two flu vaccine distribution initiatives were being pushed 
simultaneously. The H1N1 pandemic brought home the realty of a pandemic, testing 
pandemic plans at all levels. The level of detail may not have been as rich if the survey 
had been only an academic exercise without the benefit of a pandemic that had preceded 
it and having tested the public health system for emergency response. Table 3 provides a 
timeline of key vaccination events in 2009 that respondents referenced during the 
interview process.  
Table 3.   H1N1 2009 Pandemic Timeline of Events 
Date Event 
24 Apr 09 Confirmation of first H1N1 case by CDC 
01 Jun 09 First batches of H1N1 vaccine were produced 
11 Jun 09 WHO declares H1N1 a Phase 6 Influenza Pandemic 
15 Sep 09 H1N1 Clinical trials were underway 
15 Oct 09 H1N1 Vaccine allocations begin to arrive in prioritized states and major cities 
01 Jan 10 CDC recommends offering vaccine to all ages, all groups 
a. Vaccination Policy and Practice Background  
This section provided information on each SME’s background in vaccine 
policy, supply and distribution both seasonal and/or pandemic that offered functional 
insights into the strengths and weaknesses of each model. It offered an opportunity to 
explore the SMEs expertise, especially if it related to a model weakness identified in the 
literature review. In addition, it provided a baseline for in-depth follow-up in either of the 




as they relate to desired outcomes of a vaccination campaign. The section also frames the 
discussion for each SME in the context of policy as it relates to pandemic vaccine 
distribution.  
• Q1: Tell me briefly your day-to-day duties. 
Physicians were more likely to provide direct patient care than other 
disciplines interviewed. Other roles included professional association governance, 
education and consultation with both public and private sector physicians and a medical 
technical advisory role with the Department of Defense. Nurses served in a state program 
management role and involved with both seasonal and pandemic policy and budget. They 
also supported regional and local mass vaccination efforts. Those SMEs with roles in 
public health emergency management had responsibilities for critical infrastructure 
protection (CIP), coordination across federal specific sector agencies (lead agencies for 
CIP) and working closely with pharmaceutical vaccine manufacturers. Pharmacists had 
extensive experience in the private sector and public sector though their roles are now 
reversed. Each respondent understood how his or her counterpart sector worked, its 
limitations, strengths and contributions to pandemic emergency response. Roles and 
knowledge of pharmacists were not limited to vaccine distribution but applied equally to 
antivirals and other biologics. The ethicist that participated serves as a member of 
hospital bioethics committees and has chaired several pandemic ethics committees at 
local, regional and state levels. Operational personnel representing both the public and 
private sector understood clearly the mechanics of logistics and described the inter-
workings of the systems they managed. Most SMEs had advanced academic degrees or 
extensive experience in a particular sector. 
The backgrounds of SMEs included professionals from both public sector 
and private sector serving in local, state and national roles for pandemic preparedness and 
response. Academic credentials included physicians, nurses, pharmacists, emergency 
preparedness and business expertise. All have extensive experience with the vaccine 
supply chain from production, distribution, ordering, administration, including policy and 
operational perspectives. As a group, they represent pandemic vaccine procurement and 
distribution from both public and private sector perspectives. It is worth noting that 
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among the SMEs, several had extensive experience in one sector but now worked in the 
other sector, thus offering insights from both sectors as it relates to vaccine supply and 
distribution. 
• Q2a: In your view, please describe the U.S. or federal policy for pandemic 
vaccination. 
Several respondents were hesitant initially when the question was asked 
but generally, the range of responses revealed the lack of clarity regarding U.S. pandemic 
policy. One respondent referenced the executive order by the Obama administration and 
the subsequent funding by Congress of the order for H1N1 preparedness and response 
activities. This authorized the production and purchase of H1N1 vaccine and Public 
Health Emergency Program grants to states for response and staffing H1N1 mass 
vaccination clinics. Another respondent stated there is no policy for vaccination, only 
recommendations. When this respondent’s answer was probed, the respondent stated that 
policy would have dollars associated with it and referenced the Vaccine for Children 
program. A similar response (no pandemic policy) was echoed by another respondent, 
adding that there was a clear change in distribution methodology (regarding H1N1) as the 
mechanics of distribution were worked out over the course of time. The respondent’s 
point was that given a policy, operational and contractual issues would more likely have 
been worked out in advance of an incident.  
• Q2b: Describe the U.S. or federal policy for seasonal vaccination. 
A consensus of the SME panel expressed the view that there is no known 
federal policy as it relates to seasonal flu vaccinations. Several noted that the CDC 
Vaccine for Children program (VFC) reflects federal policy as it relates to the provision 
of vaccine for children with eligibility under Medicaid, uninsured, underinsured or Native 
Americans. It includes an element of seasonal influenza vaccine, administered through 
the states by providers that register and agree to comply with federal program guidance. 
One respondent noted that the policy relates to priority groups in the event of vaccine 
shortages.  
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b. Seasonal Influenza and the Private Sector Model (PSM)  
This section narrows the discussion to the seasonal flu model of 
distribution. It asks SMEs to identify strengths, weaknesses and desired outcomes for the 
seasonal flu campaign that assisted in developing model evaluation criteria. This section 
also serves to frame the discussion for the next section.   
• Q3: What has been your involvement (role) with seasonal influenza 
vaccine distribution? 
Responses ranged from no involvement to the management and 
administration of seasonal influenza vaccines. Physicians were more likely to be involved 
in vaccination issues throughout the year while those in program administration and 
policy development were equally involved but as it relates to program development and 
implementation strategy. 
• Q4: What is your familiarity with the Private Sector Model? (See 
definition below) Would you add anything to my brief description of the 
model? 
The Private Sector Model is represented by the seasonal influenza 
campaign and is a for-profit approach used annually. Vaccine is 
manufactured by the private sector, sold mostly to for-profit providers and 
distributed via the private sector. Its network is limited to the “for pay” 
sector, of which 74 percent includes physician practices. Public health 
distributes less than ten percent of seasonal flu vaccine in this model.  
A consensus of respondents agreed with the definition of the private sector 
model. A few added footnotes as federal policy relates to seasonal flu vaccine 
distribution.  For example, states can elect to expand coverage for children. State policy 
defines the parameters and the state funds vaccine purchase that covers those ages. The 
vaccine is distributed to providers who subscribe to the program.  
• Q4a: What does it (private sector model) accomplish? 
The general consensus of respondents is that the seasonal flu campaign 
prevents the spread of disease by distributing lots of vaccine rather quickly. A few 
respondents offered responses that conflict in terms of the profitability of vaccine 
production and distribution. One respondent stated that vaccine is not a profitable 
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industry and suggested this as one of many underlying reasons that there is no U.S. 
owned vaccine manufacturers. The sole U.S. based pharmaceutical manufacturer located 
in Swiftwater, Pennsylvania, Sanofi Pasteur, is French owed. Another respondent stated 
that it makes money for the private sector but the margins are low. Although Chapter VI 
explores the supply chain in detail, it basically begins at the plant, flows through 
wholesalers, distributors and eventually physician offices as well as retail outlets. 
Physicians report that for physician practices, due to the administrative time, required 
documentation and vaccine cost, it is a break even service provided to their patients. A 
few respondents offered the view that CDC does a pretty good job in promoting flu shots 
and educating the public that it is time to get protected against the season’s top bug 
strains.  
Several respondents also reported that as seasonal flu campaign has grown 
with an increase of vaccine manufacturers entering the U.S. market, non-traditional 
providers have gotten involved, which has expanded the provider network. For example, 
franchise pharmacies were referenced several times and that this sector is one that should 
be expanded further in support of both seasonal and pandemic campaigns. While there 
are regulatory limitations, some of which were worked through during H1N1, others 
remain. In South Carolina, a bill has been introduced that would allow pharmacists to 
provide vaccination without a physician’s prescription. Currently, a pharmacist in a retail 
establishment must have a prescription by a physician to vaccinate. The workaround is 
for a standing order signed by a physician (in some remote area) to permit nurses to 
vaccinate in a retail pharmacy facility. During H1N1, it was learned that health insurance 
does not pay for prescription administration, an injection, while it does pay for vaccine. 
This would have to be addressed state by state to ensure 50-state coverage for 
pharmacists. The South Carolina example describes the work that must be done and its 
collaboration with legislative bodies and state medical associations.  
• Q4b: What does it (Private Sector Model) not accomplish? 
While the private sector model gets lots of vaccine into the provider 
network quickly, it leaves gaps for specific target groups. It was stated that public health  
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fills these gaps by having the ability to conduct vaccination clinics in offsite locations. 
The example of the public school vaccination campaign for the H1N1 response was 
referenced several times.  
A few respondents reported that seasonal influenza is a limited service that 
physicians provide their clients due to the cost of product, administrative time and 
documentation. A state manager stated that due to the short vaccination period, large 
pediatric practices contracted for additional nurse services to assist with vaccination 
services. They cannot handle the volume in such a short period of time but the medical 
home does make arrangements on behalf of their clients. Another respondent described 
the current system as reactionary rather than proactive and advocated for a system that 
better approximated a universal vaccination program. The respondent suggested that a 
proactive system would push vaccine out to the provider network rather than wait for 
orders. Too often, physician orders arrive late in the vaccine ordering period resulting in 
vaccine that does not get into the distribution supply chain once the marketing campaign 
“that it’s time” has begun.   
• Q4bi: Are there important outcomes that must be included in a policy? 
A few respondents stated, “Required vaccinations for critical 
infrastructure sector employees.” This comment was made during the discussion as it 
relates to a pandemic in the context of sectors specifically healthcare workers who took 
an oath have a duty protect patients.  
• Q4bii: Are there criteria in this model that should be re-evaluated? 
Physicians strongly expressed the view that vaccinations for critical 
infrastructure sector employees should be required, especially for healthcare workers. In 
addition, the Vaccination Injury Compensation Program (VICP)7 (HHS, n.d. (c)) should 
be expanded and incorporated into both seasonal and pandemic influenza programs.  A 
few respondents, representing both public and private sectors, remarked that a publicly 
funded universal type program would push vaccine out to the provider network with 
                                                 
7
 October 1, 1988, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-660) created 
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP). VICP is a no-fault alternative to the traditional 
tort system for resolving vaccine injury claims that provides compensation to people found to be injured by 
certain vaccines.  
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greater efficiency without the encumbering administrative workload placed on physician 
practices. One respondent stated that programs of this nature are measurable and would 
expect the results to be greater vaccination rates among the general public.  
In summary, most respondents believed that the private sector model gets 
vaccine out to a growing provider network. The sector reflects innovation as the model 
expands to include non-traditional forms of vaccination both manpower and venues. 
Pharmacy was the non-traditional partner that was mentioned most often.  
Vaccination service gaps were recognized among selected population 
groups (i.e., minorities), and all respondents recognized the role of public health to fill 
those gaps. Several noted the public health program VFC program that targets young 
children to ensure all children have access to the full scope of vaccinations that offer 
protection against childhood diseases.  
Likewise, other limitations were noted. For example, the model is 
reactionary rather than proactive. Orders must be submitted by providers rather than 
vaccine being pushed out proactively in anticipation of a national seasonal flu campaign, 
which happens each year.  
c. Pandemic Influenza and the Public Health Model (PHM) 
This section focuses the discussion on the public health model of vaccine 
distribution. The questions in this section parallel those in the previous section but ask 
SMEs to contrast the public health model (PHM) to their experience with the private 
sector model (PSM) to help shape model evaluation criteria. Questions asked SMEs to 
identify strengths, weaknesses and desired outcomes for a pandemic vaccination 
campaign and not necessarily the H1N1 campaign. Most respondents answered this series 
of questions in the context of their most recent pandemic experience or the H1N1 
response rather than on the basis of state and federal pandemic preparedness plans whose 
guidance describes the public health model.  
• Q5: What is your familiarity with the Public Health Model for mass 
vaccination? Would you add anything to my brief description of the 
model? (See definition below) 
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The Public Health Model is the federal policy and strategy for mass 
vaccination when a public health emergency is declared.  It is documented 
by federal planning guidance that dates to the 1950s and 1960s when mass 
vaccination clinics were used to defeat childhood infectious diseases such 
as polio, smallpox, etc. but updated to address 21st century biological and 
emerging infectious disease threats.   
Most respondents agreed with the definition of the public health model. 
Several respondents provided clarifications such as in the 1950s and 1960s the public 
health workforce was dramatically larger in proportion to the population it had to 
vaccinate. Respondents also noted that the workforce during that period was much more 
efficient, conducting mass vaccination on a routine basis. Several made comments about 
the adequacy of the public health workforce to support the model. A physician stated that 
the federal plan is a “non-executable plan” referring to the model as one without an 
adequate staffing component. Another respondent stated, “We no longer have nurses in 
blue uniforms that can do mass vaccination clinics.” A third respondent noted that public 
health vaccination programs have been subjected to dismantling over the decades, much 
of which has been pushed into the private sector for routine vaccinations. This respondent 
underscored the point several times that public health is no longer the “medical home” for 
vaccinations. The implication is that today’s public health workforce no longer has the 
capacity to vaccinate on the scale it did during an earlier period. In contrast, today’s 
vaccinator corps is much smaller with training or “calibration of technique” required 
before vaccination. This held true for the 2003 smallpox campaign and for the 2009 
H1N1 campaign. 
Two state public health respondents commented that the public health 
model also includes a vaccine distribution management function that adds a significant 
logistics support function. The logistic function stems from the federal purchase of 
pandemic vaccine and than using CDC, state and local DoHs for the distribution function, 
which supplants the wholesaler/distributor function inherent to the private sector model. 
This creates a bottleneck for other providers (hospitals and physicians) that must go 
through public health for vaccine, as well as creating a burdensome workload for the 
public health administrative workforce as demonstrated by the H1N1 campaign. The 
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bottleneck results from a function that is not a routine capability for public health, does 
not have the staff infrastructure, nor supported by data management systems and for 
which there exists little to no training, exercising or methods on this scale.  
• Q5a: What does it (public health model) accomplish? 
A number of accomplishments were referenced by respondents but with 
no clear consensus. A few of these were presented in the context of the recent H1N1 
experience.  
• Gets a lot of vaccine out there in a relatively short period of time.  
• Uses facilities that are familiar and routine, suggesting the public knows 
public locations and serves as a convenience factor. This was referenced 
as an example of why the public school campaign for H1N1 worked so 
well in so many states.  
• It sends a message to the public that this emergency vaccination is 
important. 
• Targets high risk groups through early prioritization.  
• The private medical sector becomes dependent on the public medical 
sector for guidance and education. 
• Keeps patients in their medical home. 
• Tracks vaccine administration and vaccine adverse events.  
A few respondents commented on the speed with which vaccine was 
produced and pushed out to states for mass vaccination—an unprecedented series of 
events that came together in an attempt to mitigate the H1N1 pandemic. The event was 
the first time clinical trials were conducted on an influenza vaccine in an attempt to 
assure vaccine safety. Another respondent commented that much emphasis by the federal 
government is on the vaccine supply side as demonstrated by this event. In contrast, less 
emphasis has been placed on the distribution side of vaccination. Another respondent 
added that federal purchase of vaccine assures manufacturers that they would sell all their 
vaccine during pandemic. In contrast, during seasonal vaccinations manufacturers must 
estimate what the market will bear, charge appropriately and than discard unused vaccine. 
The government pays for vaccine both what is used and what is discarded when it 
purchases it under emergency authorization use.  
• Q5b: What does it (public health model) not accomplish? 
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Several respondents commented on communications that were inadequate 
whether those communications targeted the general public, health care workers or 
providers who served as vaccinators. As a result were required to interface with the 
state/CDC vaccine ordering system.  Many viewed the low percentage vaccination rates 
among healthcare workers as due to inadequate education or lacking confidence in the 
H1H1 production process. Others made the point that federal officials did not make a 
positive case to refute the negatives of vaccine production that grew as vaccine got into 
the marketplace. A few commented on the positive aspects of the strategy; while, in 
contrast, several commented on failed messages that could have averted negative 
messages, which resulted in a mistrust of the H1N1 vaccine.  
For example, one respondent referenced the early vaccine shipments that 
went to financial institutions, specifically Goldman Sachs. What the media did not report 
at the time was that these doses were earmarked for priority groups, pregnant women and 
children. The view was expressed that HHS/CDC officials should have intervened on 
behalf of not only Goldman Sachs, but other critical infrastructure sector partners who 
received vaccine early and had it earmarked for priority groups. Respondents felt a 
constructive message from CDC would reinforce the targeting of vaccine for priority 
groups through a variety of venues to reach those at greatest risk of infectious disease. 
A few respondents commented that H1N1 kept patients in their medical 
home, and this was a tribute to the strategy deployed for this event. Conversely, the 
public health model (historically) did not include a strategy to reinforce medical home 
patient retention.  
Several respondents commented on the inadequate data management 
system used for H1N1 to manage vaccine inventory. State level respondents remarked on 
technology strategies that they deployed early on to manage communications with 
participating providers. Two respondents with extensive private sector experience 
described a data management system as essential to support a vaccination campaign on 
this scale as a Supply Chain Inventory Management System. The comment was made that 
the data management function was fulfilled by using an “Excel spreadsheet,” but this did 
not prohibit job performance. As explained by respondents, states have one system that 
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was used to collect vaccine orders from providers. Some states elected to submit data 
daily while other states submit order data weekly. The data was uploaded to CDC where 
it was transferred to McKesson Corporation8 for fulfillment and distribution to the 
provider network. As explained by a few respondents, the supply side management 
system competed with the distribution system. Supply side was a push system, pushing 
vaccine from manufacturers to McKesson while the state/CDC system was a pull system, 
pulling orders from the provider network. It was pointed out that this type of a system is a 
routine function in the private sector, fulfilling pharmaceutical orders and distributing to 
a vast customer base of providers.  
• Q5c: Are there important outcomes that must be included in a policy? Or, 
are there elements in this model that should be re-evaluated? 
While education was cited by several respondents as a critical factor in a 
vaccination campaign, one respondent stated that a successful campaign is dependent 
upon a public that elects to participate, referencing the H1N1 effort. Another stated that 
pharmacists and their venues are not used as efficiently as they could be due to regulatory 
limitations. Many communities may not have a physician, but they do have a pharmacy 
and their use is too often discounted by other medical disciplines.  
The use of technology was mentioned by several respondents throughout 
each interview, in reference to its application during the H1N1 vaccination campaign. 
Two respondents described how the CDC system competed with the application used to 
manage vaccine from manufacturers to McKesson. A few others mentioned that from 
their perspective, CDC was trying new systems out but it was apparent not all the bugs 
had been worked out. Another respondent stated that this model “needs to be responsive.” 
The respondent defined responsive as a measure or a metric that assesses the movement 
of product quickly into the distribution supply chain. For example, a metric used in the 
H1N1 distribution was orders were filled the day they were received and delivered the 
next day. This measure was assessed daily, weekly and monthly.  
                                                 
8
 CDC contracts with McKesson Specialty Care Solutions, a division of McKesson Corporation for 
distribution of vaccine in support of the Vaccine for Children program. This contracted was expanded to 
support distribution of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic vaccine. 
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Probing respondents about technologies or strategies that may not have 
been effective as they could have been, respondents acknowledged that this (H1N1) was 
a tremendous response capitalizing on many systems that had been put into place over the 
last several years. Yet, a few respondents stated, “It caught us by surprise!” The next 
pandemic was to have come over from Asia. H1N1 came up quickly through Mexico. It 
was mentioned by several respondents that CDC adapted its VFC centralized distribution 
system to distribute H1N1 vaccine to a provider network that had yet to be recruited. This 
placed state and local departments of health in a position to build state and local 
vaccinator provider networks…without computer applications in place. These were 
adapted as well. A few respondents stated that instead of database management systems 
being used to manage data, Microsoft Excel worksheets were used. They stated that 
investment needed to be made in a supply chain inventory management system. A 
follow-up question was raised “why do we not have these now,” and the response was 
that “scientists have been involved rather than personnel experienced in business 
practices.”  
One respondent commented on the nexus that occurred between 
“immunization” and “preparedness” throughout the planning stages for the H1N1 
vaccination campaign among state and federal planners. This researcher found this to be a 
significant insight because it gets at “who is in charge during a public health 
emergency?” among other issues of command and control. H1N1 served as the first 
public health emergency of national significance in which public health served as lead in 
an emergency in which agencies operated within the NIMS environment. This becomes a 
tactical planning issue more so at a state level than federal level but plays out at the local 
operations level.  
• Q6: What has been your involvement (role) with pandemic vaccine 
distribution, tactical or strategic? 
Respondents were evenly divided between responsibilities that were 




identified their roles as strategic while those at state or regional (local) were more likely 
to describe their role as tactical. Private sector and national association respondents 
operated at the strategic level.  
• Q7: What do you see as the desired outcomes for a pandemic campaign? 
Are there outcomes that either of these distribution models is not 
addressing that should be included in a pandemic vaccine distribution 
policy? 
Responses ranged from strategic to tactical, depending on the role and 
experience of the responder. Generally, the desired outcomes of a pandemic vaccination 
campaign were described as population health and stability and critical infrastructure 
protection. Population health, or the prevention of disease, should be accomplished by 
achieving a high vaccination rate. Follow up questions probed what was meant by “high 
percentage rate,” and several respondents identified the range of 60–80 percent as a rate 
that would achieve herd immunity.  
Most respondents, at some point in the interview, commented that a 
pandemic vaccination campaign should be based on familiarity and routine or what is 
normal for the public and for those who would care for them. Physicians were more 
likely to comment on the burdensome of vaccine ordering and administration while 
others directed comments to how the public is served. For example, one respondent 
commented that a desired outcome should be to “lift administrative barriers” to improve 
vaccination response.  Some consensus surrounded the notion that either vaccine 
availability or vaccine distribution should integrate both pandemic and seasonal flu into a 
single system. A pandemic vaccination campaign should layer into a seasonal vaccination 
campaign and minimize the confusion during the 2009 H1N1 campaign when two 
vaccines were seen as competing for the public’s attention.  
Most respondents offered personal stories that reflected a story that could 
have been told by any member of the general public; they were frustrated with their 
inability to get an H1N1 flu shot for a family member or themselves. The irony is that 
due to their work role, they had access to thousands or millions of doses, yet vaccine was 
not in the distribution network, and therefore, inaccessible to family members, target 
group individuals or the general public. Their point was that a distribution system “must 
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get vaccine out there” which respondents contrasted with the private sector model that, 
for the most part, gets it out there. Several respondents voiced the view that vaccine 
distribution should be conducted as efficiently as possible and draw upon the core 
competencies of the public sector and the private sector. Most expressed the view that the 
distribution model should reflect a partnership of sectors building on the core 
competencies of each sector and the model should be proactive rather than reactionary.   
Several respondents suggested that pandemic campaigns must tailor 
distribution strategies to accommodate the lifestyles of today’s public. One respondent’s 
comment captures the consensus view expressed by most respondents:  
The public wants a fast food approach, convenience and accessibility 
which, is why the public school vaccination campaign (H1N1) worked so 
well, a captive audience, with no waiting, and minimal parental 
involvement.   
In summary, H1N1 brought into focus the limitations of the public health 
model to support pandemic response from several perspectives. All respondents noted the 
limitations of staffing to support the public health model, with several noting that the 
model is not executable as currently resourced.  The assumptions on which the model 
was established have changed dramatically but implementation strategies do not reflect 
decades of devolution. A companion issue is the limited use of technology as a strategy 
incorporated into the model. The H1N1 response brought about several implementation 
strategies from national and state to support distribution. Respondents noted that 
technologies had to be adapted or created to support vaccine distribution and contended 
this issue contributes to a non-executable plan. The other observation that surfaced by 
several respondents was the need for a separate distribution structure to manage, 
distribute and administer a vaccine during a public health emergency. Several suggested 
there should be a single system that simply scales for emergency response when 
vaccination is the response strategy, in contrast to one system for seasonal flu and another 
for pandemic. It was noted that VFC represents a third model upon which the H1N1 
vaccination response was constructed.   
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Finally, several respondents noted a federal preoccupation with supply-
side issues and less emphasis on distribution limitations. This was discussed often in the 
context of vaccine allocation, target groups and who gets first choice of limited vaccine 
doses. Then in the end, allocation priorities changed, which resulted in confusion among 
critical infrastructure planning partners and the general public. In the end, the public grew 
weary and moved on.  
d. The Ethics of Emergency Vaccine Distribution 
Vaccine distribution during public health emergencies is intended to 
allocate vaccine fairly and equitable to groups at greatest risk.  Much discussion ensued 
throughout the interview process. This section captures that discussion while by asking 
each SME to assess whether or not these models are achieving the intended results and 
what evaluation criteria should be used to determine if candidate models fit with ethical 
concerns or issues.   
• Q8: What ethical principles do you think are involved in these respective 
models? 
The consensus by most respondents was that the implementation of 
priority groups, targeting those at greatest risk, was the most ethical allocation of limited 
vaccine resources. A few stated the utilitarianism principle of “the greatest good for the 
greatest number” and that allocation of vaccine pits public health versus clinical practice 
in conflict. But these views were based on the H1N1 experience so the premise of the 
question (U.S. vaccine production self-sufficiency) was articulated and respondents asked 
again. Most respondents conveyed the notion that vaccine would not be plentiful 
immediately but would be distributed via batches. Thus, in the early stages of vaccine 
distribution, there may still be a need to allocate based on initial pro-rata allocation 
schemes.  
The topic of the CDC vaccination priority groups was introduced early by 
several respondents. This topic provided the opportunity to explore the ethics of 
balancing vaccination of those at greatest risk in contrast to all who wish to be vaccinated 
in order to achieve herd immunity. When respondents were probed to give a percentage 
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of a population vaccinated to achieve herd immunity (protection of the community), 
several respondents offered a range from 60–80 percent. One respondent did convey the 
view that even vaccinating those at greatest risk achieves herd immunity. He claimed that 
those at greatest risk serve as primary vectors and can infect many others due to the 
proximity of social distance. Public school children sequestered in a classroom for seven 
hours a day illustrates this concept. One respondent statement captured the collective 
discussion: 
To provide the maximum prevention and protection for the public, and 
articulate the reasoning for logistical reasons, distribution priorities and 
target groups.  
As presented earlier, several respondents remarked on the need to educate 
healthcare workers, particularly nurses, with the implication that education would work 
to overcome their reservations about pandemic vaccine and vaccination. A few remarked 
that medical professionals take an oath with an obligation to provide care, knowing the 
risks that they may face in their professional career. This speaks to the ethical principle of 
“duty of care” and, conversely, the responsibility of society to protect those who put 
themselves in harm’s way. This is reflected in the CDCs priority ranking with healthcare 
workers at the top of the list.  
Finally, the broader ethical perspective was expressed by one respondent 
and stated the current medical model of medicine is that the sickest patients get first 
claim on medical resources. Medical system structures support this view such as legal, 
insurance and physician scope of practice. Yet, in a pandemic the view shifts to patients 
with the best chance of recovery get first claim on limited medical resources. The 
challenge becomes how to engage partners in a collaboration process to lay a foundation 
that will support these ethical principles before a public health emergency of national 
significance. The discussion of the ethical principle of “duty of care,” thus far, is centered 
on the individual healthcare worker. But it equally applies to the institutions (i.e., 
professional associations) that support healthcare workers and maintain policies or 
credential practices that prohibit the use of scarce skill sets in a public health emergency. 
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2. Development of Evaluation Criteria 
Survey data were analyzed to determine those themes that emerged from the 
interviews and resulted in the identification of enablers (the how) and criteria (the what).  
Data that represented a particular vaccination outcome was tagged a “what” while data 
representing a “how” was tagged an enabler. An enabler was defined as a process that 
supported a particular outcome or criteria (see Table 4). Enablers were sorted based on 
the interview discussions that related to a major theme. For example, several respondents 
described the “need to educate” selected groups, such as the public or nurses. Those 
discussions or themes were associated with a particular group such as client or provider. 
Another example, “publicly funded vaccine,” was associated with the nation’s ability to 
execute a plan, recruit providers or incentivize clients to participation in vaccination.   
The epidemiologic model of “web of causation” was used to model and depict the 
inter-relationships among the enablers and criteria (see Figure 3). The web of causation 
was introduced in the 1960s to show relationships among causal factors of disease and 
especially the chronic diseases as research sought methodologies to understand cause and 
affect (Duncan, 2007). The web of causation model was used to explain heart disease and 
cancers (such as lung cancer) whose causal factors were not limited to a single cause but 
reflected other influences such as behavior, heredity and social circumstances. The model 
contrasted disease causation from multiple factors versus disease that results from a 
single agent (i.e., H1N1 virus) illustrative of the germ theory of disease. The survey 
revealed that several factors contributed to more fully understanding the dynamics of 
vaccine distribution. Figure 3 summarizes the relationships among enablers and criteria 
and conceptualizes how criteria relate to a model of vaccine distribution. The 
development of the evaluation criteria and the enablers that supported each criterion 






Table 4.   Desirable Criteria for a Pandemic Vaccine Distribution Strategy 
Evaluation Criteria Brief description Evaluation Criteria Enablers
Integrated & routine use of technology
Staffing model: Sized for response




Vaccination is familiar & routine
Vaccination is convenient & accessible
Transparency of vaccine administration and production
Lift and/or minimize administrative barriers
Minimize administrative barriers
Electronic interface with ordering system
Transparency of vaccine production
Publicly funded vaccination campaign
Seasonal influenza: The base plan
Pandemic influenza: Emergency option




A policy implementation strategy 
must reflect federal guidance and 
frame planning continuity from local, 
state to federal levels 
Provider-Centered
A policy implementation strategy 
must maximize provider-centered 
strategies to support and achieve the 
vaccination campaign goal
Integration
A policy implementation strategy 
must build on a seasonal strategy 
and exercise pandemic response
A policy implementation strategy 
must maximize client-centered 
strategies to achieve the vaccination 
campaign goal
Client-Centered
A pandemic plan developed from a 
policy implementation strategy must 




A policy implementation strategy 
must be scalable upward or 





Figure 3.   Criteria & Enablers That Influence Pandemic Vaccine Distribution 
3. Round Two—Validation of Evaluation Criteria 
Round two interviews used a criteria evaluation worksheet (Appendix B) to guide 
the discussion that accompanied the assignment of relative importance for each criteria 
and a rank ordering all six criteria. The worksheet grouped enablers by criterion and 
supplemented with a narrative description.  The worksheet was electronically distributed 
in advance of the interview to allow each respondent to review the collective results from 
round one.  Each respondent was directed to consider each criterion and its enablers and 
then rate its relative importance as high, medium or low. Discussion was encouraged, and 
the researcher asked why the respondents rated as they did. This process was completed 
for all six criteria.  
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The second step was then to rank order all six, from one through six, from most 
important to least important. The rank ordering usually led to further discussion of the 
importance of one criterion over another, and the respondents weighed each criterion in 
make that assessment.  Once the assessment concluded, the respondents were asked if 
there were any criteria that had not been included but all respondents reported that they 
felt the list was rather comprehensive. 
Tables 5 and 6 reflect round two assessment of the evaluation criteria. Table 5 
shows the relative importance of each criterion in terms of the respondent’s view of its 
importance while Table 6 shows the rank order of each criterion. Table 5 lists 
respondent’s rating of each criterion, as high, medium or low. Respondents were asked 
why they rated the criterion as they did, and their comments follow the tables. The 
discussion by respondents revealed many interdependencies among the criteria and the 
enablers that support those criteria. The discussion that follows reflects their comments. 
Table 5.   Evaluation Criteria: Relative Importance 
Scalable Integration Client Executable Provider Guidance
1 High Med High High Med Med
2 High Med High High High High
3 High Med High High High High
4 High Low High High High High
5 High High Med High High Med
6 High High High High High Low
7 High High Med Med Med Med
8 High High Med High Med Med
9 Low High High High High Med
10 High High High Med Med High
11 High Med High Med High Med
Median High High High High High Med
Respondent Evaluation Criteria: Relative Importance
 
Table 5 lists the relative importance assessments by the SMEs from round two 
interviews. The criterion scalable was rated high most often followed by executable and 
client-centered. The median value for each criteria shows five of the six were rated high. 
Only the median value for guidance was a medium. 
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Table 6.   Evaluation Criteria: Rank Order 
Executable Scalable Client Provider Integration Guidance
1 2 1 3 4 5 6
2 1 3 5 4 6 2
3 1 5 4 3 6 2
4 1 3 4 2 5 6
5 1 6 2 3 4 5
6 1 4 3 2 5 6
7 4 2 3 5 1 6
8 1 2 5 4 3 6
9 2.5 6 4 5 1 2.5
10 5 4 2 6 3 1
11 4 3 1 2 5 6
Median 1.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00
Range 1-4 1-6 1-5 2-5 1-6 1-6
Respondent Evaluation Criteria: Rank Order
 
Table 6 lists the rank order scoring of the evaluation criteria by respondent. The 
median score for the evaluation criteria revealed that “executable” (1.00) was viewed as 
the most important criterion followed by “scalable” (3.00) and “client-centered” (3.00). 
These were followed by provider-centered (4.00), “integration” (5.00) and “federal 
planning guidance” with the lowest ranked criterion at 6.00. The discussion that follows 
highlights enablers that resonated with respondents and the views expressed to either 
support or express reservation about a particular enabler. 
C. DISCUSSION OF EVALUATION CRITERIA  
Respondents were generally unanimous that executable was a key criterion for 
policy development but often would draw relationships between it and scalable. Two 
criteria, integration and guidance, showed the most variance in respect to both relative 
importance (Table 5) and variation in the ranking scores for each. The criteria are 
discussed in their rank order as displayed in Table 6. 
1. Executable  
Most respondents viewed this criterion and its enablers as critical to the success of 
a pandemic policy. One respondent shared the anecdote that his wife went to a local 
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department of health only to learn that it was not a vaccination clinic day; no staff were 
there to give shots and she would have to come back. To this respondent, vaccinators 
sufficient to staff multiple venues were seen as significant to support a vaccination 
policy. While respondents supported a staffing model sufficient to meet the goal, its 
interdependency with scalable was noted due to the staffing component. Discussions 
were introduced covering the use non-traditional providers and venues to support 
executable; those discussions continue in the scalable section.  
Public funding was seen as critical for activation of an emergency plan and 
mobilization of the nation for mass vaccination. The act of a publicly funded emergency 
vaccination campaign sends the message that this is important and readies the population 
for vaccination. A contrasting message, stated by several respondents, was that while the 
public gets the message, the bureaucrats, who are responsible for administration of those 
funds at both federal and state levels of government, did not get the same message. Much 
frustration was expressed concerning the hiring of personnel for critical positions, which 
took too long, procurement of supplies, the processing of memorandum of agreements 
and the simple mobilization of logistical support for which public health was neither 
staffed, trained nor equipped to direct. One respondent noted that an objective was set to 
fill a critical H1N1 coordinator by September 1, 2009; however, it was well into 
November before the individual came on board. Another respondent stated, “It took too 
long to hire people,” and “we added more bureaucrats than we added vaccinators.” 
Public dollars also fund ancillary supplies, such as syringes, alcohol swabs, cotton 
balls and medical waste buckets, which were described from both a strategic (national) 
and tactical (state) perspective as “huge.” Even though both state and federal respondents 
stated that they encountered bureaucratic hurdles, their view was that the ancillary 
supplies to support a campaign were keys to recruiting and expanding the provider 
network. One respondent shared a contrasting view that the time it takes to work through 
bureaucratic hurdles, “we lose capacity.” For example, when the funding request was 
submitted to the Office of Budget Management, it was initially rejected. In the interim, 
Canada went into the market place and bought six million syringes. Canada, with a 
population of 30 million, purchased one-fifth of its requirements. The U.S. government 
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(USG) competes in a world economy for resources that become scarce quickly, and in a 
national emergency, bureaucratic dithering does not support emergency response.   
Federal planning guidance issued to the states described key planning issues for 
planners and states that vaccine would be purchased by the USG: “Pre-pandemic and 
pandemic vaccines was purchased by the federal government and distributed to project 
areas, who was to determine allocation of vaccine within their jurisdictions” (CDC, 2006, 
p. 6). 
Less certainty surrounded the purchase of ancillary supplies in early guidance 
(CDC, 2006, p. 11), but as revealed in the survey, the USG did purchase these supplies 
and distributed through its contract with McKesson.  
2. Scalable   
The three enablers that support the scalable criteria were viewed as key to a 
successful pandemic policy and represented interdependencies with other criteria. One 
respondent noted that these two criteria (executable and scalable) represent both sides of 
the same coin.  
A few respondents were most troubled by the “scaled vaccine production” 
enabler, viewing it as most likely unachievable due to two key factors. Otherwise, they 
rated the other two enablers that support scalable as high. The two factors pointed out 
were: 
1. The fact that response is driven by the epidemiology of the infectious 
disease. 
2. Due to long production cycle required for vaccine production and factors 
uncontrollable, this is not doable.  
The basis of the first factor, vaccine insufficiency, drives who gets vaccine first. 
H1N1 revealed how pandemic plans for vaccine distribution can be changed weeks 
before vaccine is set to arrive at provider’s front doors. One responder noted that “change 
of target groups” caused consternation when the Tier Group Targets were changed from 
critical infrastructure private sector partners (i.e., financial) to pregnant women and 
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children. It caused confusion among federal agencies responsible for communicating this 
information to private sector CI/KR partners. This illustrates how the epidemiology of a 
disease, given scarce sources of vaccine, can rather quickly change who gets vaccine 
first. The planning guidance did alert planners to account for a shift in target group 
priorities (CDC, 2006).  
The context for factor two was the H1N1 pandemic vaccine whose production 
cycle was impressive given the timeframe to produce a vaccine. But this experience is 
shaping actions and corrective actions for the next pandemic, so it must not be discounted 
and, therefore, it enters into the discussion. The severity of H1N1 in Mexico was 
extremely high initially, in addition to the attack rate.  The case fatality rate exceeded 65 
percent.9 A U.S. National Center Medical Intelligence (NCMI) disease intelligence 
estimate stated: 
NCMI assesses with medium confidence 2009-H1N1 influenza illness 
rates two to five times higher than those caused by typical seasonal 
influenza are possible in areas where vaccination and other 
countermeasures are not applied (United States National Center Medical 
Intelligence. [NCMI], 2009, p. 2) 
The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) (The 
White House [TWH], 2009) laid out the strategic implications for the While House with 
H1N1 that supported the decision to protect the nation against the H1N1 threat. These 
documents, among others, supported the decision to produce vaccine to protect most of 
the nation’s population on the basis of the known epidemiology of the disease. Once 
production was set into motion, scaled vaccine production was not possible given the 
methodology used to produce vaccine or chicken and egg vaccine methodology.  The 
timeline, production phases and investment required for vaccine production was the basis 
for which respondents were troubled by the concept of vaccine production scalability.  
One respondent described the lengthy production cycle, which requires the 
purchase of embryonated eggs and the harvesting of eggs and vaccine. This is followed 
                                                 
9
 Case Fatality rate (CFR) is calculated by dividing the number of deaths by all who contract the 
disease, confirmed by laboratory tests.  
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by readying it for bulk shipment before finishing. The testing and approval by FDA 
follows, and the lab-testing is conducted by both the manufacturer and FDA. Finally, 
each lot is approved by FDA.10 A manufacturer would not take on this task unless a 
contract was in place or the product can be sold and a return on investment can be made. 
Operations must be scaled up, resources committed, and a lead time of six months does 
not permit scaled vaccine production. 
These were the issues raised by respondents, but this was in the context of today’s 
conventional methodology for producing vaccine and demonstrates the rationale that 
supports the U.S. government’s decision to invest in cell-based vaccine production, 
which eliminates the need for eggs. The respondents with apprehensive views about 
scaled vaccine production were reminded that the premise for this set of criteria was that 
the U.S. was near vaccine production self-sufficiency and producing cell-based vaccine.  
A refocus on a future with cell-based technology modified their views in support of 
scaled vaccine production. One respondent stated, “Yeah, much easier.” Cell-based 
technology eliminates egg requirements and shortens the process time. Once the 
discussion was framed in the context of cell-based methodology, then apprehensive 
respondents recalibrated the relative importance of scalable to high.  
Several respondents drew relationships between scalable, executable and 
provider-centered, with sufficient staffing as the thread to tie the three criteria together.  
A few respondents noted that “scalable makes the plan more executable.” Reference was 
made to the use of non-traditional providers to provide the necessary scalability. Barriers 
were noted with use of non-traditional providers, indicating the resistance of other health 
professional associations that have lobbied against the use of non-traditional providers to 
vaccinate. One respondent noted these are the “force multipliers we should be using.” To 
address the use of non-traditional providers across the nation and state by state would 
require the effort that it took states to upgrade their public health emergency laws 
                                                 
10
 Lot sizes differ dependent on the container size used by a manufacturer. For example, one 
manufacturer uses a bulk container that can hold a lot size of 660,000 doses of vaccine. When vaccine is 
shipped initially by a manufacturer, it is shipped in bulk. Finishing plants ready vaccine for vaccine 
administration such as multi-dose vials (10–15 doses), pre-filled syringes or nasal spray formulations 
(anonymous survey interview, May 19, 2010).   
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following 9/11.  States that have updated their emergency health power laws have 
conditions that permit use of other disciplines to vaccinate but require a state declaration 
of public health emergency. For example, in South Carolina, there was no such 
declaration and therefore activation of other health professionals to vaccinate did not 
occur. One public health association did publish and disseminate to state and local DoHs 
a framework for partnering with pharmacies just before the H1N1 vaccination campaign 
began; this serves as one example of the suggested guidance (ASTHO, 2009). 
A scalable staffing model is significant. The consensus of respondents felt 
strongly, including physicians that pandemic plans must finds ways to get vaccine out 
and into arms if indeed this is the objective. Efforts to establish a staffing model must 
include provider incentives and the recruitment of non-traditional providers and non-
traditional venues. It was clear this group acknowledges, that public health no longer has 
a workforce to conduct mass vaccination campaigns, nor will future planning models that 
depend on a public workforce offer this capacity. These must be abandoned in favor of 
models that will expand the provider network beyond public health. Several respondents 
described the legal, regulatory and credentialing barriers that had to be addressed during 
the H1N1 response to recruit non-traditional vaccinators. Yet, it remained insufficient. 
One respondent stated that these barriers were encountered when the nation deployed its 
smallpox vaccination campaign in 2003. Professional institutions continue to resist the 
use of non-traditional disciplines for vaccination purposes.  
When respondents stated that much effort has been expended on the supply side 
but not the distribution side, they referred to the lack of attention directed to the 
manpower required to staff and support mass vaccination campaigns. This discussion is 
descriptive of the project scope required to address scalable staffing and the 
modifications to the credentialing process to permit those with the skill set to serve as 
vaccinators during a public health emergency. This illustrates the relationship between 
scalable to the enabler “robust vaccinator corps” and a plan that is executable. It also 
conveys the high ranking for provider-centered and its complimentary role to support 
scalable and executable criteria.  
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3. Client-Centered  
Most respondents expressed the view that if the public was not on board, then a 
campaign would be unsuccessful, referencing the 2009 H1N1 vaccination campaign. 
While this criterion ranked third overall, most respondents rated it high. One respondent 
saw this criterion linked with the integration criterion, explaining that if clients are not 
sufficiently motivated to participate, then integration would not being successful. Another 
referenced public health messaging and stated that public health is viewed as the 
authority and primary information source by the public in these matters. Similar 
statements were made by several respondents in the round one interview that both CDC 
and states do this well whether it was the H1N1 pandemic or the seasonal flu campaign. 
However, a couple respondents believed that some states and CDC failed to address 
emerging issues, causing confusing. This was compounded by states not sufficiently 
proactive with messaging and, as a result, the public’s distrust of public health grew.  
A few respondents noted that there would always be a need for some minimum 
level of documentation, and therefore make it unlikely that administrative barriers would 
be totally lifted. The rationale is that with the federal purchase of vaccine, accountability 
was required to demonstrate to the general public that indeed priority groups were served 
first. It equally serves the purpose of measuring herd immunity for any given target 
group.  
Several respondents commented on the transparency or lack thereof of vaccine 
production as practiced during the H1N1 incident and suggested it be expanded to 
include vaccine administration as it relates to the communication of priority groups, who 
gets vaccine and when. There was confusion at national, state and local levels. No 
jurisdiction seemed to be immune from the lack of transparency regarding priority group 
allocation. The confusion stemmed from the inconsistent application of the allocation and 
target guidelines across state borders and county lines. One respondent described how 
one public health department was saving its vaccine for a public school vaccination 
campaign but was not offering it to pregnant women. Pregnant women who wanted to be 
vaccinated were advised to visit a neighboring county, several hours away. Eventually, 
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the public grew weary and gave up on its attempts to get vaccinated. One respondent saw 
transparency as one side of a two-sided coin with the flip side representing publicity. The 
implication is that while “media relations” is revealing production issues and allocation 
schemes, it must also conduct those messages in sufficient volume and timeliness to be 
effective.  
Another respondent, who shared this view, suggested that a set of standardized 
triggers be developed and instituted so that once some threshold of vaccination was 
achieved for a particular target group then the jurisdiction could move on and offer 
vaccine to the next tiered target population. Several respondents described CDC vaccine 
allocation and target guidelines as administrative barriers to vaccination. In an effort to 
achieve the ethical principle of fairness, USG established a complex system of vaccine 
allocation but which raises the question, “The system is intended to achieve fairness, but 
is it achieving herd immunity?” However, the current allocation system is based on the 
scarcity of the vaccine. Until the nation achieves some level of production self-
sufficiency, it is unlikely to disappear. 
4. Provider-Centered  
Generally, respondents expressed the view that if physicians were not on board, 
then “execution won’t happen.” It was pointed out by non-physicians that physicians 
have a significant influence on the decision clients make and it is critical that they 
understand and support the rationale for mass vaccination.  Support should be 
demonstrated as well, by getting a shot.  A medical practice where nurses reserve 
judgment on vaccine safety, efficacy and contraindications undermines a client’s 
willingness and desire to seek vaccination. Clients use these views, reservations and 
behaviors as the calculus in their decision-making of whether to seek vaccination. But not 
all physician specialties are involved in vaccination activities, and the question arises 
what incentives can be offered to enlist their support as a vaccination venue under 
emergency conditions. The appeal may be no more than a message that reinforces the 
practice of “patient-centered medical home.” Another strategy may be to enlist physician 
 60
specialty associations (i.e., ACOG)11 that serve a defined priority group (pregnant 
women) to support emergency vaccination. For example, through a targeted association 
campaign its members could be encouraged through duty to client and country, serve as a 
core group of vaccinators during only emergency vaccination campaigns.  
Physician practices do provide the bulk of seasonal flu vaccinations and serve as 
the cornerstone of a vaccination campaign.  One physician respondent sought to divide 
the ranking between provider-center and client-centered, viewing both criteria as equally 
important. After some deliberation, the respondent ranked provider-centered higher and 
stated, “If I get it, they get it!” This perspective is seen in the average ranking with 
provider-centered ranked slightly higher than client-centered. Other respondents shared 
the view that client participation was more critical than that of providers, and campaigns 
should be biased in favor of the public.  
Often during discussions, respondents would refer to a particular enabler grouped 
under one criterion as critical to another criterion. The example of public funding, 
previously described in the discussion of executable, was also a significant rationale for 
the high ranking of the provider-centered criterion.  Another respondent, commenting on 
the Narrative Description (Appendix B) listed under the “executable” criterion (H1N1 
ordering was cumbersome for physician practices-not the normal system), cited the 
results of a Zoomerang survey to show physicians’ favorable response South Carolina’s 
initiative to address physician communication using electronic methods. Over 90 percent 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that the “Vaccine Management System 
VMS) is an effective and efficient tool to use” (South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control, [DHEC], 2010). 
5. Integration  
The integration criterion ranked fifth but rated high by most respondents. One 
respondent viewed this criterion as a strategic companion to executable and federal 
planning guidance and saw integration of vaccination strategies as key to execution. 
                                                 
11
 American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) is the professional association for 
OB/GYNs.  
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Several viewed it in the context of supporting the client-centered criterion. The 
respondent who rated the relative importance of this criterion low added that seasonal flu 
vaccine is a commodity, and it should be marketed as such and permit people to buy it. 
Another respondent commented that the enablers described to support this criterion did 
not come as a surprise and viewed them as significant factors. She explained that we 
“must pattern behavior on what we expect normally, rather than learn a new behavior.” 
Her view was that the pandemic vaccination for the public should be familiar and that 
public health “must do it (respond) like first responders where they train as they 
respond.” This perspective was supported by respondents during the round two 
interviews when the discussion described the role of a client’s medical home. 
Respondents viewed this as a very important factor that must factor into mass vaccination 
campaign planning.  In contrast, a few respondents stated in round one that public health 
is no longer viewed as the medical home for vaccination. The emerging strategy in public 
health is to implement tactics that encourage clients to seek health care services from 
their medical home. Yet in contrast, respondents stated that the physician specialty of 
obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) is moving away from delivering vaccination 
services, and it was a tough sell to engage them in H1N1 vaccination. An OB/GYN 
practice is more likely unfamiliar with cold-chain management and may not have the 
dedicated refrigeration capacity required to properly store vaccine, in contrast to a 
pediatrics practice.  
6. Federal Planning Guidance  
The average rank order score for the guidance criterion ranked it sixth overall, yet 
its relative importance scored about half mostly high rating.  A few respondents 
interpreted guidance to mean the recommendations that flow from the CDC Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). Others saw federal guidance as the 
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: Implementation Plan, published in May 2006 
by the Bush Administration’s Homeland Security Council (HSC, 2006). And another 
respondent stated that rather than a federal plan, referring to the National Strategy, that 
the U.S. needs a national plan that represents the views of all partners, including state and 
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local stakeholders as well as critical infrastructure private sector partners. The rationale 
referenced here is that under the system currently deployed, and when inviting private 
sector partners to participate, private sector partners are asked to adapt to 64 different 
state and jurisdictional plans. A national plan would provide guidance so that state plans 
are relatively consistent across the board. The respondent viewed this criterion along with 
scalable and executable as legs of a three legged stool that supports pandemic response. 
One respondent rated guidance high and ranked it first among all criteria. When 
probed why, the respondent revealed that “guidance sets priority and strategic direction 
for the states” and that “you can’t have 60 ways to do things.”12 The worksheet listed 
guidance last, yet this respondent initially identified another criterion as first but when the 
discussion came to guidance, the respondent recalibrated the ranking leaving guidance 
first. The theme of 50 state plans for regional and national private sector partners was a 
comment that emerged in several discussions among the various criteria. This 
respondent’s comment was the first that associated with planning guidance. When 
probed, the underlying perspective was stated as “Who is the driver here?” (referring to 
either the federal government or state governments and the H1N1 incident). The 
respondent added, after some discussion, that many different plans retard implementation 
and cause loss of efficiency. An example cited was that once the system for ordering was 
established there was a lack of immediacy among states to place vaccine orders. 
D. DEFINING EVALUATION CRITERIA 
The criteria validated for evaluating each vaccine distribution model were: 
executable, scalable, federal planning guidance, client-centered, provider-centered and 
integration. Chapters V and VI used these evaluation criteria to evaluate two models for 
vaccine distribution, the public health model and the private sector model. This 
established the basis to identify the strengths and weaknesses of these models and form 
the foundation for a third model of implementation, a public private partnership for 
pandemic vaccine distribution (PPP4PVD). Figure 3 illustrated the relationship of 
                                                 
12
 The respondent was referring to the number of CDC Project areas, which number 64 states, 
territories and cities.  
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enablers to each criterion and how the survey identified these as desirable to support a 
strategic policy for pandemic vaccine distribution.  In this section the criteria, which were 
identified, shaped and validated by the survey, are defined. Also identified was the rating 
scale used in Chapters V and VI for the model evaluations. The scale used to assess each 
criterion (stated as a performance measurement) was whether it was present (high), 
absent (low) or potential for improvement (medium).  
It is understood that these criteria represent only a few that could be considered 
for inclusion is a model policy. But they represent those identified by respondents that 
should be incorporated in a policy implementation strategy for a vaccine distribution 
campaign.  
1. Federal Planning Guidance  
Federal guidance for vaccination may originate from policy but may also 
originate from advisory groups, as was learned in the survey and presented in Chapter III. 
The advisory groups affiliated with national immunization programs provide guidance on 
the basis of policy and equally best practices. Federal policy, as it relates to pandemic 
influenza vaccine, addresses vaccine supply and targets vaccine production self-
sufficiency (CBO, 2008). There is no established policy that relates to the distribution 
mechanism for pandemic vaccine, but there is extensive guidance that targets who gets 
vaccine and in what order. There also exists a federal policy that relates to children as 
defined by the Vaccine for Children Program, and it was identified by several 
respondents in the survey. VFC is a comprehensive childhood immunization program to 
ensure all children are immunized against a number of infectious diseases and includes 
seasonal influenza. Some states elect to expand this basic federal program beyond the 
minimum federal requirements of age and vaccine type.   
As an evaluation criterion, federal planning guidance represents a multitude of 
goals, strategies, tactics, tasks and job descriptions to direct, assist and aid state and local 
jurisdictions with preparedness actions.  Planning doctrine documents the roles and 
responsibilities of partners. It outlines the administrative and logistical support crucial to 
support essential duties. It also specifies command and control and how it changes as 
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incidents expand and contract. The survey revealed limitations with current planning 
guidance as it relates to vaccine distribution in the context of an H1N1 response. This 
included lack of published guidance for the “blended” model, and respondents believed 
that the pandemic model should be integrated with seasonal flu campaign.  
Another suggestion is to place planning guidance in the context of the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) and an incident command system (ICS). Vaccine 
administration falls into the operations section while distribution issues fall within the 
purview of the logistics section. Guidance should be sufficient to support ICS functions 
and could be expanded to detail the planning section as well as the finance section.  
2. Executable  
Three enablers’ support an executable plan and include funding, a staffing model 
sufficient to support the goal and the use of new technology that is used routinely.  An 
executable plan becomes one in which these enablers are identified and adequately 
resourced to meet the plan’s objective.  In the evaluation of the two models, each was 
evaluated on the basis that it exhibits characteristics consistent with the enablers assigned 
to the executable criterion. The collective assessment of enablers that support executable 
was evaluated as high (present), low (absent) or medium (has the potential for 
improvement). 
3. Scalable  
This criterion is supported by three enablers defined to provide flexibility in 
response depending on pandemic severity.  They include scaled vaccine production, a 
robust vaccinator corps and multiple venues. The purpose is to clarify capacity of the 
model to expand, contract and accommodate pandemic severity requirements13 for 
emergency response.  In a less severe pandemic, the number of providers responding 
would not be the same as that required in the most severe pandemic. What are the triggers 
                                                 
13
 The Pandemic Severity Index (PSI) was established by CDC and links appropriate actions for 
communities to take based on grade of severity. It ties to the category scheme used for hurricane and 
resembles the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale classification scheme. 
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for activating additional vaccinators, and what are the sources? This enabler looked at not 
only traditional vaccinators, nurses and doctors but the potential to recruit non-traditional 
vaccinators such as dentists and vetenarians to expand the vaccinator corps. But for any 
public health emergency where vaccine is the recommended countermeasure, the process 
and the model should provide synergist capabilities.  
Scalable describes venue and provider diversity, traditional providers and non-
traditional providers.  It includes a dispersion of venues, considering factors such as 
geographic, demographic, retail and healthcare settings essential to provide vaccination. 
It targets not only healthy, mobile population groups but uninsured, underinsured, 
residential care population groups as well.  It delineates the provider network required to 
reach a diverse population and achieve some measure of herd immunity, given a 
pandemic’s severity.  
Finally, there is the challenge of scaled vaccine production that can only be 
considered when the nation achieves some level of vaccine production self-sufficiency. 
Self-sufficiency will progress as new production technologies, such as cell-based vaccine 
production increase vaccine production capacity. In the evaluation of the two models, 
each was evaluated on the basis that it exhibited characteristics consistent with the 
enablers assigned to the scalable criterion. The collective assessment of enablers that 
support scalable was evaluated as high (present), low (absent) or medium (has the 
potential for improvement). 
4. Integrated System  
An integrated system is a vaccine distribution infrastructure that works for both 
seasonal influenza and pandemic influenza. It is a strategy that would be used each 
influenza season but equally is intended for use in a public health emergency that requires 
a mass vaccination strategy. Each flu season becomes an exercise for an infectious 
disease outbreak or pandemic when a mass vaccination is the response strategy.  
This strategy is documented by planning guidance that describes the integration 
principal and the mechanism that makes this option viable for either season or pandemic. 
For example, contracts are made with pharmacy franchise chains for seasonal flu 
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campaigns, but those contractual relationships are exercised for pandemic response. The 
H1N1 pandemic defined the limitations of insurance and licensure that presented barriers 
for using pharmacists as vaccinators; some of which were worked out during the course 
of the campaign. Integration would assist identification of barriers for either scenario.  In 
the evaluation of the two models, each was evaluated on the ability of the model to 
support a policy of integration. The model was evaluated as high (present), low (absent) 
or medium (has the potential for improvement). 
5. Client-Centered  
Consensus among respondents underscored the significance of enablers that 
support a client-centered strategy for pandemic vaccine distribution. This strategy is not 
unlike social marketing strategies designed to affect behavior of customers when a 
customer centered strategy is the objective. This thesis views the individual who seeks 
vaccination as one who is healthy, proactive and seeking a risk reducing behavior in an 
effort to avoid illness. The individual is therefore seeking a service that consists of a 
specific product, administered by a credentialed health professional. In contrast, the 
medical model refers to the individual who seeks medical services as the patient, with the 
underlying premise that one who is sick, exhibit symptoms sufficient to determine a 
diagnosis that can be treated. Likewise, a consumption driven economy views a customer 
as one who seeks a product to meet some need. It is in this context that this criterion is 
labeled as “client-centered” versus patient- or customer-centered.   
Client-centered describes a set of strategies used by planners to reach prospective 
clients who seek vaccination services. Strategies should minimize barriers that prohibit or 
discourage vaccination-seeking behavior and administer the service where those 
prospective clients conduct normal and routine day-to-day activity. One example, cited 
frequently by respondents, is that of the medical home. This is a strategy that has taken 
hold over the past decade to ensure that every child has a medical home, a health and 
medical professional practice where the child can receive the full range of wellness 
services including immunization.  
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The survey identified four key enablers that would facilitate vaccination seeking 
behavior by adults during an emergency in which the response is vaccination. Much 
discussion focused on behavior that was familiar to clients rather than new venues that 
are not likely part of their routine. Those enablers are: vaccination venues that are routine 
and familiar; that are convenient and accessible; transparency about the process of 
vaccine production and vaccine administration; and lifting administrative barriers. In the 
evaluation of the two models, each was evaluated on the basis that it exhibited 
characteristics consistent with the enablers assigned to the client-centered criterion. The 
collective assessment of enablers that support client-centered was evaluated as high 
(present), low (absent) or medium (has the potential for improvement). 
6. Provider-Centered 
Many family and pediatric physician specialties have adopted the concept of the 
patient-centered medical home, thus institutionalizing this practice.  The relationship 
between provider-centered and client-centered strategy is supported in the literature as a 
wellness strategy incorporated into medical practices. Provider-centered enablers, 
described by respondents in the survey, aim at the government’s relationship with 
providers who agree to serve in the vaccination network during an emergency. Thus there 
a continuity of practice between the government, provider and client to maximize support 
for vaccinations, whether it is seasonal or pandemic. But as discussed by respondents, 
this practice does not carry across all physician practices nor does it reach all adult 
population groups. Rather, family and pediatric practices reach those medical home 
adopters but other physician specialties, such as OB/GYN have yet to fully embrace 
vaccination practices.  
Most likely, the healthy adult population, which consumes limited medical 
services but spends much of its time in a work setting, are less likely to be in contact with 
a medical provider. Because of this, alternative strategies must be established to reach 
this segment of the population in an emergency vaccination campaign. For example, 
recruiting Urgent Care Centers (UCC), that provide acute care and injury care services 
into the network, could serve as one strategy to reach this population group.  It might be 
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important to learn what population sector uses UCCs. Another would be distribution 
through the work setting, but then this requires a strategy that is deployed annually rather 
than a strategy that waits for the next emergency vaccination campaign. The 
interdependency of this criterion, provider-centered methods with that of integration 
methods illustrates the rationale for a strategy of distribution based on a single 
vaccination distribution network for both seasonal and pandemic campaigns.  
Thus, provider-centered enablers as discussed in this chapter, represent a set of 
strategies that emphasize those processes that facilitate participation of providers, expand 
the network and maximize penetration and reach into the various population targets. The 
enablers identified in the survey, transparency of vaccine production and administration; 
publicly funded vaccine; minimizing administrative barriers and electronic interfaces to 
facilitate communication, represent a few of those enablers to make this strategy a 
provider-centered approach. This is not to say there are not others that would facilitate a 
provider-centered approach. It simply says that in the context of this discussion, where 
the focus was pandemic vaccine distribution, specifically with the recent experience of 
H1N1, these four enablers are those that surfaced most often and for which there was a 
consensus of perspective. In the discussion of two models, each was assessed on the basis 
that they exhibit characteristics consistent with the enablers assigned to the provider-
centered criterion. The collective assessment of enablers that support provider-centered 
was evaluated as high (present), low (absent) or medium (has the potential for 
improvement). 
In summary, results of data analysis were displayed in Figure 3. The schematic 
represents enablers and criteria that will be used for the assessment of each model in 
Chapters V and VI. Table 7 will be used in Chapter V, VI and VII to summarize model 
evaluation results from the two existing distribution models and contrast a new model.  
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V. THE PUBLIC HEALTH MODEL: THE CURRENT POLICY 
AND PANDEMIC IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY? 
A. OVERVIEW 
The literature reflects a federal dependence on the public health model for mass 
vaccination with an underlying assumption that the public health workforce will be 
sufficient to staff mass prophylaxis operations.  This guidance calls for the traditional 
public health model for mass vaccination clinics, which was introduced in the United 
States in the 1950s and 1960s.  This guidance is found in numerous mass prophylaxis 
planning guidance documents, including smallpox, pandemic, strategic national stockpile 
and mass casualty guidance documents.  
Missing in the literature is discussions of alternative distribution models or 
supplemental distribution methods in the event that mass prophylaxis is not feasible, 
and/or the event is large and requires additional resources. The literature suggests the use 
of dentists and veterinarians, but little planning guidance can be found that calls for a 
partnering with the public sector in a public health emergency or for an administrative 
mechanism to secure these partnerships.  This absence in the literature is significant 
because it reveals a void in the planning guidance of alternative models that is available 
to state and local public health jurisdictions. The public health model is limited to 3,036 
local and tribal departments of health in 50 states, and it has been confronted with a 
shrinking infrastructure over several decades (HHS, 2007, p. 11).   
Contemporary pandemic planning for the United States began with the 
publication of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (Homeland Security Council 
[HSC], 2005). It was soon followed by the Implementation Plan (HSC, 2006) for the 
National Strategy published in 2006. Since then, numerous plans and guidance have been 
published by the USG, including a pandemic preparedness plan for each critical 




and published to assist states and local jurisdictions with state and local pandemic plans 
based on the national strategy. Guidance also assists states with evaluation of those plans 
with the intention to improve their operational aspects. 
B. THE PUBLIC HEALTH MODEL  
The public health model (PHM) depicted in Figure 4 is the current documented 
strategy for mass vaccination when a public health emergency is declared.  It is 
documented historically through federal planning guidance and implies federal policy for 
mass vaccination when there is a public health emergency. This guidance dates to the 
1950s and 1960s when mass vaccination clinics were used to defeat childhood infectious 
diseases such as polio, smallpox, etc.  In the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
guidance was revised, updated and then pushed to state and local jurisdictions. This 
model is described in numerous mass prophylaxis planning documents.   
 
Figure 4.   Public Health Model 
Figure 4 depicts the public health model. The federal government is the purchaser 
and distributor of pandemic vaccine. It has the sole responsibility for procurement and 
distribution to the states. This model depends on state, local and tribal departments for 
distribution. This adds a logistics function for these entities no longer in place for day-to-
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day functions in most states. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic distribution plans were modified 
dramatically from this model and impacted routine functions (Association for State and 
Territorial Health Officers, 2010).  
Vaccine shortages, both seasonal influenza and pandemic, have demonstrated this 
approach is encumbered by numerous operational limitations such as a shrinking public 
health infrastructure, greater demand for vaccination and the ambitious goal for 
vaccination of a jurisdiction’s population set by the CDC. While public policy is set to 
expand production capacity (CBO, 2008) public policy does not exist to improve 
distribution.  
The advantage of this option is that public health has trained for, exercised for and 
implemented mass vaccination campaigns on a limited basis. However, this baseline of 
experience does not rise to the level of proficiency with which public health professionals 
conducted routine mass vaccination campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s. The model’s 
planning doctrine has evolved over 50 years and is well established at federal, state and 
local levels. For example, job descriptions for all defined roles have been written, 
published and widely disseminated. In addition, these duties are even tailored for specific 
biological threats such as small pox, and pandemics. 
However, the model is limited to 3,036 local and tribal departments of health 
across the United States and is confronted with an infrastructure that has been shrinking 
over several decades (HHS, 2007). In contrast and according to the HHS Public Health 
Critical Infrastructure, the public health sector consists of over 370,000 providers capable 
of vaccination (HHS, 2007. p. 11).  
C. FEDERAL PLANNING GUIDANCE 
The survey in Chapter IV revealed that the public health model, as defined in 
federal planning guidance, is not “executable” due to the inadequate staffing resource 
upon which it is based.  Federal guidance fills many roles, but this thesis explores 
guidance as it relates to pandemic vaccination distribution before the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic. Published federal guidance has targeted the threat of H5N1 or avian influenza. 
The guidance reviewed stems from strategic documents, national planning documents 
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and even the 10 national planning scenarios of which a pandemic is ranked third of 10.14 
All of the guidance emphasizes attention to priority groups, and one guide is dedicated 
solely to allocation and targeting of pandemic vaccine for priority groups.  Other 
guidance addresses various aspects of vaccination planning. Key phrases that were 
searched for in the guidance were “distribution planning” and/or “vaccine distribution.” 
Typically, a reference to allocation suggests that vaccine is incorporated into guidance as 
“distribution” but refers to a vaccine inoculation strategy based on ethical principles 
when vaccine is a limited or scarce resource.   
There exists numerous pandemic vaccination guidance documents published by, 
not only the USG, but other entities as well. This section will discuss a few key federal 
guidance publications that have served as the basis for state and local pandemic 
vaccination planning.  A definitive document for pandemic vaccine allocation is the 
Guidance on Allocating and Targeting Pandemic Influenza Vaccine (HHS, n.d. (a)).15 
Essentially, this document outlines who gets vaccine and in what order. The document 
provides the clearest guidance for pandemic vaccination based on categories (e.g., 
homeland security), tiers and target groups (e.g., pregnant women). The premise of this 
allocation strategy is that vaccination will not be sufficient, and therefore initial key 
target groups are those at-risk and those who will serve others. The document is not 
intended to address how a vaccine is distributed, where it is distributed or by whom.  
Another set of documents assesses the influence of planning guidance on state 
plans by using a methodology of survey analysis to review those plans. The intended 
product from the analysis is to provide additional guidance in an effort to improve plans. 
These instruments are used to gauge how well federal plans have come to convey 
strategic goals, objectives and strategies. For example, the Congressional Research 
Service surveyed the pandemic plans of 50 states (51 plans) and reported its results in 
2007 (CRS, 2007). The analysis was conducted 10 years after avian influenza was 
                                                 
14
 The number three National Planning Scenario is for a “Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic 
Influenza” with an estimated attack rate of 15 percent causing 87,000 fatalities and 300,000 hospitalizations 
(Homeland Security Council, 2004). 
15
 The Center for Biosecurity at UPMC press release dated July 28, 2008 announced the final version 
was released by DHHS July 23, 2008 but document is undated (Center for Biosecurity, 2008).  
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confirmed in Asia and two years after pandemic preparedness funds began flowing to the 
64 project areas.16 Of the eight topical categories one is “Vaccine Management,” which 
describes the findings of the reviewed plans in respect to priority groups, storage, 
security, vaccine tracking, etc. Of the 51 plans reviewed, 36 plans were noted to have met 
the evaluation criterion phrased as “describes plan for vaccine distribution (CRS, 2007, 
p.12).” The “36” was the high score of any vaccine management activity surveyed (CRS, 
2007). CRS wrote this finding about vaccine distribution: 
While about three-fourths of state plans discussed vaccine procurement 
and distribution, 12 states appear to have kept their options open, and have 
planned to distribute vaccine, or coordinate its distribution, according to 
several different possible procurement scenarios. (Congressional Research 
Service [CRS], 2007, p. 13) 
The conclusion drawn from this statement is that there was a wide range of 
planning elements rather than a set of consistent methods that reflect strategies articulated 
in federal guidance. If 12 states “appear to have kept their options open,” does that mean 
that the distribution planning has yet to be reconciled?  While the Trust for America’s 
Health reported progress in its review of H1N1 preparedness and response among states, 
it equally notes gaps persist (Trust for America’s Health [TFA], 2009). The report 
highlights a key concern is that while all states have plans to distribute vaccine, resources 
fall short to execute those plans: 
Despite years of planning, many state health departments have struggled 
with limited resources to develop mass vaccination plans to receive, 
distribute, and administer the H1N1 vaccine, raising concerns about the 
ability of the public health sector to collaborate with the health care 
system. (TFA, 2009, p. 5) 
Another guidance document published by HHS in 2008 was the Federal Guidance 
to Assist States in Improving State-Level Pandemic Influenza Operating Plans (United 
States Government [USG], 2008). Its purpose was to review state operations for 
pandemic preparedness and note areas for improvement. This document was a tool for 
                                                 
16
 Projects are CDC Preparedness Grantees (or areas) and include states and metropolitans areas. For 
example, South Carolina, a centralized system would be one grantee while Illinois would have at least two 
grantees, the state and city of Chicago. Collectively, there are 64 project grants (CDC, n.d. (e)).  
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both states and federal agencies to assess state plans and give feedback on 26 operating 
objectives—one of which was “Ensure Mass Vaccination Capability during Each Phase 
of a Pandemic” referenced as Appendix B.6 (USG, 2008, pp. 81–82).  Appendix B.6 asks 
if the plan included a number of support activities, two of which are shown in Figure 5. 
The descriptions reflect venue locations and staffing activities but are quantitative 
assessments versus a qualitative assessment.  







Does the plan determine number and location of clinics 
based on planning assumptions? Does it include:                        
-     MOA's (or other appropriate document)                          -     
Points of contact identified
Does the plan identify sources of staffing and develop 
memoranda of agreement with the following?                         
-     Backups identified                                                                   
-     Job descriptions
 
Figure 5.   Ensure Mass Vaccination Capability (From USG, 2008, p. 82) 
Appendix B.6 also refers the reader to two additional guidance documents: 
Pandemic Influenza Vaccination: A Guide for State, Local and Territorial and Tribal 
Planners (CDC, 2006) and Status of Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Manufacturing 
Capacity, Pre-Pandemic Stockpile, and Planning for Vaccine Distribution (CDC, 2007). 
The guidance, Status of Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Manufacturing Capacity, 
Pre-Pandemic Stockpile, and Planning for Vaccine Distribution, is an update for planners 
on “vaccine distribution planning, current planning assumptions and a brief discussion of 
key planning considerations” (CDC, 2007, p. 1) as well as a discussion of ship-to-sites. 
This guidance, distributed to state projects, suggests it was directed to immunization 
program personnel rather than guidance for those responsible for the logistics function 
and planning for vaccinators, venues and the assembly of material in support of a 
campaign. Its only reference to distribution planning is this statement: 
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CDC has been working with HHS, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), and vaccine manufacturers to develop a vaccine distribution plan 
for pre-pandemic and pandemic influenza vaccines. At this time, planning 
and exercises are underway with vaccine manufacturers for distribution of 
pre-pandemic and pandemic influenza vaccines. (CDC, 2006, p. 2) 
The implication is a strategic distribution plan would incorporate after action 
items that result in a corrective actions improvement plan. Less clear are the implications 
for state and local jurisdictions?  Another exercise reviewed earlier, the New Jersey 
TOPOFF exercise, revealed inherent weaknesses of its planning scenarios: “In point of 
fact, NJ [New Jersey] does not have enough manpower to meet its needs as demonstrated 
by the exercise, but officials ignore this lesson as they engage new plans based on old 
assumptions” (Santiago, 2006, p. 38). The implication is that operational awareness and 
planning limitations becomes more astute by those on the ground or on the frontline than 
perhaps those that developed and published the guidance. The survey in Chapter IV noted 
that a national plan would incorporate state and local input while federal plans are more 
likely to not include this input. Really good guidance becomes a collaborative process 
where both federal and state/local partners learn from one another through the process, 
and the guidance product improves as a result.  
Another document referenced earlier is the Pandemic Influenza Vaccination: A 
Guide for State, Local, Territorial and Tribal Planners (CDC, 2006). Its purpose is “to 
assist state, local, territorial, and tribal officials in developing pandemic influenza 
vaccination plans” (CDC, 2006, p. 1). The document continues and adds that in an 
attempt to provide guidance “in a pandemic scenario—notably those caused by the 
current limited capacity to manufacture vaccine—and provides detailed guidance on 
working with those challenges to conduct large-scale vaccination efforts” (CDC, 2006, p. 
1). The document identifies the premise “limited vaccine availability” and recognizes the 
challenges inherent to a mass vaccination campaign.  
Statements in the guidance show awareness of the challenges such as, “Over time, 
project areas may elect to shift control from public health departments to the private 
sector” (CDC, 2006, p. 5).  While an apparent challenge, this is one that requires pre-
planning and H1N1 provided a perspective of the elaborate collaboration that takes place 
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at national, state and local levels to arrange these partnerships. Section II. B. Vaccine 
distribution and allocation references ship-to-sites, allocation responsibilities, but it offers 
little direction on making plans executable. In fact, the discussion stop shorts of the ship-
to-sites and leaves it to planners to imagine the process from storage sites to the arms of 
clients.  
In general, the guidance in this document reflects a dependence on public health 
to serve as not only lead for incident management but also fulfilling the logistics, 
planning and operational aspects of plan execution with the implication that workforce 
capacity fulfillment would be sufficient to execute these functions. For example, the 
following statement demonstrates the assumption (insufficient workforce capacity) and 
dependence on public health as the vaccine manager. The statement implies the 
expectation that public health will activate a logistics responsibility to consist of 
repacking vaccine from a centralized depot and than distribution to vaccination clinics.  
The wisdom of using scarce public health personnel to vaccinate other healthcare workers 
would probably come under scrutiny by a public health operations section chief 
responsible for clinic operations.  
Due to the large number of outpatient offices in most localities, it may be 
impractical for public health agencies to deliver vaccine to individual 
offices. Therefore, planners should designate distribution sites where 
medical office staff may pick up vaccine stocks. Public health may elect to 
vaccinate staff from small practices at the distribution site to help limit 
wastage that could occur with vaccinating staff in small practices since 
vaccine will be provided in multi-dose vials. (CDC, 2006, p. 9) 
Of course, the H1N1 response departed from this guidance as vaccine was 
dropped shipped to those providers who registered through the state and with CDC to 
serve as pandemic vaccinators. Also, VMBIP dramatically changed a state’s centralized 
vaccine storage depot from a single, centralized distribution ship-to-site to direct 
shipments to registered providers. Other references in the guidance suggest this 
dependence but also recognize the need to recruit non-traditional providers:  
The identification of professional partners and volunteers who can help 
run these clinics is a critical aspect of pandemic planning. Potential 
partners include: Community Health Centers, the Visiting Nurse 
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Association, and other community vaccinators, nursing and medical 
students and pharmacists, dentists and veterinarians. (CDC, 2006, p. 11)  
The guidance proposes local planners think outside the box and consider non-
traditional sources to address its needs for vaccinator staffing needs. But as the survey 
concluded, there are barriers with the use of non-traditional professionals that must be 
addressed in advance of an emergency and the guidance is quiet in this respect.  
These documents represent a sampling of technical guidance for pandemic 
vaccine distribution disseminated to state and local planners. Pandemic plans have been 
referenced elsewhere in this thesis but do not provide the level of detail that these 
guidance documents provide. Yet, guidance stops short of taking vaccine distribution to 
the next level. They reflect pre-occupation with the limitations of vaccine supply and who 
should get vaccine first and in what order. The documents emphasize the ethics of 
vaccine distribution. But these ethical distribution concerns do not go far enough to 
recognize the operational limitations that are nestled with legal, licensure and 
credentialing. These limitations become barriers to using the full range of community 
resources to mount a campaign and deploy all of its available resources to address a 
biological threat. Guidance should address these limitations and improve execution.  
The dependence on the public health model for pandemic vaccine distribution is 
not limited to federal guidance but trickles down through state public health and medical 
authorities as well. The South Carolina Pandemic Ethics Task Force (2009) wrote, “We 
expect that rationing of available vaccine will be necessary. In periods of limited vaccine 
supply, public health clinics will be the predominant locations for influenza vaccine 
administration” (p. 11). The HHS plan also describes this assumption that vaccination 
clinics will be operated by public health in the Vaccine Production, Procurement and 
Distribution section. It guides DoH to be prepared to “Identify locations for vaccination 
clinics that will be operated by health departments and enter into memoranda of 
agreement with organizations that agree to provide vaccinators or other staff” (HHS, 
2005b, p. S6-5). The H1N1 response illustrated how plan working assumptions change 
(i.e., sufficient workforce capacity) as the realities of the incident becomes apparent. 
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In summary, less attention is directed toward development of a distribution 
network consisting of identifying multiple venues or recruitment of a robust vaccinator 
corps such as described in the survey. Several conclusions are drawn from this brief 
review of federal guidance for pandemic vaccine distribution  
• An assumption that local DoH clinics will be the primary venue for 
conducting mass vaccination campaigns. 
• The complexity of legal, licensure and credentialing among professional 
medical associations prohibits the integration of these disciplines into a 
readily activated vaccinator corps.  
• Insufficient guidance is provided to support the logistical requirements of 
conducting mass vaccination campaigns using the Public Health Model.  
• Generally, guidance is limited in respect to how vaccine is distributed 
(strategies), where it is distributed (venues), and by whom (vaccinator).  
D. EVALUATION 
The evaluation of the public health model considers those elements consistent 
with the criteria identified and validated by subject matter experts in Chapter IV. The 
criteria become a framework to analyze model elements in light of survey data, 
qualitative analysis from the literature and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Each criterion is 
stated in a performance measurement (i.e., is the public health model executable?), a 
discussion follows and rating assessed. The assessment was made based on the extent to 
which each criterion is supported by its enablers. The rating scale is either present (high), 
absent (low) or potential for improvement (medium). The assessment offers an indication 
of the strength of this criterion as exhibited in the model. 
As reported in the survey and the ASTHO H1N1 project report (2010), the H1N1 
pandemic response recognized that the public health infrastructure was inadequate to 
manage vaccination response and introduced strategies to address operational gaps. In 
essence, the H1N1 event exercised the nation’s pandemic response including vaccination. 
As a result, it serves as a dataset to contrast with the public health model defined in 
federal planning guidance.  The PHM is differentiated from the H1N1 vaccination 
distribution model rolled out for the 2009 pandemic. It is viewed by public health 
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authorities as a “blended model” that combines elements of public and private sectors and 
for which planning guidance did not exist. The researcher acknowledges that elements of 
the blended model were adopted from VFC, as described in the survey. As the survey 
revealed, lessons learned from H1N1 offers insights into operational issues that can be 
strengthened and built into PVD. 
1. Is the Public Health Model (PHM) Executable? 
Chapter IV identified, shaped and validated three enablers that support the 
criterion executable. This framed the evaluation and discussion of the PHM. Elements of 
the model illustrative of evaluation criteria enablers were evaluated using interview data 
and qualitative analysis from the literature review. The criteria represented by these 
elements was as rated high (present), low (absent) or medium (potential for 
improvement). 
a. Integrated and Routine Use of New Technology  
There are two perspectives that relate to this enabler. This is described in 
the context of the H1N1 pandemic but reveals the intricacies of moving product and the 
data processing that must accompany that movement. These are systems the survey 
described, but these are not systems fully described in federal guidance as those systems 
planners should expect for a pandemic. 
The first is a state vaccine management system that is used to interface 
with its provider network and whose order data is used to upload to the CDC. The other 
perspective is that from the centralized distribution (CD) contractor (McKesson) to the 
customer or the provider registered with a state. The latter perspective relates to a system 
managed by CDC but operated by the private sector contractor or in this instance, 
McKesson. The federal involvement, coordinated by BARDA, is to manage vaccine 
shipments from the four offshore plants and one onshore plant to one of four McKesson 
CD depots. This was described as the “push” portion of the system. BARDA, working 
directly with manufacturers, pushed vaccine to McKesson, where the contractor awaited 
for the orders to arrive from CDC through its pull system.  
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This enabler considers technology deployed for the management, 
distribution and tracking of vaccine data. PHM depended upon public health systems in 
place for routine infectious disease outbreaks. Some states had robust systems in place 
that support the vaccination programs used routinely. Other states had traditional ordering 
systems in which providers ordered vaccine using paper, pen and fax machine. Some 
were integrated with the CDC’s VAXMAN vaccine ordering system. As described in the 
survey, these are systems designed to support the VFC program for children. These are 
not systems used for working with the private sector during seasonal influenza 
campaigns, nor were they intended to support a pandemic in which a state DoH would 
administer some 72 percent of the doses allocated to the state. These technologies were 
not intended to scale upward and states had not intended for them to be used for 
pandemic vaccination response. While the CDC’s VMBIP will eventually be the 
technology solution of choice, it is years from full implementation but portions of it were 
used for vaccination response. As revealed in the survey, SMEs noted it was apparent to 
them that the application of these technologies was unfamiliar to the users.    
Federal guidance describes vaccine distribution that would ship from 
manufacturers to state and local depots (warehouses) where workers would manually 
repackage vaccine in the necessary quantities and ship to local DoHs or its network of 
providers. One estimate put the number of depots at more than 400 before VMBIP began 
implementation in 2008 (K. Lane, personal communication May 9, 2010). Depots began 
being dismantled once VMBIP was implemented; therefore, for H1N1, many states were 
no longer in a position to support the warehousing portion of distribution. Today, 
immunization grantees number 64, depots number three (one in Alaska and two with 
McKesson, CDC third party distributor) and the application of centralized distribution for 
H1N1 has eliminated the need for many of these by drop shipping directly to the provider 
network (K. Lane, personal communication May 9, 2010).  
Technology became essential in distributing pandemic vaccine during the 
H1N1 response. The survey described the use of centralized distribution, electronic 
communication interfaces with a provider network, to name a few applications that were 
introduced for pandemic response. Conversely, these are technologies that were not 
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incorporated into the traditional PHM. To reference the example of VMBIP, this is new 
technology is not fully operational, and segments of it were adopted for the H1N1 
response.  Thus, planning based on guidance would have been incomplete.  
This overview shows that the PHM, in terms of technology, was limited; 
and although H1N1 pandemic required new applications for distribution, it was still 
found cumbersome (ASTHO, 2010). The survey data supports the notion that this enabler 
was marginally executable.  
b. Staffing Model: Sized for Response  
The PHM references the mass vaccination clinic staffed by public health 
personnel and volunteers and was conducted in public facilities. As described above, 
DoHs are limited to 3,036 units and additional offices those units may be able staff. 
However, the public health workforce needed to support a mass vaccination campaign is 
limited by public health nurses, logistics support personnel and an incident management 
team sufficient to meet the vaccination goal. Additional evidence is the grants17 that are 
administered by HHS for the H1N1 pandemic in which state and local DoH were infused 
with funds to hire part-time personnel, contract with private sector, turnkey vaccination 
clinics and recruiting and expanding the private and public sector physician provider 
network. The survey also revealed that most respondents viewed the public health 
infrastructure as inadequate to support a mass vaccination campaign. This perspective 
reflects both the PHM as well as the H1N1 response.  
c. Publicly Funded Vaccine  
According to the CBO (2008), the USG vaccine policy of production self-
sufficiency does call for the purchase of pandemic vaccine.  In addition, federal planning 
guidance, which preceded the CBO report, states that pandemic vaccine will be 
purchased by the federal government. As experienced with the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, 
                                                 
17
 Public Health Emergency Response grants were administered in three phases to state and local 
public health grantees for implementation of vaccine distribution. Separate sources were used for the 
purchase of vaccine and ancillary supplies administered through BARDA.  
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emergency funding authorizations were executed, proposed by the President, approved by 
Congress and then directed to HHS for procurement, purchasing, fulfillment and 
distribution.  A few of the complications were described in Chapter IV. The consensus is 
that a pandemic necessitates emergency funding and the public purchase of vaccine, 
ancillary supplies and the personnel, which are essential to execute the campaign. H1N1 
witnessed these funding elements in addressing the H1N1 threat.  
But, there is an ethical principle integral to this discussion. Once a vaccine 
is publicly purchased, then government is compelled to make the necessary arrangements 
and offer it to all citizens. This is the principle of fairness: 
A principle of fairness suggests that all persons who are in a similar 
situation will have similar access to the medication that is available from 
public sector stockpiles. Availability of treatment will not be based on 
gender, race, ethnicity, citizenship or ability to pay. (SCPETF, 2009, p. 
14)  
There must be some mechanism in place that assures the public this will 
happen. Yet, guidance does not provide a staffing component nor sufficient venue 
settings that assure distribution under this model can happen. This planning component is 
left to state and local jurisdictions but provides little assurance of continuity of 
implementation from one state to another, and from one county to another. Confusion 
among the public was described in the survey as states and counties opened up the 
offering of H1N1 vaccine to other target groups but a neighboring state/county had not 
done so. The public was confused and asking, “Why can’t I get it here but I can drive six 
hours to get it?”   
Is the public health model executable? Pandemic planning guidance called 
for public purchase of vaccine and the H1N1 pandemic witnessed the purchase of H1N1 
vaccine under the Emergency Use Authorization. However, the staffing model is missing 
from the PHM guidance. According to the survey, recruitment was left to states. The 
survey documented a few of the difficulties experienced by one state, but difficulties 
were equally observed at the national level as well. Federal planning guidance also leaves 
vaccine distribution to the states without specifying a distribution methodology. While 
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public funding is assessed as high, it is limited by a mechanism to assure the principle of 
fairness is achieved.  Both staffing and technology enablers were assessed as low, and the 
evaluation of the traditional public health model was as assessed low for this criterion.  
2. Is the Public Health Model Scalable? 
Chapter IV identified shaped and validated three enablers that support the 
criterion scalable. This framed the evaluation and discussion of the PHM. Elements of the 
model illustrative of evaluation criteria enablers were evaluated using the interview data 
and qualitative analysis from the literature review. The criterion represented by these 
elements was rated high (present), low (absent) or medium (potential for improvement). 
a. Scaled Vaccine Production   
As revealed in the survey, scaled vaccine production that uses traditional 
vaccine production technology has drawbacks. Until the USG has achieved production 
self-sufficiency and ceases its dependency upon offshore vaccine manufacturers, scaled 
vaccine, production is not possible. The premise of the model guidance is production 
insufficiency, and therefore vaccine rationing and related allocation schemes follow.  
b. Robust Vaccinator Corps 
Given the literature review and the discussion of public health nurses, the 
primary means of vaccination, the PHM is limited in terms of a vaccinator corps. ASTHO 
recognized this limitation when it published its framework for incorporating pharmacists 
as vaccinators for H1N1, and the survey also revealed state and national efforts to use 
pharmacists as vaccinators. But such a framework does not exist in federal planning 
guidance for the traditional public health model. And while a recommendation is made to 
use volunteers as experienced during the H1N1 pandemic, barriers persist that prevent the 
immediate assimilation of non-traditional professionals into the corps of vaccinators. The 
survey revealed a consensus of respondents, who believed this as an inherent weakness of 
this model and therefore noted the model non-executable. This enabler is assessed as low. 
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According to critical infrastructure/key resource planning guidance (HHS 
2008), the public health sector includes 300,000 ambulatory care providers (physicians, 
veterinarians and dentists); 70,000 pharmacies, in addition to the 3,036 local and tribal 
departments of health. This network has the capability to provide 373,036 providers 
(HHS 2008). If the assumption is made that nearly 50 percent includes administrators, 
academicians and policy writers, it leaves a distribution network of 180,000, which is 
double the current structure. The survey revealed that a framework must be established 
and recruitment of both traditional and non-traditional providers to expand the vaccinator 
corps. One such framework was introduced by ASTHO and provided a detailed 
recruitment methodology to recruit pharmacists.   
c. Multiple Venues 
In the context of the PHM, this enabler parallels robust vaccinator corps 
but distinguished by the facility type where vaccination can occur. Venues under the 
PHM are unlimited and quite flexible, as demonstrated by the number of venues where 
public health conducts seasonal flu clinics to ensure board coverage. These venues 
include not only onsite public health clinics, but also offsite facilities such as workplace 
settings, nursing homes, churches and municipal recreation centers. Mobile units were 
referenced in the survey and saw modest use around the nation as a method to reach rural 
communities. For example, one West Virginia DoH partnered with its emergency 
management authority to use its mobile command vehicle to provide mobile vaccination 
capability (Kiley, 2010). Public health works to ensure the principle of fairness in its 
daily business and its leadership understand this mission. The limiting factor is 
vaccinators.  This enabler could be assessed high in support of the model that was 
demonstrated by its ability to reach many population groups in a multitude of venues but 
limited by staffing.  
Is the public health model scalable? There are elements of the model that 
could be scaled upward, given a robust staffing model, but as it stands and defined in 
federal guidance, it is not a model that is scalable. It is assessed low in respect to scalable. 
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3. Is the Public Health Model Provider-Centered?  
Chapter IV identified shaped and validated four enablers that support the criterion 
provider-centered. This framed the evaluation and discussion of the PHM. Elements of 
the model were illustrative of the evaluation criteria enablers that were evaluated using 
the interview data and qualitative analysis from the literature review. The criterion 
represented by these elements was rated high (present), low (absent) or medium 
(potential for improvement). 
In general, this is a challenging criterion to evaluate, given that most federal 
guidance is directed toward public health as the lead planner and responder. The fact of 
the matter is that the PHM did not have a mechanism to incorporate private physicians 
nor non-traditional providers but left it to local jurisdictions to make those arrangements. 
But that was the rationale for titling the H1N1 vaccination response a “blended model” 
because it encouraged recruitment of the private sector physician community. So, given 
the H1N1 emergency, federal authorities did provide guidance to states to recruit the 
private sector. Ironically, those providers with familiarity with the public system through 
VFC had a base of experience that could be built upon, and therefore this group was 
among the “early adopters” of the blended model strategy. In addition, they served 
priority groups. This speaks to the criterion of integration and explored in that section.  
a. Minimize Administrative Barriers 
As discussed, federal planning guidance is directed toward public health 
as the primary mechanism for pandemic vaccine distribution, and therefore, there were 
few administrative tasks in the guidance for medical providers. However, the strategy of 
H1N1 vaccination response targeted, selected medical specialties, especially those that 
reached priority groups such as children and pregnant women.  
The guidance does direct planners to provide protection for critical 
infrastructures, such as the healthcare providers, which includes medical practices. A 
review of the Federal Guidance to Assist States in Improving State-Level Pandemic 
Influenza Operating Plans reveals a strategic goal is to protect critical infrastructure and 
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names the public health and healthcare sectors. However, “the focus of this document is 
on the operations of the State government” (USG, 2008, p. 6). The document describes 
planning efforts to reach at-risk populations and even citizen preparedness but only as 
guidance. Statements, such as written in Appendix B.6 titled Operating Objective: 
Ensure Mass Vaccination Capability during Each Phase of a Pandemic, asks if the plan 
identifies sources of staffing and job descriptions but this guidance is directed toward 
public health roles rather than private sector physician participation (see Figure 5).  
The survey revealed that administrative requirements of providers electing 
to participate in the H1N1 vaccination were somewhat burdensome. Vaccine orders were 
placed each week, and weekly vaccination activity was reported to the state, etc. These 
administrative requirements were not defined in guidance, but due to the necessity to 
recruit additional vaccinators were implemented prior to the H1N1 campaign.  
b. Transparency of Vaccine Production 
Planning guidance emphasizes communication strategies throughout 
guidance doctrine but the strategies are generally directed toward the public.  
c. Add Electronic Interface with Ordering System 
Planning guidance rarely refers to technology, let alone electronic 
interfaces with ordering systems in support of physician practices that elect to participate 
in a public mass vaccination campaign. In traditional federal planning guidance, this 
enabler does not exist but leaves it to state and local planners. The analysis of the 
executable criterion, and its enabler addressing technology, described the dependences, 
complexities and limitations of technology used to distribute H1N1 vaccine. In today’s 
market driven economy, technology is central and connects, providers, states, federal 
administrative agencies and private sector partners. The survey described how one state 
integrated electronic communications with its online ordering system. One respondent 
described this component as a significant source of support for its provider network 
throughout the mass vaccination campaign.  
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d. Publicly Funded Vaccine 
The discussion of publicly funded in the section executable supports this 
enabler in the context of the provider-centered criterion and shows the interdependency 
among criterions with an enabler such as publicly funded.  
In summary, the provider-centered criterion as applied in the PHM is assessed as 
low and in particular in the absence of strategies that target providers for recruitment and 
sustainment of public health emergencies. This evaluation reveals that work must be done 
if the public health model were adopted to recruit private physicians. This criterion is 
provider-centered. While most seasonal flu vaccine is distributed though private 
physician practices and is suggested in the survey, the model must expand the vaccinator 
corps to include non-traditional types.  
4. Is the Public Health Model Client-Centered? 
Chapter IV identified shaped and validated four enablers that support the criterion 
client-centered. This framed the evaluation and discussion of the PHM. Elements of the 
model illustrative of evaluation criteria enablers were evaluated using the interview data 
and qualitative analysis from the literature review. The criterion represented by these 
elements was rated high (present), low (absent) or medium (potential for improvement). 
a. Transparency of Vaccine Administration and Production 
This enabler is quite specific and while federal guidance provides a full-
range of communication strategies, transparency of vaccine administration and 
production is not apparent in those documents reviewed for this thesis. This activity 
(vaccine production) may be appropriate for message mapping,18 which is a strategy that 
breaks down a task and identifies the salient message components. Federal guidance 
recommends communication strategies across all planning doctrine and incorporates it 
into the guidance that evaluates state pandemic plans. For example, it includes the use of 
                                                 
18
 “Message mapping is a science-based risk communication tool that enables members of the 
emergency response and environmental protection communities to quickly and concisely deliver the most 
pertinent information about an emergency” (Homeland Security Research, n.d.).  
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technology (radios, HAN)19 as well as staffing call centers.  It also describes the pre-
developed use of crisis communication and risk reduction messages.  
b. Vaccination is Familiar and Routine, Convenient and Accessible 
Vaccination that is familiar and routine and convenient and accessible 
refers to an enabler that is customer-service based. A strategy that emerged from H1N1 
vaccination was to emphasize the medical home as a place where clients could get their 
influenza vaccination.  But the survey also revealed that the PHM traditionally did not 
emphasize the medical home, rather it established offsite public facilities where clients 
would be instructed to go for their pandemic vaccination. Public school locations are 
familiar, and they are routine for families who transport children whether daily or 
occasionally. The fact is the public knows where schools are and many county emergency 
management points of distribution are based around the location of public schools. 
However, public facilities do not reach the entire population and probably omit most 
adults in the workforce. Familiarity with a clinic location is more likely where resident’s 
evacuation and sheltering operations are routine such as coastal states threatened by 
hurricanes. Options must be considered where the use of public schools is limited to the 
purpose of education and may not serve as sites in emergency response.  
This enabler contributes to the criterion client-centered approach; 
however, much more can be done as experienced with H1N1 and what the private sector 
has accomplished through the seasonal flu campaign.  
c. Lift and/or Minimize Administrative Barriers 
The survey reported that in general, administrative barriers included 
medical screening requirements, documentation and even fee charges. Pandemic vaccine 
is purchased by the federal government, and there is no charge for the vaccine 
administered through the provider network. But there is variation in the “administration” 
fee charged by providers, which can serve as a barrier for clients. A shot in a public 
                                                 
19
 The Health Alert Network (HAN) is a public health electronic alert system that communicates with 
healthcare providers registered throughout a state. States are connected through HAN to CDC.  
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health managed clinic has no administrative fee when those clinics are held in public 
schools, onsite clinics or other venues. Chain pharmacies charged a minimal $5.00 per 
shot while reports of providers administering shots to Medicare eligible clients billed up 
to $19.00. A recent analysis of insurance concludes: 
To date no state mandates coverage of vaccine administration fees during 
public health emergencies as a basic aspect of public health preparedness, 
thereby raising questions of how accessible private sector immunization 
services would be, particularly for larger families. (Rosenbaum, Lopez & 
Margulies, 2009, p. 3) 
Messages that state on one hand, “there is not charge for a flu shot,” but 
then retail facility charges a fee, though administrative, is a conflicted message, which 
compounds confusion and becomes a barrier that minimizes immunization uptake.  
5. Can the Public Health Model Support Integration? 
Chapter IV identified shaped and validated two enablers that support the criterion 
integration. This framed the evaluation and discussion of the PHM. Elements of the 
model that were illustrative of evaluation criteria enablers were evaluated using the 
interview data and qualitative analysis from the literature review. The criterion 
represented by these elements was rated high (present), low (absent) or medium 
(potential for improvement). 
The PHM is a staple of public health practice in the United States and has been 
given much credit for the eradication of polio, smallpox and controlling numerous other 
infectious disease breakouts. In fact, in many developing countries today, the model is 
still deployed and based on very robust public health systems with the resources to 
marshal against disease agents.20   
The likelihood of the U.S. public health system returning to the workforce 
capacity in proportion to the population is not likely given the multitude of demands on 
                                                 
20
 Conversation with Sheldon Jacobson on his statement in Vaccine to use the pediatric vaccination 
model for pandemic vaccination. He stated the limitation for the U.S. is a public health system with an 
inadequate infrastructure to support vaccination on this scale (S. Jacobson, personal communication, June 
3, 2010).  
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states and the federal government. Thus, alternatives must be sought that can accomplish 
the mission expected of a nation during a public health emergency of national 
significance but are unencumbered by barriers described in Chapter IV. Public health 
offers the nation a system and a workforce that knows and practices partnering routinely 
with the healthcare private sector, as witnessed during the H1N1 pandemic response.  
What is missing from the model for state and local jurisdictions is partnering with the 
non-healthcare sector to expand the vaccinator and venue base for emergency response.  
The U.S. Public Health System has demonstrated its ability to partner at all levels, 
as described throughout this thesis. For example the VFC program serves as an example 
of federal, state and local public health jurisdictions that partner with physician providers 
to ensure every child receives the full compliment of childhood vaccinations. The federal 
government partners with pharmaceutical manufactures to establish onshore production 
facilities and bring to fruition “high-tech” cell-based vaccine production. The 2009 H1N1 
response saw many of these elements come together; this demonstrates the willingness of 
public and private sectors, local, state and federal to address this particular biological 
threat. Can the public health model support a policy of integration? The evaluation 
assessed this criterion as high.  
6. Is the PHM Supported with Federal Planning Guidance? 
Chapter IV identified shaped and validated two enablers that support the criterion 
planning guidance. This framed the evaluation and discussion of the PHM. Elements of 
the model that are illustrative of evaluation criteria enablers were evaluated using the 
interview data and qualitative analysis from the literature review. The criterion 
represented by these elements was rated high (present), low (absent) or medium 
(potential for improvement). 
Extensive guidance was in place before the 2009 H1N1 pandemic as described 
previously in this chapter. Numerous checklists (HHS n.d. (e)) were developed by sector 
and by target groups, as described in Guidance on Allocating and Targeting Pandemic 
Influenza Vaccine (HHS, n.d. (a)). For example, there is a published pandemic 
preparedness checklist for nursing homes that outlines very specific steps a nursing home 
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should take to prepare for a pandemic. Likewise, the same checklist format is used to 
provide guidance for utilities, workplace and individual and families. The national 
planning scenario illustrates the threat of a pandemic to the nation by ranking it number 
three of the 10 scenarios and is well supported with exercise and evaluation methodology 
(Homeland Security Council, 2004).  
Respondents in the survey acknowledged awareness of federal guidance as it 
relates to pandemics, whether or not it supported what most thought would be the H5N1 
pandemic or the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Most could speak to its strengths and its 
limitations, and therefore their knowledge base served as a particular area of expertise. In 
the review of guidance in this chapter, reference was made to several documents that 
serve as evaluation instruments for state and local pandemic plans. There does exist, for 
the most part, a continuity of plans from the federal, to state and to local public health 
jurisdictions—though in any state there may be much variation, as discussed in the 
guidance section. Is the public health model supported with federal planning guidance? 
The evaluation assesses this criterion as high.  
E. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
This summary itemizes the narrated strengths and weaknesses by criterion for the 
PHM. Table 8 summarizes the rating of the model evaluation criteria for the PHM while 
Table 9 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses by rating and criterion.  
Table 8 summarizes the evaluation of the public health model using the criteria 
defined in Chapter IV. The criteria executable, scalable and provider-centered were rated 
low; client-centered rated medium and planning guidance and integration rated high.  
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F. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The reference is made to the public health model, and the survey revealed the 
limitations of the federal pandemic plan. The survey revealed three limitations with the 
PHM staffing model: sized for response, inventory management database and publicly 
funded.   
Historically with the PHM, vaccine would be shipped from CDC to state 
pharmaceutical depots where states would than parcel out product, label and ship it to its 
provider network. As revealed in the survey, many state depots have been disassembled, 
including fixtures, equipment and personnel essential to support a depot operation. An 
element of this logistics function is the inventory management for which most states no 
longer have a current vaccine inventory management system. Therefore, inherent in this 
model is the lack of a provider network that places full dependency upon the public 
health infrastructure to vaccinate its state population. Without this logistics infrastructure, 
a states pandemic plan would fail to support its execution.  
Support of the public health model requires an infrastructure that includes 
multiple venues, staffing, and a management team to support incident response. It was 
stated earlier that there are over 3,036 departments of health in the United States, which 
represents at least 3,036 venues and probably many more (HHS, 2007). Plans call for 
public health to establish offsite clinics at public schools, mass gatherings and other 
venues. But the limitation of staff prohibits an aggressive campaign in the event mass 
vaccination is called upon to protect the population. An element of this limitation is the 
management infrastructure to support a robust campaign that includes logistics support, 
incident command structure as well as operations or nurse clinic managers. Nurse clinic 
managers are essentially to direct clinic operations in offsite locations while ensuring the 
safety of attendees and protection of workers as well as maintaining cold-management of 
vaccine.   
A critical component in the execution of pandemic plans, whether they are 
federal, state or local, is funding. There currently are no funding mechanisms in place to 
support federal, state or local pandemic plans in their execution phase. The survey 
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revealed that policy carries with it funding but there exists no pandemic policy. Pandemic 
plans that have been developed are dependent upon a funding mechanism to fall into 
place before response begins.  
Three enablers were identified in the survey as key support for scalability in a 
pandemic plan. These enablers were described as a robust vaccinator corps, scaled 
vaccine production and multiple venues.  
At one time, the PHM was staffed with a robust vaccinator corp. Public health 
personnel were skilled, efficient and the staffing model sufficient to wipe out smallpox, 
eliminate polio and dramatically reduce infectious diseases that afflicted children of the 
period. Today’s public health staffing numbers are no longer sufficient to support the 
PHM as implemented during the middle of the twentieth century.  
Accompanying public health staff are facilities, but these must be viewed from 
two perspectives, both onsite and offsite. Onsite facilities are those sites where 
immunization clinics are held and managed by public health. These sites have been 
reduced in an effort to consolidate, reduce cost and conserve staff. Many of these sites 
were established in rural, remote locations in an effort to support the public health needs 
of those constituents. As public health funding contracted, so did remote facilities, which 
required citizens to travel further for fewer services. As a result, this venue network has 
contracted and can no longer serve as a viable element of the vaccination provider 
network. It must be resurrected in some form to provide vaccination services.   
The other component of multiple venue criteria is those offsite clinics that have 
served as the hallmark of mass vaccination efforts over the decades. Today, these are a 
robust component of pandemic vaccination plans and one that many public health 
jurisdictions have exercised in recent years. They include public schools, municipal 
recreation centers and convention centers.  There are several limitations such as 
vaccinator corps, logistics support and the incident management structure to support 




mass vaccination center, how many have exercised multiple venues over an extended 
period of time? This is a goal of CDC, a prolonged, sustained vaccination campaign, 
requiring six months to vaccinate a nation. 
Four enablers were identified from the survey that contributes to a client-centered 
model: 1. vaccination that is routine and familiar, 2. vaccination that is convenient and 
accessible, 3. lifting administrative barriers, and 4. transparency of the vaccine 
production.  
If the PHM calls for standing up special clinics in venues that are the planned 
response, while convenient and accessible, this would not qualify as routine and familiar. 
When those plans call for a public school setting, this would meet the qualification as 
routine and familiar while also being convenient and accessible. The likelihood is that 
most local plans have factored in these two enablers and, therefore, would meet these 
qualifications.  
The lifting of administrative barriers to maximize vaccination rates are 
considerations that are determined once a suspect novel virus is confirmed and the full 
scope of response is understood. The PHM, when initially introduced in the mid 1950s, 
did not have the vaccine safety concerns, the litigious society and the anti-vaccine 
movement as is present in the twenty-first century. On the other hand, the model evolved, 
it failed to include compensation mechanisms that would have protected the public while 
demonstrating confidence in vaccine products by incorporation programs, such as the 
vaccine compensation injury program described in Chapter IV.  
Transparency of vaccine production was identified as an education strategy to 
compromise the skepticism that surrounds “quickly” developed vaccine. The PHM does 
include robust communication strategies with sufficient funding but as the survey 
revealed, there is room to use new technologies and improve communication messages.  
G. CONCLUSION 
The public health model for pandemic vaccine distribution, evaluated on the basis 
of the model evaluation criteria, is mixed with high marks for federal planning guidance 
and integration. On the other hand, it is assessed as low for criterions executable, scalable 
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and provider-centered. The model reflected an assumption that DoH clinics will be the 
primary venue for conducting mass vaccination clinics. The H1N1 response showed 
much divergence from this assumption and suggests this assumption is no longer valid. 
An additional implicit assumption is that the logistical requirements to support mass 
vaccination would be sufficient; yet the H1N1 response revealed many of these 
mechanisms are no longer in place and, as a result, was supplemented for the H1N1 
response (ASTHO, 2010).  
Two findings result from the evaluation and analysis of the public health model: 
1. The HHS pandemic vaccination distribution plan (PVD) is not executable. 
2. There exists statutory, regulatory and licensure barriers to the use of 
alternative healthcare professionals as vaccinators. 
A model for PVD should identify and incorporate strategies that will strengthen 
the implementation of the model to achieve its goal of mass vaccination and herd 
immunity. The evaluation highlighted the extensive guidance for vaccine administration 
to target groups, achieve the ethical principle of justice and manage who gets vaccine. 
What is absent in the model and its guidance is how vaccine is distributed (strategies), 
where vaccine is distributed (venues) and by whom (vaccinators).  
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VI. THE PRIVATE SECTOR MODEL: AN ALTERNATIVE 
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
The private sector model (PSM) is represented by the seasonal influenza 
campaign and is a for-profit approach used annually. A vaccine is manufactured by the 
private sector, sold mostly to for-profit providers and then distributed via the private 
sector. Its provider network is limited to the “for pay” sector, of which 74 percent 
includes physician practices (HHS, 2005a).  In the two seasonal flu years (2007-08) that 
preceded the H1N1 season, this sector model distributed vaccine doses in the range of 
135 to 140 million doses (Health Industry Distributors Association [HIDA], 2009a, p. 5). 
It is supported by a wholesaler/distributor network that approximates 200,000 distributors 
(HIDA, 2009a, p. 3). It distributes or re-distributes vaccine to not only private sector 
physician practices but also hospitals, retail pharmacies and big box department stores. 
Big box stores and pharmacies contract with private sector “flu teams” who manage and 
administer vaccine using sound vaccine management practices. In contrast, during the 
H1N1 pandemic, centralized distribution technology, inherent to the PSM, was expanded 
to manage vaccine distribution to 90,000 providers (McKesson, 2009).  
A review of the literature in relation to a private sector vaccine distribution model 
reveals its omission for use in public health emergencies. It is well documented for 
seasonal influenza distribution but there is a gap regarding its application for emergency 
response. This brief literature review includes the “real time” events of H1N1 as captured 
through conference calls between CDC and the states and minutes as well as the 
government online resources that describe the use of the public sector distribution model 
(ACIP, 2009). It is the 2009 H1N1 incident in which the federal response leveraged the 
public sector distribution model. For example, in a July meeting of the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP, 2009), CDC introduced the expansion of 
its contract with McKesson to distribute H1N1 vaccine based on the Vaccine for Children 
program. A significant event, it underscores the absence of planning guidance for state 
 100
and local public health jurisdictions in rolling out new methodology. This chapter will 
show how elements of the private sector model (PSM) were tapped for the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic, its first foray into the emergency realm.   
B. THE PRIVATE SECTOR MODEL 
A vaccine is manufactured for profit, sold to wholesalers and distributors who sell 
to frontline providers. Over the past decade, this provider network has expanded to 
include not only physician practices but retail pharmacies (chain-owned), grocery stores 
and big box retail outlets. It is estimated that a third of all annual flu vaccines are 
administered through the retail sector (Lien, Maldin, Franco & Gronvall, 2006). While 
the ability of this model to distribute vaccine is powerful, its ability to respond to public 
health emergencies is limited. For example, during periods of vaccine shortage, the 
system lacks the responsiveness to retrieve vaccine and distribute to high-risk population 
groups.  Distribution of the first doses of vaccine goes to high-profit margin, bulk buyers. 
As a result, vaccine administration is offered through retail outlets before the healthcare 
sector begins to offer vaccine to its client base, which includes both physicians and public 
sector providers.  
Figure 6 shows the private sector model and illustrates the complexity and 
redundancy of production, distribution, wholesale and provider relationships. The role of 
government, federal state and local, accounts for less than 10 percent of activity in this 
model (HHS, 2005a). It shows that physicians, at the provider level, purchase a vaccine 
directly from either a manufacturer or from a wholesaler. That purchase can include 
auxiliary supplies such as syringes, alcohol swabs and cotton balls.  
The limitations of this model to serve as public policy are twofold: failure to reach 
both geographically remote and high-risk population targets. The model offers limited 
reach into remote, rural areas, which are not served by large corporations with franchise 
networks. For example, while corporate retail pharmacies are members of the network, 
such as CVS, Walgreen’s and Rite-Aids, those locally owned pharmacies in remote areas 
are not served by the pharmaceutical corporate structure. Therefore, these communities, 
in all likelihood, are not served by this service delivery model and would also be 

































Figure 6.   Private Sector Model (From HHS, 2005a, p. 5) 
A second limitation of the model is that it does not incorporate a community 
outreach component that serves high-risk population targets. Vaccination rates among the 
uninsured, underinsured and geographically remote population groups are underachieved 
by this model, due to limited accessibility. 
The public sector’s sole responsibility in this model is as a buyer of vaccine, 
which accounts for less than 10 percent of total vaccine sales. The U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services bulk contracts for cost-effective vaccine pricing and permits 
state, tribal and local Departments of Health (DoH) to purchase vaccine from the contract 
price. In periods of shortage, crisis or emergency, without the intervention of the federal 
government, population groups at greatest risk persist with unmet medical needs.   
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C. EVALUATION 
The evaluation of the private sector model considers those elements consistent 
with the criteria identified and validated by subject matter experts in Chapter IV. The 
criteria become a framework to analyze model elements in light of survey data, 
qualitative analysis from the literature and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Each criterion is 
stated in a performance measurement (i.e., is the private sector model executable?), a 
discussion follows and rating assessed. The assessment was based on the extent to which 
each criterion is supported by its enablers. The rating scale is either present (high), absent 
(low) or potential for improvement (medium). The assessment offers an indication of the 
strength of this criterion as exhibited in the model. 
As the PSM is examined, important considerations are those strategies developed 
by health and medical associations to transform their practice in the context of solving 
twenty-first century healthcare delivery issues.  It is a transformation internally to adjust 
to external healthcare dynamics and to provide patient care in new ways to solve complex 
systematic problems. A practice referred to throughout this thesis has been that of 
pharmacy. This section explored how the discipline is reinventing itself, in such a way, 
that for the pharmacists of the future, their practice becomes provider-centered, client-
centered and contributes to a staffing model that increases the ability of the model to be 
executable. The example shows how the discipline was poised to serve as vaccinators in 
their local communities but it took the H1N1 crisis for other practices to take note. Even 
then, institutional barriers persisted. This case study refers to one discipline, yet other 
disciplines are working with similar innovations, which are worthy of further study. 
1. Is the Private Sector Model (PSM) Executable? 
Chapter IV identified shaped and validated three enablers that support the 
criterion executable. This framed the evaluation and discussion of the PSM. Elements of 
the model that were illustrative of evaluation criteria enablers were evaluated using the 
interview data and qualitative analysis from the literature review. The criterion 
represented by these elements was rated high (present), low (absent) or medium 
(potential for improvement). 
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a. Integrated and Routine Use of New Technology  
The PSM is technology driven and uses the centralized distribution, which 
made it attractive to adopt for the H1N1 vaccination. The survey reported that the 
pharmaceutical industry uses supply chain inventory management system routinely to run 
operations. More importantly, the PSM is not built around one vendor, such as the CDC 
contract with McKesson, but all approved influenza manufacturers/distribution chains 
would operate similarly. Thus, while there is redundancy in the private sector system, 
each distributor becomes responsible for performance measurements with each customer 
and that can vary from one distributor to another.21  
Vaccination is a process that does not occur in a healthcare vacuum. A 
transformation is occurring in the industry by retailers who have begun to “cherry-pick 
the most profitable services” (Malvey & Fottler, 2006, p. 170). This issue will be 
revisited in subsequent analysis of the PSM, but retailers have demonstrated the ability to 
use technology, gain market share and provide value to the customer. One observation 
describing Walmart’s22 entry into healthcare delivery wrote, “Walmart uses information 
technology (IT) to facilitate organizational innovation for critical processes that leverage 
productivity and customer satisfaction” (Malvey & Fottler, 2006, p. 170). 
While this comment addresses the use of technology for improving 
productivity, it also suggested its use for attracting customers through value and 
convenience.  This topic will be revisited in the analysis of client-centered, but this 
observation and the example of centralized distribution illustrates that external forces 
influence the PSM and its delivery of vaccine. The PSM is not a medical model, driven 
by healthcare organizations in the traditional sense. Rather, it is a model driven by the 
private sector that leverages resources and technologies to deliver a good and, in this  
 
                                                 
21
 There are tradeoffs, redundancy versus accountability. McKesson expanded its performance 
measurement metrics with CDC for H1N1to ensure same day fill or 100 percent of orders were filled day 
of receipt. In contrast, VFC is a three to five day fill (80 percent orders filled in three days, 100 percent 
filled in five days (Survey Interview, May 18, 2010).  
22
 The branding of Walmart was refreshed from Wal-Mart to Walmart June 30, 2008 (Walmart 2008). 
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instance, a service/good. This brief overview shows that PSM in terms of technology is 
robust; it demonstrates the power of the private sector system, and, with the capacity to 
distribute 140 million doses, it is executable.  
b. Staffing Model: Sized for Response   
The evaluation of the enabler staffing model addresses the distributor 
network  as well as a provider network, which receives and distributes vaccine into the 
arms (or noses) of clients.  Figure 6 illustrated the distributor network that supports the 
provider network and gets vaccine into the system.  
According to a 2008–09 industry report, the two seasonal flu years that 
preceded the H1N1 season saw flu vaccine doses that were manufactured in the range of 
135 to 140 million doses (HIDA, 2009a, p. 5). The provider network, in place to 
administer those doses, is challenging to quantify due primarily to the proprietary nature 
of the customer database. But open source documents do provide some indication of a 
network that supports the seasonal flu campaign. For example, according to HIDA, the 
wholesaler/distributor network approximates 200,000 distributors (2009a, p. 3). These 
distributors buy vaccine and sell it direct, redistribute or package it with vaccination 
ancillary supplies and sell the package.  
Three major pharmaceutical/medical centralized distributors23 account for 
an estimated 85 percent of vaccine distribution. Thirty additional regional distributors 
provide the balance of distribution. It is the major specialty groups that redistribute 
vaccine to other regional and smaller distributors.  Finally, a HIDA 2007 industry market 
profile described the distribution network and wrote that it served “more than 50,000 
points of care across the country and more than 12,000 U.S. medical practices with six or 
fewer physicians”  (2008, p. 3). 
The known customer base served by the distribution network is propriety, 
but open source documents do provide a feel for the range and types of vaccinators that 
                                                 
23
 Three major pharmaceutical medical specialty groups are McKesson Medical Specialty, 
AmerisourceBergen Specialty Group and Cardinal Health.  
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makeup this network. Consider the 100,000 pharmacists poised to staff community-
pharmacy based clinics in chain pharmacies, supercenters and grocery stores and 
supplement medical practices that have served as the core for vaccination services 
throughout the decades (M.C. Rothholz, personal communication, June 9, 2010). 
Walmart offers 15,000 pharmacists in 3,000 in-store clinics (C. Aliger, personal 
communication, June 15, 2010), nearly the same number of DoH sites referenced in the 
public health model. The staffing model enabler is explored further in the evaluation of 
the scalable criterion but we learn this enabler supports an executable PSM. 
c. Publicly Funded Vaccine  
The funding mechanism with which the PSM operates is self sufficient; 
however, as reported in the survey, profit margins are low but the PSM provides a service 
to those at greatest risk and those who wish to get a flu shot. However, once cell-based 
technology comes to production, its technology development investment will have been 
underwritten by the USG. While this is a shared investment, the technology will have 
dual-purpose; one, pharmaceutical manufacturers having a contractual obligation to 
produce pandemic vaccine, and two, other vaccine countermeasures as a result of the 
public investment.  
Is the private sector model executable? Each season this model gets 
vaccine out through its distribution network. The limitations over the years have been the 
vulnerability of vaccine production to contamination such as in 2004–05 with Chiron 
(GAO, 2004). In 2007–08, the PSM distributed an average 135–140 million doses, over 
45,000 more doses than were distributed in the 2009 pandemic (HIDA 2008).. The 
redundancy of its centralized distribution works and it gets vaccine out to multiple venues 
and a provider network representing both traditional and non-traditional providers. The 
staffing and technology enablers are assessed as high, and the evaluation of the PSM is 
high for this criterion.  
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2. Is the Private Sector Model Scalable? 
Chapter IV identified shaped and validated three enablers that support the 
criterion scalable. This framed the evaluation and discussion of the PSM. Elements of the 
model illustrative of evaluation criteria enablers were evaluated using the interview data 
and qualitative analysis from the literature review. The criterion represented by these 
elements was rated high (present), low (absent) or medium (potential for improvement). 
a. Scaled Vaccine Production   
Vaccine production that uses egg-based technology has drawbacks as 
described in the survey and discussed in the evaluation of the public health model. This 
affects either model equally. The difference in this evaluation is that the 
wholesale/distributors are holding the orders and the customers are the private sector 
provider network versus the USG. Until the nation has achieved production self-
sufficiency and while it is dependent upon offshore vaccine manufacturers, scaled 
vaccine production is not likely.  
b. Robust Vaccinator Corps 
One respondent in the survey, with a pharmaceutical industry background, 
described seasonal vaccine as a commodity and that when coupled with service, should 
be sold as a product. This perspective contrasts with that of public health/medical that 
views vaccine as a medical/patient curative. A significant reason the executable criterion 
was rated high among respondents is because the provider network is not limited to 
physician practices. While physicians administer 74 percent of seasonal flu shots, the 
retail portion has grown steadily over the last several years (HHS, 2005a). The PSM is 
expanding its provider network through retail outlets, including community-based 
pharmacies, grocery stores and big-box department stores or supercenters.  It is the later 
that supports not only food, clothing, garden supply and hardware but pharmacy as well. 
In fact, it is the bulk buyers who pay premium prices for vaccine that get the first 
shipments and, therefore, get vaccine into the market place before physician practices. 
Consider this press release from the Walgreen’s newsroom: 
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The retail pharmacy channel continues to play an increasingly important 
role in trying to drive higher rates for flu immunizations in all 50 states. 
Pharmacist-administered seasonal flu shots grew 36 percent this flu 
season, accounting for approximately 10 percent of the total administered 
nationwide. A recent study by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) found that approximately 12 percent of those surveyed 
said they received their seasonal flu shots from a drugstore or pharmacy. 
(Walgreen, 2010) 
Equally attractive to the growing segment of retailers is that “flu shots” 
serve as marketing strategy to make the supercenter a one-stop-shop for all needs at great 
value. Chain pharmacies also use this as a marketing ploy to attract customers as well. 
Factors of this nature contribute to physician specialties, such as the OB/GYN described 
in the survey, moving away from offering vaccination in their practices.  The Walgreen’s 
newsroom also reported, “According to the American Pharmacist Association, there are 
now more than 100,000 pharmacists nationwide who have completed a certificate-
training program in pharmacy-based immunizations” (2010). 
c. Multiple Venues 
While physician practices provide an estimated 74 percent of seasonal 
vaccinations, the retail sector is growing its market share as a marketing strategy and 
expands the number of venues offered through the PSM (HHS, 2005a).  Retailers have 
been aggressive to enter the vaccination market and use vaccination to get customers into 
their storefronts. Other models are also being used to deliver vaccination services: 
“Pharmacies, supermarkets and other retailers are jockeying to become the go-to provider 
for swine-flu vaccinations, in a bid to attract more customers and, in many cases, promote 
their in-store health clinics” (Martin, 2009). 
Walgreen’s reports 7,100 pharmacies (Martin, 2009) and CVS boasts 
another 3,000 pharmacies that give flu shots (CVS, 2009), in contrast to local DoHs at 
3,036 venues. But this shows the scalability of the private sector tapped for seasonal flu 
and poised for pandemic response.  
An additional corporate competitor in this market is Walmart with its 
presence in 4,300 communities (Walmart, 2010a). Its pharmacies are present in 49 states 
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and it recently introduced its in-store health clinics, which currently numbers 73 
(Walmart, 2010b). Walmart leverages its 4,300 storefronts with a pharmacy presence and 
extends it with 15,000 pharmacists (C. Aliger, personal communication, June 15, 2010), 
Other private sector flu shot providers are the retail contract services such 
as CIGNA, Maxim Healthcare and Flu Busters. Described as “onsite, multi-service 
wellness programs” (CIGNA, 2010), these services are adjunct taking their business 
model to workplace, supercenters (e.g., Costco) and even physician practices to assist 
with flu shots during the seasonal campaign. They were used during the H1N1 response 
as a contract service provider. Their vaccine was still provided through public health, the 
gate keeper for all pandemic vaccine. What drives the sector interest to expand the venue 
network is the market forecast for vaccine production stimulated by USG investment.  
While prescription drug sales are forecast to rise by a third in five years, 
vaccine sales should double, from $19 billion last year to $39 billion in 
2013, according to market research firm Kalorama Information. That's five 
times the $8 billion in vaccine sales in 2004. (Associated Press, 2009) 
The growth of the vaccine market illustrates the interest in innovation that 
is driving the private sector to use vaccination as a strategy to grow their service portfolio 
and therefore expand its venue base. Equally important to consider are the 
wholesalers/distributors that supply a broad-based, multi-level distribution system. An 
industry market profile in 2007 reported, “more than 600 distributors operating 800 
distribution centers” (HIDA, 2008, p. 3). It added that this distribution network served 
“more than 50,000 points of care across the country and more than 12,000 U.S. medical 
practices with six or fewer physicians” (HIDA, 2008, p. 3). 
Is the private sector model scalable? It offers the capacity for scalability 
but is limited by vaccine availability and marginal profit returns. But this brief overview 
shows that the private sector identifies strategies to leverage vaccine distribution within a 
corporate marketing strategy and grow the market for vaccinations.  The survey indicated 
a strength of the PSM is that it gets lots of vaccine into the supply chain quickly, which 
speaks to the strength of its distribution network. The PSM is rated high for scalable. 
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3. Is the Private Sector Model Provider-Centered?  
Chapter IV identified shaped and validated four enablers that support the criterion 
provider-centered. This framed the evaluation and discussion of the PSM. Elements of 
the model are illustrative of evaluation criteria enablers that were evaluated using the 
interview data and qualitative analysis from the literature review. The criterion 
represented by these elements was rated high (present), low (absent) or medium 
(potential for improvement). 
Over the past two seasons, prior to H1N1, 135–140 million doses of flu vaccine 
have been pushed out through a provider network, 74 percent of which are represented by 
physician practices (HHS, 2005a).  Seasonal flu vaccinations have become routine for 
most providers. It was described earlier, in the evaluation of the scalable criterion, that 
there are many new comers to the network. The model attracts innovation expanding the 
network beyond traditional vaccinators, including non-traditional vaccinators.  
a. Minimize Administrative Barriers 
The private sector model, through innovation, has expanded its network of 
providers and has done it with minimal government oversight of vaccine distribution and 
administration, which is not to say that current documentation requirements are not 
burdensome. As described in the survey results in Chapter IV, physician practices find 
government directed services burdensome. Yet to understand the difference of 
administration and documentation, the analysis of this enabler will contrast similar tasks 
under a pandemic and how those tasks are present or absent during administration of 
seasonal flu vaccine. For example, a significant factor as described in the survey is that 
during H1N1, providers were required to order vaccine weekly. In contrast, for seasonal 
vaccine, the order is submitted once unless there is a re-order. Providers agreed to 
provide an information packet to vaccinees that included not only a patient medical 
screening page but the 2009 H1N1 Vaccine Information Statement (VIS). If the provider 
offered flu-mist, then the packet would include the “Influenza Vaccine Live, Attenuated” 
statement. If the offering was the injectable, then an “Inactivated” or “flu shot” statement 
was included. VIS is required for all vaccinations. 
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An additional administrative expectation from private sector providers 
who participated in the H1N1 vaccination campaign was a set of registration documents. 
A registration packet precludes vaccine ordering and with H1N1, physician practices 
were required to register twice. First a practice registered with the state then once 
qualified, registered with the CDC. The typical packet included an enrollment form, 
memorandum of agreement (provider agreement), order and activity worksheet plus sets 
of instructions regarding cold-chain management of vaccine, filling out order forms, etc. 
Also included would have been guidance regarding vaccine adverse events24 and their 
point of contact such as the DoH. Finally, the “dose administration report” forms were to 
be completed on a weekly basis by the practice and then reported to the project area (state 
or other jurisdictional DoH). With the exception of the VIS, these forms and activities are 
not required for seasonal flu administration even if the provider is a VFC program 
provider.  The rationale is that they are already enrolled with VFC.  These public sector 
administrative requirements depart from the customary administrative requirements a 
private sector practice completes when offering seasonal vaccine.  It is this public sector 
process that providers find burdensome.  
b. Transparency of Vaccine Production 
Planning guidance emphasizes communication strategies throughout 
guidance doctrine but the strategies are generally directed toward the public.  
c. Electronic Interface with Ordering System 
This enabler is embodied in a broader context of system dynamics that 
temper the adoption of technology among healthcare providers by organizational 
structure type. For example, ambulatory clinics (in-store clinics) participating in the 
provider network are more likely to adopt health information technology (HIT) to 
maximize productivity and cost efficiencies than traditional physician practices 
(Siddharta, Battott, Beasley, Nadkarni, Gertner, & Holmbae, 2010). In contrast, 
                                                 
24
 A vaccine adverse event is an adverse change in health that is initially assumed to result from the 
vaccination. National surveillance is conducted through the Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System 
(VAERS) and is hosted by the CDC and FDA to report adverse events, as well as vaccine safety.    
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traditional healthcare organizations would “primarily use IT [information technology] to 
improve financial reporting” (Malvey & Fottler 2006, p. 170). In recent years, healthcare 
providers have been challenged with electronic health record (EHR) mandates and its 
associated Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE) system. Several factors 
contribute to the reluctance among providers to adopt technology with the changing 
dynamics of healthcare delivery, cost reimbursement and legislative mandates all 
contributing factors. For example, the Medical Group Management Association 
(MGMA) reported in October 2009 that 75 percent of its members had not made the 
investment in EHR due to expense, return on investment and reduction in Medicare 
reimbursement (Healthcare IT News Staff [Healthcare], 2009).  
Surveys have also been conducted to understand the factors that lead to 
adoption of these technologies, especially EHR. For example, a recent survey found that 
predictors of adoption included physician age, prior technology experience, years 
experience, system support, and clinical specialty (Morton & Wiedenbeck, 2009, p. 14). 
In general though, physician practices have been slow to adopt electronic systems with 
the exception, as noted to use for maintaining financial records (Bechham, 2002). The 
survey in Chapter IV revealed one state’s application of technology for H1N1 providers 
did address communications and a Zoomerang survey reported high levels of satisfaction.  
d. Publicly Funded Vaccine 
As described previously under executable, this enabler is not a factor when 
distribution through the private sector is administered as the private sector model.  
4. Is the Private Sector Model Client-Centered? 
Chapter IV identified shaped and validated four enablers that support the criterion 
client-centered. This framed the evaluation and discussion of the PSM. Elements of the 
model illustrative of evaluation criteria enablers were evaluated using the interview data 
and qualitative analysis from the literature review. The criterion represented by these 
elements was rated high (present), low (absent) or medium (potential for improvement). 
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a. Transparency of Vaccine Administration and Production 
When vaccine is readily available through the private sector model, there 
is no rationing and vaccine administration and production are not issues that become 
barriers to vaccination. The model is supported by an extensive public information 
campaign with four key messages, similar to those adopted for the H1N1 campaign that 
is managed by CDC in cooperation with state DoHs.  
b. Vaccination is Familiar and Routine, Convenient and Accessible 
The PSM has evolved and adapted to the changing strategies for 
delivering health care services, especially vaccinations. Physician-directed care is the 
core for vaccination services, especially with the institutionalization practice of the 
patient medical home.  But this strategy reaches only a segment of the population and 
leaves a significant portion looking for convenience in healthcare.  
Other segments of the system have responded with alternative strategies to 
deliver non-critical care as introduced earlier. Consumer-driven health care is an 
emerging trend that is expected to grow as the insured become more responsible for 
financing healthcare as a result of higher co-pays and higher premium deductibles. 
Consumers are making decisions based on value and convenience when care is not 
urgent, and vaccination services are becoming a commodity widely offered by retailers. 
These are attributes of the consumer profile that have attracted the attention of retailers as 
they adapt the retail, customer-driven model for healthcare delivery.  
Customer convenience and accessibility has attracted the attention of 
retailers hosting in-store clinics. Vaccination is a service that has become part of the 
service mix as retailers have explored this service. Consider this statement published in 
California Health Care Foundation report: “Retail companies are ready to cater to this 
new kind of healthcare consumer by offering what they believe their shoppers want; 
convenient basic medical service at a fair price, stated in advance” (Scott, 2007, p. 18). 
Over 90 percent who visited a retail clinic were satisfied according to a 
2007 study and 83 percent reported satisfied with the convenience (Bright, 2007). A 
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factor of high satisfaction is the point-to-point service aspects of vaccination at these 
locations, not unlike the strategy adopted by Southwest Airlines that contributed to its 
success (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005 p. 39). The point-to-point service concept refers to air 
travel that takes a customer from home to destination without layover. Getting a shot at a 
retail in-store clinic where the customer is visiting for other products and services is a 
variation of point-to-point service.  
Convenience and accessibility found application in other customer-centric 
strategies used during the H1N1 response. For example, public health clinics provided 
“drive-thru flu clinic” (Sullivan, Trapnell, Muller, Kehler, & Stoops, 2006, p. 1). Clients 
remained in their vehicle, completed a form, and once medical screening was conducted, 
the vaccination was administered while the client remained seated in the vehicle. This 
strategy grew out of the 2004–05 vaccine shortage when high-risk, ambulatory client was 
unable to stand in long lines to get a flu shot. Clients report high levels of satisfaction 
with an average of 12 minutes to get a shot.  
c. Lift and/or Minimize Administrative Barriers 
Clients report high levels of satisfaction as the PSM has evolved, 
increasing convenience and accessibility and simultaneously minimizing administrative 
barriers to improve vaccination uptake. The administrative documentation differential is 
evident between public sector and private sector for the seasonal campaign. The PSM 
minimizes required documentation while the public sector seasonal vaccinations follow 
the documentation regimen used for any vaccination campaign, pandemic, seasonal or 
other.   
In summary, this assessment of the criterion client-centered targeted the 
specific enablers defined in Chapter IV. The discussion reveals the extent to which 
interdependences among the scalable, executable and integrated criterions in this model 
supports a client-centered approach to vaccination. For example, a variety of venues, both 
traditional and non-traditional address client-centered enablers of convenience and 
accessibility in terms of no or minimal waiting, 24/7 access, and great value (in contrast 
to traditional provider cost structures).     
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5. Can the Private Sector Model Support Integration? 
Chapter IV identified shaped and validated two enablers that support the criterion 
integration. This framed the evaluation and discussion of the PSM. Elements of the 
model illustrative of evaluation criteria enablers were evaluated using the interview data 
and qualitative analysis from the literature review. The criterion represented by these 
elements was rated high (present), low (absent) or medium (potential for improvement). 
Can the private sector model support a policy of integration? Given that elements 
of the PSM were adopted for the H1N1 vaccination campaign, this suggests the model 
can support a policy of integration. The providence of Ontario uses its seasonal influenza 
model as the basis for its pandemic response. The Ontario strategy is the administration 
of a single integrated vaccine distribution system for both seasonal influenza and 
pandemic vaccinations. Distribution depends not only on the public health sector but 
works closely with the private healthcare sector, retail pharmacies and related retail 
outlets.  
Ontario has a vaccine distribution system in place to support its Universal 
Influenza Immunization Program (UIIP). A similar system may be used to 
distribute vaccine during a pandemic, with some changes. (Ontario 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care [OMHLTC], 2008, p. 9–4) 
The difference is that the UIIP, as implemented in Ontario, is the purchaser of 
vaccine, both seasonal and pandemic by the government. This flexibility permits the 
government to distribute vaccine to its provider network, both public and private. This is 
the Ontario, Canadian vaccine distribution network. In contrast, the U.S. strategy presents 
at least three barriers or limitations with the private sector model as currently configured 
to support a policy strategy of integration. These are: 
• Publicly purchased seasonal vaccine distributed to private providers 
• Availability of vaccine to all who want a shot 
• Federal guidance to support a policy of integration does not exist 
There is distrust among public sector providers of the private sector when vaccine 
is distributed and administered via the private sector model. This perspective was 
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described in Chapter IV. As the model is currently configured, and while it offers several 
elements that are desirable for a mass vaccination campaign, it would require a 
partnership with the public sector before it could be assessed to support integrations. The 
evaluation assesses this criterion as medium. 
6. Is the PSM Supported with Federal Planning Guidance? 
Chapter IV identified shaped and validated two enablers that support the criterion 
planning guidance. This framed the evaluation and discussion of the PSM. Elements of 
the model that were illustrative of evaluation criteria enablers were evaluated using the 
interview data and qualitative analysis from the literature review. The criterion 
represented by these elements was rated high (present), low (absent) or medium 
(potential for improvement). 
The private sector model is built around market forces and the exchange of goods 
in a free market. It works with what appears to be a great deal of efficiency and capacity 
to distribute 140 million doses of vaccine and it does this with a minimal degree of 
government interference (HIDA 2009a).  However, it could be argued that federal 
regulation of vaccine production does incorporate a certain amount of interference. But in 
contrast to the public health model, there is minimal strategic planning guidance by the 
federal government that provides oversight of this model to distribute millions of doses 
each year. It is understood that actors involved in supply, distribution and consumption 
more than likely have business plans and strategic initiatives, several of which were 
described in discussions of other criteria, such as scalable and executable.  
Private sector planning guidance was identified through open sources, designed 
for vaccine buyers and incorporates vaccine administration guidance from CDC via 
ACIP. Guidance of this nature is supported by industry associations but is directed to the 
individual vaccine administrator rather than a planning body, such as a state or local DoH 
responsible for mass vaccination efforts. For example, the online Flu Supply News 
published guidance titled Flu Vaccine Planning Kit for the Healthcare Supply Chain and 
reflects CDC guidance for both the seasonal flu vaccine and the H1N1 vaccine (HIDA, 
2009b). This particular guidance is published by a coalition of pharmaceutical 
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manufacturers and distributors whose interest is to convey accurate information regarding 
vaccine administration to its collective customer base. It is one example of how the 
industry serves itself with planning guidance tailored for the customer-provider.  
The performance measurement stated, “Is the private sector model supported with 
federal planning guidance?” The criterion was based on a definition of federal planning 
guidance that is published by HHS, and it included the need for administrative toolkits 
such as the “pandemic checklists” used by planners with responsibility for mass 
vaccination campaigns. The guidance offered by the private sector could support 
vaccination when administered during an emergency. However, the limitation of 
guidance of this nature is that it is not sufficient for strategic planning of a campaign but 
does support the customer-provider. The evaluation assesses this criterion as low.  
D. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
This summary itemizes the narrated strengths and weaknesses by criterion for the 
PSM. Table 10 summarizes the rating of the model evaluation criteria while Table 11 
lists the strengths and weaknesses by rating and criterion. The criteria executable, 
scalable and provider-centered were rated high, client-centered and integration rated 
medium and planning guidance rated low.  
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Three criteria were assessed high for the private sector model; executable, 
scalable and client-centered. The free market of the U.S. economy provides a scalable 
feature of the model that permits it to expand when vaccine availability is high and 
prospective providers can leverage vaccination services with other product offerings. 
This holds true whether the product offering is a medical service in a physician’s office 
or a customer product that can be purchased from a retail pharmacy, grocery store or big-
box supercenter.  The base for the model is the medical provider whose advantage is that 
their medical practice serves as the medical home to families, particularly children and 
families. But other population targets find this traditional model has limitations and 
therefore seek alternative models of healthcare delivery to include both non-traditional 
providers and non-traditional venues. Scalability makes the PSM model executable, given 
that it offers a capacity to distribute 140 million doses of vaccine in any given year 
(HIDA, 2009a). The provider network is sufficient to support these criteria as well.  
Innovation was referenced in the evaluation of the criteria executable, scalable 
and client-centered. Retailers exhibited innovation toward customers by providing 
strategies that would attract those customers to healthcare service products that offered 
convenience, value and familiarity. The criterion client-centered was assessed high 
though its limitations to serve the underserved, uninsured groups warranted a medium. 
The model demonstrates a propensity for clients, and it also operates with the knowledge 
that the role of public health is to fill gaps. Survey respondents reported the view that 
public health fills gaps well. The public health role is to reach out to population sectors 
not currently served by the private sector, such as was accomplished with H1N1. Yet, the 
model revealed innovations that over time, these strategies may reach and offer limited 
healthcare services to special need populations.  
Both client-centered and integration were assessed as medium, and the rationale 
for the assessment of client-centered described in the previous paragraph. The PSM 
offers a base from which an integrated model can be constructed, and therefore it was 
assessed as medium. If one were to place the two models of distribution on a continuum 
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and be able to quantify them both in some statistically, meaningful way, the conclusion 
may very well be that they represent the polar ends of vaccine distribution strategies for 
the nation. A conclusion, drawn in Chapter V, was that federal guidance reflects a 
preoccupation with target allocation for at-risk groups to ensure the ethical principle of 
fairness. The PSM contrasts with the PHM using a disease-prevention biologic (flu 
vaccine) that serves as a commodity to draw customers to a retail establishment and earn 
profit. This strategy is dual-purpose as it is leveraged to entice return visits by the 
customer and sell additional products and services.  As a result, it is a variation but draws 
upon the point-to-point service concept.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The private sector model for pandemic vaccine distribution was evaluated using 
the model evaluation criteria, and it rated high for executable, scalable and client-
centered. On the other hand, it was assessed as medium for provider-centered and for 
integration and assessed low for the planning guidance criterion. The PSM has 
demonstrated the capacity to distribute 140 million doses of vaccine through multiple 
venues and both traditional and non-traditional provider network (HIDA, 2009a). Surveys 
showed that clients are receptive and satisfied with the introduction of non-traditional 
providers and that the PSM supports client-centered enablers of convenience and 
accessibility.  
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VII. A NEW POLICY STRATEGY FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCIES OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE WHEN 
VACCINATION IS THE MITIGATION STRATEGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
This thesis began with two research questions. The first research question was 
addressed in Chapter IV; it identified, developed and validated model evaluation criteria, 
which were used to evaluate two current models of vaccine distribution. These results 
were presented in Chapters V and VI. The first question set a framework to explore the 
second research question:  
How could a model be designed to support pandemic vaccine distribution 
for a public health emergency of national significance?  
While the U.S. is progressing toward vaccine production self-sufficiency, little 
progress has been made on the distribution side.  The premise of this thesis is the USG 
policy of vaccine production self-sufficiency. Its intent was to conduct analysis for a 
period in the future when vaccine distribution is not based on scarce allocation schemes 
or vaccine rationing but instead based on vaccine self-sufficiency. As a result, the 
analysis contributes to the discourse of what the nation’s pandemic vaccine distribution 
system should look like.  
In respect to vaccine, partnerships in the past have been either supply-related or 
vaccine administration-related. Supply-related refers to vaccine manufacturing while 
administration-related refers solely to the protocol of inoculating humans with vaccine. 
The historical relationship has been on the supply side; however, due to the increased 
interest in bioterrorism and national security in this century, vaccine production capacity 
was renewed between the federal government and the pharmaceutical industry. As 
described in the survey, HHS/ASPR/BARDA managed H1N1 vaccine procurement with 
the manufacturers while CDC managed vaccine administration issues including 
distribution.  
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Other vaccine related partnerships have a historical basis and include advisory 
committees such as the ACIP, established in 1964, which connects federal agencies with 
the private sector medical community. The nature of this partnership is probably not 
commonly perceived as a partnership but it is a defined relationship between government 
agencies and the private and public sector medical community (Smith, 2010). The ACIP 
advisory group consists of “15 experts in fields associated with immunization” that 
represent both public and private sector and liaisons from 26 health-related associations. 
Most experts represent medical specialties such as infectious diseases, pediatrics, internal 
medicine, family medicine, virology, immunology, public health, preventive medicine, 
vaccine research, but some included policy, economics and cost effectiveness and a 
consumer representative. ACIP represents the private sector, professional associations 
and federal agencies. Its role defines its scope of responsibility: 
The Committee develops written recommendations for the routine 
administration of vaccines to children and adults in the civilian population; 
recommendations include age for vaccine administration, number of doses 
and dosing interval, and precautions and contraindications. The ACIP is 
the only entity in the federal government that makes such 
recommendations.  (CDC, n.d. (a)) 
Vaccine distribution is tasked to the CDC, but the ACIP advisory committee 
makeup is essentially medical professionals. An additional perspective of the ACIP role 
comes from within the medical academic community and is reflected in the Annals of 
Internal Medicine. Distribution is not discussed as a role of ACIP, nor does the word 
“distribution” appear in the academic journal article (Smith, Snider, & Pickering, 2009). 
So, what group represents the logistics of vaccine distribution? What is missing, as 
described in the survey, is representation from the business retail sector and/or the 
distribution sector. This is the logistics support for public vaccination campaigns that was 
expanded for H1N1. Until H1N1, this function was an assumed responsibility of the 
states, which was described in federal guidance but seen as ambiguous by others (GAO, 
2009b).  
As presented in previous chapters, a paradigm shift has occurred in relation to the 
public health workforce capacity, state public health budgets reductions and the 
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expectation that the USG will fund an expansion of a state workforce.  In all likelihood, 
the federal budget will not grow to expand or to sustain a state’s public health workforce. 
H1N1 response showed partnerships are essential to improving the efficiency of PVD, 
but the nation must get ahead of the paradigm shift and shape the system.  
This thesis has explored the complexities of vaccine distribution and proposes that 
solving systematic constraints will require a collaborative effort. It should include those 
state and national health and medical associations that influence scope of practice and 
credentialing for those professionals with the skill set to vaccinate. Involvement of state 
governments is also needed as they set the statutes and regulatory apparatus that permit 
professionals to practice.  
This chapter used the evaluation criteria developed in Chapter IV to frame the 
discussion for a new model of pandemic vaccine distribution. Each model evaluation 
criterion, discussed in the context of the evaluations from Chapter V and VI, described 
the gap that existed and proposed strategies to strengthen or adopt the criterion to earn a 
rating of high for a new model. What should a new hybrid model for PVD look like?  
Section B narrates a theoretical description of the new model and six goals to 
support it. Section C proposes a policy for pandemic vaccine distribution accompanied by 
a framework that outlines its format and suggested legislative solutions. Section D 
presents barriers to implementation of the proposed policy.   
B. THE PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP DISTRIBUTION MODEL 
A public private partnership (PPP) leverages private sector resources to achieve 
the goal of herd immunity during a public health emergency of national significance. The 
public sector and private sector work toward delivering a public good by building on their 
core competencies. The public sector, federal government serves as the lead partner 
coordinating activity among federal agencies, state governments, vaccine advisory 
committees and pharmaceutical manufacturers. It funds the project and works toward 
those benefits that ensure and protect the manufacturers, such as indemnification of a new 
product. The private sector uses its production capabilities, the strength of its logistics 
support technology and reasonable cost to accomplish the public health goal. The private 
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sector is protected legally, and fulfills its social responsibility as a contributing corporate 
citizen. The public sector meets its mandate to provide for the common good. 
Figure 7 illustrates the PPP model for pandemic vaccine distribution. The federal 
government is the purchaser and distributor for all pandemic vaccine. Removed from the 
supply chain, as shown in Figure 6, are the wholesalers and to a great extent the large 
purchasers all of which are critical for distribution to providers in the private sector 
model. This hybrid model restores the distribution network, missing in the public sector 
model but prominent in the private sector model. It expands vaccination venues by 
incorporating retail sector in-store clinics, pharmacy, grocery and big box sites, a concept 
supported by retail executives (Lien, Maldin, Franco & Gronvall, 2006).  
The PPP model is defined by planning doctrine, used for public health 
emergencies of national significance. It builds on the network of providers used for 
seasonal influenza vaccinations and leverages the full scope of the private sector for both 
distribution and administration of vaccine. Additionally, it recruits, prepares and readies a 
network of “emergency” vaccinators. It integrates the public health system and its target 
population emphasis with the broad net cast by the private sector to maximize vaccine 
distribution. This policy solution ensures emergency distribution of vaccine is routine by 
maximizing geographical reach and use of several sources for vaccine administration.  
The role of the public sector is to serve as lead throughout the emergency, and it 
coordinates procurement, purchase and distribution of vaccine in cooperation with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. It works to network the public health sector with 
providers at state and local levels, establishing those partnerships before emergency 
operations commence. It uses each influenza season to train, exercise, test and update 
plans. This follows the policy, practice and methodology of emergency management 
authorities for preparedness, response and recovery and reflects National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) guidance.  
1. A New Model for Pandemic Vaccine Distribution 
This new model for pandemic vaccine distribution is a public private partnership. 
It builds on decades of the USG partnership and state governments partnering with the 
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private sector to implement cost effective, but policy based vaccine distribution 
programs, such as VFC and recently H1N1. This partnership with the pharmaceutical 
industry has persisted in one form or another since the 1950s but limited to the supply 
side of vaccine availability until its deployment for H1N1. The partnership must now 
expand and blend a distribution model for emergency response when vaccination is the 
mitigation strategy. This section narrates a theoretical description of the new model for 
PVD.  
The model is executable, publicly funded with a staffing model sufficient to meet 
the vaccination goal. It is supported by technology that is used routinely for vaccine 
ordering and distribution fulfillment. The two systems do not compete.  Rather, the two 
technology systems are complimentary and sufficiently intuitive that provider orders are 
based on historically ordering. They push product out to the provider with minimal 
administrative involvement. 
It is a scalable model, capable of sizing vaccine production upward or downward 
without sacrificing vaccine yield or production time. More importantly, a robust 
vaccinator corps has been readied at multiple venues throughout communities to 
administer vaccine without the encumbrances of regulatory or licensure limitations. 
Clients have the choices of venue setting and time of day without waiting. The scalability 
of the model offers options, point-to-point service and encourages vaccination.  
The model is client-centered, and its strategies parallel those for scalability. It 
offers multiple venues staffed by a multi-disciplinary team of vaccinators who administer 
point-to-point vaccination services. The venues where clients go are familiar, routine and 
convenient. They use them for seasonal flu campaign, whether it is a physician’s office, 
workplace clinics, retail clinic or a public school setting where children participated in a 
mass vaccination clinic. The model is geographically dispersed, urban, rural, and 
suburban with venues that are fixed or mobile but still sufficient to reach most population 
targets.   
The provider-centered network builds around physician practices It emphasizes 
the patient-centered medical home but expands to incorporate non-traditional providers to 
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provide client convenience and accessibility. The network consists of fixed facilities, 
temporary facilities and mobile facilities. It is intended to provide surge capacity and use 
traditional public facilities for mass vaccination clinics. Pre-registered providers use 
familiar technology since they already serve as providers for the seasonal flu campaign.  
Integration has been achieved, and there exists a single vaccine distribution 
system that is layered with similar technologies, administrative protocol and program 
support used for VFC, seasonal and pandemic. The seasonal flu campaign has been used 
to exercise pandemic response in local communities with public sector and private 
partners. These exercises help partners work through the mechanics of ordering, 
documentation, billing and memorandum of agreements that define the scope of service 
during a public health emergency. Exercises are not limited to healthcare providers but 
work toward incorporating the non-traditional provider network into the public private 
partnership.  
Federal planning guidance provides the strategic direction, funding priorities and 
describes the mechanics of the integration philosophy. States have a choice whether or 
not they wish to adopt integration, but there are incentives that encourage adoption and 
are codified by public policy. The pandemic plan reflects not only vaccine administration 
but includes annexes that describe vaccine distribution with administrative tools to 
execute actions.  
The model is embodied in a new policy and shaped by collaboration of state and 
federal government in cooperation with state and national health and medical 
associations. The effect is to shape policy that sheds the encumbrances of statutory, 
regulatory or licensure constraints. Control of vaccination activities are in the hands of 
local communities unconstrained by the quagmire of state and/or federal licensure issues. 
It is these manpower and distribution issues that frustrated the general public who sought 
H1N1 vaccination but grew weary and moved on unprotected.  
Figure 7 depicts the new hybrid model. When this model is compared to the PSM 
(see Figure 6), the USG becomes the purchaser and distributor of pandemic vaccine. The 
difference between this model and the PHM (Figure 4) is the expansion of the provider 
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network and distribution separated from the CDC role as purchaser/distributor. It 
underscores the prominence that distribution assumes in this model, and that 
differentiates it from the PHM where DoHs served in a lead role for distribution 
fulfillment.   
 
Figure 7.   Public Private Partnership Model 












Public Low Low Medium Low Medium High 
Private High High Medium High Medium Low 
PPP High High High High High High 
2. Goals of the New Model and Gaps with Current Models 
What are the policy goals of the new hybrid model, and what gaps exist between 
this model and current models for vaccine distribution? How does this model build on the 
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strengths of each model evaluated in Chapters V and VI and, conversely, minimize 
weaknesses inherent in each model? This section describes policy goals, gaps and 
presents issues, strategies and/or actions that could guide policymakers and planners 
toward a new model. Table 12 summarizes results from PHM and PSM evaluations and 
provides a comparative analysis of gaps between the criterion of those models and the 
hybrid model. Table 13 itemizes strengths and weaknesses of the PPP model. 
The model is executable and supported by a publicly funded campaign and a 
staffing model sufficiently sized to meet the HHS vaccination goal. Evaluation of the 
PHM assessed the criterion as low, in contrast to the evaluation of PSM that assessed it 
high. This new model will retain its publicly funded component. Portions of VMBIP 
were introduced during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and show promise to become a 
technology that will drive future pandemic response while becoming integrated with 
routine vaccination distribution. H1N1 revealed the necessity of a supply chain inventory 
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The PHM advocates for the use of non-traditional providers to supplement the 
vaccinator corps; yet the analysis revealed that 1) no staffing model is described in 
guidance and 2) barriers persist that prohibit the use of non-traditional vaccinator types. 
The USG, in concert with professional and medical associations, must work toward the 
reduction of those barriers as part of a broader strategy for vaccine distribution during a 
public health emergency.  
For example, much discussion throughout this thesis has described the use of 
pharmacists as vaccinators. The profession of pharmacy has worked through its 
professional organization, like APhA, to prepare pharmacists at the state and national 
level to serve as vaccinators, a campaign that has taken 16 years to achieve the authority 
in all 50 states (M.C. Rothholz, personal communication, June 9, 2010). It is estimated 
that “there is a retail pharmacy within five miles of 95 percent of the population” (Lien, 
Maldin, Franco & Gronvall, 2006, p. 179). Yet, H1N1 revealed that selected disciplines 
within public health were apparently unaware of the readiness of this vaccinator group to 
serve. This reflects a lack of inclination to reach out and recruit other professions for the 
manpower to staff mass vaccination efforts during the pandemic preparedness phase. 
Pharmacy represents one profession that has worked to expand its scope of practice. Yet, 
other branches of medicine, such as dentists, could serve as members of the vaccinator 
corps, but their scope of practice confines their skill set. The question arises what must be 
done to ready this profession for its role as vaccinator? 
Dentistry serves as an example of a branch of medicine whose practice is limited 
to the oral cavity, maxillofacial area and adjacent structures. The American Dental 
Association (ADA) references this definition as its scope of practice: 
The evaluation, diagnosis, prevention and/or treatment (nonsurgical, 
surgical or related procedures) of diseases, disorders and/or conditions of 
the oral cavity, maxillofacial area and/or the adjacent and associated 
structures and their impact on the human body; provided by a dentist, 
within the scope of his/her education, training and experience, in 
accordance with the ethics of the profession and applicable law. 
(American Dental Association [ADA], n.d.) 
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Dentists have the skill set to perform needle sticks, as anyone who has ever 
required dental care can attest. But the profession’s scope of practice is limited to the 
facial area while vaccination involves the upper arm in adults and legs in small children. 
This thesis has described how federal guidance suggests recruitment of other professions 
as vaccinators, but the process to ready a profession for vaccination is complex. For 
example, to use dentists as vaccinators would require a modification to the scope of 
practice for dentists during public health emergencies, state by state. It may also involve 
changing statutory regulations regarding medical control. This could be encouraged by 
the national association if it adopted a recommendation that state dental associations 
consider a recommendation that broadened scope of practice. The recommendation 
would target public health emergencies where the mitigation strategy is vaccination with 
the mechanism, such as governor declaration, that would permit dentists to perform intra-
muscular injection. The process requires further analysis of state statues that may prohibit 
other medical professions from practicing outside their scope of practice. Regulatory, 
governing and licensing boards would also be included in the review process as well.  
What other health and medical professions should be represented in the staffing 
model for PPPVPVD? Physician practices must serve as the cornerstone for vaccine 
distribution but work must continue in recruiting and readying other medical specialties 
for emergency response. Hospitals have played significant roles during the seasonal flu 
campaign by using not only nurses in community settings for mass vaccination clinics but 
equally deploying pharmacists as well. Their role was much more limited during H1N1 
response due primarily to the vaccine pro-rata allocation scheme and the limited 
availability of vaccine. Hospitals are viewed in local communities as centers for health 
and medical care and, therefore, must be incorporated into pandemic response. 
While dentistry and pharmacy has been discussed, other professionals with the 
desired skill sets include paramedics, veterinarians, nursing school students and allied 
health professionals, such as a phlebotomist.25 Scope of practice is set by the professional 
                                                 
25
 Phlebotomists are trained to draw blood and relieve physicians and nurses from this task. At one 
time, phlebotomists were trained on the job, but technical schools offer certification courses that develop 
the finger stick and venipuncture technique along with patient interaction skills and blood collection 
legalities. 
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association responsible for licensure. Each requires a gap analysis to determine 
constraints to the scope of practice during a public health emergency where vaccination is 
the mitigation strategy. This analysis should identify medical control conflicts and 
recommendations to modify those controls for emergency response. Equally important is 
to determine who will the professional turn to in the event of a vaccine-related adverse 
event. In public health vaccination campaigns, such as the recent H1N1 or the smallpox 
vaccinations of 2003, public health infectious disease medical specialists serve as 
consultants to private sector physicians. This would be one option to be addressed. Each 
profession requires involvement of its professional association. 
Expand the vaccinator corps to support the staffing of multiple venues with a 
mechanism that permits capacity to expand or contract. Three criteria have been 
discussed and recommended for inclusion in a scalable model, but the analysis shows that 
the critical path is a robust vaccinator corps. The evaluation of the PSM illustrated how 
retail is expanding the non-traditional venues market for vaccination sites. The premise of 
this thesis is that vaccine production self-sufficiency will progress and USG policy has 
invested heavily to ensure self-sufficiency. The evaluation of the PSM explored the range 
of venues established to support the seasonal flu campaign. The analysis showed the 
growth and range of network venues and providers and why portions should be adopted 
for pandemic response. Venues are accompanied by vaccinators and could be 
pharmacists, visiting nurses or a third party contractor. As discussed previously, elements 
of the PSM were recruited by public health for the H1N1 response such as pharmacies.   
According to the American Pharmacists Association (APhA), there are 175,000 
pharmacists in the U.S. and 95 percent of the population lives within five miles of a 
pharmacy (M.C. Rothholz, personal communication, June 9, 2010). The practice 
transformed itself from that of a dispensing pharmacist to a clinician pharmacist or the 
primary care pharmacist (American Pharmacists Association [APhA], 2007, p. 1). The 
profession is transitioning from a product-centered profession to a patient-care centered 
profession. Academic institutions train pharmacists in this new role, and APhA has 
offered a 20-hour course to licensed pharmacists who wish to upgrade their skill set to 
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serve in a vaccinator role. This prepares the pharmacist for the full range of vaccination 
services defined for age groups including flu vaccinations.   
Consider, for example, the use of veterinarians in rural areas of the nation. 
Veterinarians use mobile clinics to serve clientele not unlike what was described as an 
innovation during the H1N1 response where command vehicles were deployed as mobile 
H1N1 clinics. Greater use of veterinarians could incorporate this strategy into pandemic 
response. This would offer scalability that incorporated a venue, vaccinator and outreach 
to a remote, population group. Of course, the use of vets to immunize humans would 
present perception issues, but it may be more acceptable to those target populations 
where the economy is agrarian-based. This aspect would be worthy of further study.  
Adopt client-centered strategies to maximize vaccination rates. The evaluation of 
the two models rated each criterion medium in relation to the application of client-
centered approaches. Collectively, these two models target a significant portion of the 
population especially for the seasonal flu campaign. An additional study could identify 
the precise percentage covered, but that is beyond the scope of this research. The gap lies 
within the pandemic response with the general population, as experienced during the 
H1N1 campaign. Each model targets different segments of the population, but there 
exists synergism between the two models. Public health strategies for mass vaccination 
have adopted private sector strategies, such as deployment of vaccination clinics in 
private sector settings during the H1N1 campaign. Within the context of the seasonal flu 
campaign, public health provides service coverage through outreach to remote, uninsured 
or underinsured segments of the population. Though it could be argued, rightfully so, that 
the private sector does not deliberately plan for public health to fill these voids during the 
seasonal flu campaign, there is collaboration. Public health understands its role and is 
intuitive to find and serve under-represented groups.  
What specific strategies, discussed in the evaluation of the two models in Chapter 
V and VII, would improve client-centered approaches during pandemic response as 
described by the four enablers?  
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• Continued emphasis on the medical home 
• A greater role for workplace clinics   
• Greater use of urgent care centers and ambulatory care centers 
• Greater use of non-traditional venues represented by pharmacies, in-store 
clinics 
• Greater use of drive-thru clinics 
• Greater use of mobile clinics to include veterinarians, hospital-based 
mobile clinics and first responder command center vehicles.26 
Collectively, these strategies describe the “point-to-point” service concept 
adopted by some airlines (i.e., Southwest) and supported by airline manufacturers.  
Point-to-point service is defined in terms of passenger experience. Any 
flight that takes a passenger nonstop from point of origin to destination is 
a point-to-point flight. Point-to-point service does not eliminate hubs; it 
reduces the need to change planes at an intermediate airport. (Boeing, 
2005, p. 2) 
Airlines and manufacturers understand that airline commuters seek transportation 
that will take them from home to their destination without layover, and therefore a 
smaller aircraft can accommodate increased frequency. Manufacturers build more smaller 
aircraft. Airlines run the same routes with greater frequency to accommodate passengers. 
This contrasts with the current “hub and spoke” system used by most airlines. In terms of 
mass vaccination, setting up clinics in public facilities, from a client perspective is a hub 
and spoke system. In contrast, workplace clinics, pharmacy visits and in-store clinics are 
examples of point-to-point service. This is the essence of client-centered strategies.  
Finally, a key policy consideration that would offset the public’s 
apprehensiveness about the pandemic vaccine is coverage under the National Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program (VICP) for any pandemic vaccine. This is not unlike other 
vaccines used to protect children, healthcare workers and DoD personnel. As revealed in 
                                                 
26
 The assumption is that mobile command centers are not deployed for other incidents.  
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the survey, H1N1 was not covered under VICP but individuals who sought a claim found 
contradictory guidance. Consider these two statements from the HHS webpage: 
The 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza vaccine (swine flu vaccine) is not 
covered under the VICP. If you received the 2009 pandemic H1N1 
influenza vaccine (swine flu vaccine) or drugs to treat or prevent H1N1 
influenza such as Tamiflu, Relenza or Peramivir and think that you have 
been seriously injured by this vaccine or these drugs, see the 
Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program. (HHS, n.d. (c)) 
The above statement, cited at the Health Resources and Services Administration 
webpage on VICP, refers the reader to the Countermeasure Injury Compensation 
Program (CICP). Yet, once the reader arrives at CICP, it refers the reader to the VICP.  
Seasonal influenza vaccines are not covered countermeasures under the 
CICP. If you received the seasonal influenza vaccine or other vaccines 
covered by the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) 
such as tetanus or the human papillomavirus vaccine and think that you 
had an adverse reaction from one or a combination of these covered 
vaccines, see the VICP. (HHS, n.d. (c)) 
The contradiction of these two statements regarding injury compensation does not 
suggest that this issue supports a client-centered strategy in two ways: 1) H1N1 was not 
covered; and 2) the contradictory statements lack clarity, causes confusion and fuels 
apprehensiveness. What is needed is clear guidance that covers pandemic vaccines during 
a public health emergency (PHE). These strategies and venues represent convenience and 
accessibility with sufficient incentives for vaccine-seeking clients.  
Adopt provider-centered strategies to recruit and expand the traditional provider 
network. The evaluation of the two models rated this criterion low for the PHM and high 
for the PSM. Historically, the PHM model was limited in its efforts to recruit 
participation by private physician practices until H1N1.  In contrast, the PSM evolved 
around the physician practice until recent years, when the non-traditional sector expanded 
to provide greater access to vaccination services.  The challenge for the public sector is 
how to incorporate incentives in a model for pandemic response that approximates the 
strengths inherent with the PSM but encourages physicians, through incentives, to adopt 
immunization practices.  For example, public funding is one incentive, but it could be 
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strengthened by including an administrative reimbursement fee for patients whose 
insurance does not cover such expenses. Other improvements include:  
• Improved communication with an expanded provider network addresses 
issues of efficacy, safety and contraindications.  
• Insure a single vaccine ordering system is used by all states with the 
necessary electronic interfaces. For example, expand VFC program but 
also use it for pandemic response.  
Adopt an implementation strategy that supports an integrated vaccine distribution 
infrastructure. Each seasonal campaign is an exercise for pandemic response.   
The evaluation of the two models rated this criterion medium for the PHM and 
medium for the PSM. It has been decades since public health last managed a pandemic, 
and at that time, it had the workforce to implement its sole strategy, the public health 
model. The integration concept argues that public health no longer has the capacity to 
sustain a separate model for pandemic vaccine distribution and must develop alternative 
strategies. The “blended” model incorporated for H1N1 was an alternative model, and the 
VFC program represents yet another model from which elements were adopted for the 
H1N1 campaign. Integration suggests pandemic response be developed around a single 
model; this represents a philosophical shift of strategy from that described in planning 
guidance. In a review of H1N1 barriers, ASTHO (2010, p. 107) recommended use of 
normal distribution channels: An approach that follows normal distribution channels 
could have been used, and the initial limited supplies could have been sent to the public 
health departments and identified priority vaccination providers (i.e., those participating 
in VAFAC). 
The concept of integration is not new but has been incorporated into pandemic 
response by the United States’ northern neighbor Canada. It was tested in 2003 with 
SARS and again in 2009 with H1N1. While not all providences implement integration, 
Canada reported the highest H1N1 vaccination rate of all countries in the world at 46 
percent (K. Scott, personal interview, April 9, 2010). In contrast, the United States 
reported an estimated 24 percent (Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report [MMWR], 
2010).  
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Canada has established a framework for an integrated vaccine distribution 
infrastructure, and it advocates for universal vaccination. The strategy is supported by 
agreements and procedures that worked for both seasonal influenza and pandemic 
influenza. Two additional policy strategies that support Canada’s integration strategy are 
its Universal Influenza Immunization Program (UIIP) and policy of vaccine production 
self-sufficiency. The Canadian plan states the goal of UIIP is “Universal vaccination has 
the advantage of creating a population that is highly resilient to the pandemic virus 
because of both individual protection and potential herd immunity” (Public Health 
Agency of Canada [PHAC], 2008, p. 12). 
The providence of Ontario used the federal infrastructure to establish a 
distribution infrastructure to achieve high vaccination rates and prepare for pandemic 
vaccine distribution. Ontario pioneered UIIP in 2000, and its distribution system was 
designed to support UIIP. The Ontario plan states, “Ontario has a vaccine distribution 
system in place to support its Universal Influenza Immunization Program. A similar 
system may be used to distribute vaccine during a pandemic” (OMHLTC, 2008, p. 9-4). 
Today, it serves as a mature model for the integrated strategy. It uses this strategy each 
year as a test of its pandemic response for mass vaccination. The European Union called 
this a “best practice” (Osterhaus, 2006, p. 6802) that should be incorporated into the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) pandemic plan.  
The strategy illustrates the Canadian policy as described in the Ontario Health 
Plan for an Influenza Pandemic (MOHLTC, 2008). The Ontario plan lists many elements 
such as the public private partnership, public sector responsibilities and expectations of 
providers on the private side. Several features of the plan are consistent with enablers that 
support private-centered and client-centered criteria. A unique feature of the pandemic 
plan is that it details how the seasonal flu season builds toward pandemic response and 
incorporates a variety of non-traditional venues such as workplace flu clinics.  
For example, the Ontario UIIP recruits workplace settings to establish flu clinics 
during the inter-pandemic period by providing vaccine at no charge. Employers are 
encouraged to provide the service at no cost to employees. The incentive is a partnership 
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with Ontario who provides vaccine at no cost. The benefit to the employer is employees 
reporting to work and being productive rather than out of work and collecting sick leave.  
The flu vaccine is provided to employers by the MOHLTC (Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care) free of charge. If a corporation requires a 
nursing agency to administer the program the nursing agency will charge, 
on average, a fee of $12.00 per person. It is important to put this number 
in perspective against potential lost time due to sick days. If a company 
has 100 employees and 40% of these employees opt to take the flu 
immunization, the total cost to the company is $480.00. Given that the flu-
related absences can range between one and five days, the cost of the 
immunization program can pay for itself if influenza illness is avoided in 
one employee. (MOHLTC, 2004, p. 5) 
This thesis has argued that there should be one vaccine distribution system, and it 
should be exercised for pandemic response. But what would it take to bring the resources 
and capacities of the public sector and the private sector into a single system for vaccine 
distribution during emergency response? The initiative must rival that legislated in 
support of vaccine production self-sufficiency and will require a policy implementation 
strategy to include program support and funding.  The recommendation is a policy 
strategy that clearly describes the strategy with a distribution plan and guidance that can 
guide state and local planners, supported with funding incentives for state and local DoH. 
It must be optional for states but with incentives for those that elect to participate, similar 
to the arrangement between Canada and its providences such as Ontario.  
Expand federal planning guidance to incorporate proactive distribution strategies. 
Vaccine distribution should be differentiated from vaccine administration in planning 
guidance. Too often in guidance, distribution is discussed in the context of vaccine 
administration, and the discussion is exclusively about vaccine administration. If the 
discussion were framed in the context of ICS, distribution would be a function of 
logistics while administration is a function of the operations section. A public policy 
should be adopted that differentiates these functions and will establish a deliberate course 
of action. It should build on current capabilities while encouraging constructive change of 
distribution limitations. What strategies should this policy establish? 
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• It has been established that pandemic vaccination campaigns will be 
publicly funded. While stated in guidance, public policy is not clear. 
• Establish a single, national strategy for vaccine distribution in contrast to 
an estimated 64 different strategies.  
• Establish a single, integrated distribution system, used annually but 
exercised for pandemic response. 
• Establish funding mechanisms that will encourage national health and 
medical associations to work with state association and state regulatory 
agencies to identify statute, regulatory, and/or licensure restrictions that 
prohibit those professionals with the skill set to vaccinate.   
The USG should adopt a new strategy given the limitations of the public health 
model as defined in this thesis. The gap that must be bridged is a philosophical gap of 
how two different models operate. The private sector is represented by technical know-
how, innovation and the capacity to expand and contract as presented in Chapter VI. The 
public sector should extend the principle of justice by maximizing venue sites and 
ensuring those venues are staffed with skilled vaccinators.  
C. U.S. POLICY FOR PANDEMIC VACCINE DISTRIBUTION 
1. The Policy Strategy 
The USG has invested $7.1 billion in pandemic preparedness, of which $3.2 
billion was invested in enhancing vaccine production (CBO, 2008), both expanded 
capacity and new technology. In the near future, the return on investment will be realized 
but funding investments should be redirected into pandemic vaccine distribution 
infrastructure projects. Considering, for example, the $176 million set aside each year for 
egg embryos that are used for nurturing the 1940s egg-based vaccine production process 
(CBO, 2008). Once cell-based vaccine production is proficient, these investments will 
expire and could be invested into distribution strategies.  
Just as a USG policy evolved to develop pandemic-influenza vaccines, a policy 
accompanied by similar investments and initiatives should be directed toward distribution 
strategies. A goal of the 2005 HHS pandemic plan was to “facilitate a rapid response.” 
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This thesis has argued this is not likely given the current infrastructure. Options should be 
explored to establish a viable and executable rapid response structure. A policy for PVD 
should address goals presented in the previous section but must also describe strategies 
for incorporating several key elements discussed throughout this thesis. The policy 
should match the comprehensiveness of the CBO (2008) document “U.S. Policy 
Regarding Pandemic-Influenza Vaccines,” which describes in detail the USG strategy 
regarding pandemic vaccine production self-sufficiency.   
The policy strategy is to establish a comprehensive public private partnership for 
pandemic vaccine distribution that achieves the HHS goal and facilitates a rapid 
response. The objective of this policy is the HHS goal of the 2005 pandemic plan and its 
claim “to facilitate rapid response” (CBO, 2008). The plan must be achievable; it must be 
executable. As a result, it is supported by public funding, describes a staffing model sized 
for response, offers scalability and improves vaccination rates by integrating client-
centered and provider-centered strategies. Finally, the policy is defined in planning 
doctrine and achieves the goals introduced in the previous section. These goals are: 
1. The model is executable supported by a publicly funded campaign and a 
staffing model sufficiently sized to meet the HHS vaccination goal. 
2. Expand the vaccinator corps to support the staffing of multiple venues 
with a mechanism that permits capacity to expand or contract. 
3. Adopt client-centered strategies to maximize vaccination rates. 
4. Adopt provider-centered strategies to recruit and expand the traditional 
provider network.   
5. Adopt an implementation strategy that supports an integrated vaccine 
distribution infrastructure. Each seasonal campaign is an exercise for 
pandemic response.   
6. Expand federal planning guidance to incorporate distribution strategies. 
Figure 8 presents a framework for the development of a U.S. policy for pandemic 
influenza vaccine distribution and is a starting point for a discourse on the subject. Two 
topics are described here, based on previous discussions, as examples of subjects to be 
developed and included in a comprehensive policy that addresses distribution issues.  
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Staffing is a key issue. Therefore, the policy must address how suggested entities 
are working the issue of statutory, regulatory and licensure barriers that frustrate health 
professionals from serving as vaccinators during public health emergencies. This could 
be encouraged by national associations if recommendations were put forth and adopted 
by state associations. This should be conducted in collaboration with medical boards. 
Issues of medical control and scope of practice should be studied, modified and defined 
for public health emergencies.  For example, as recommended above, dental associations 
could consider incorporation of a recommendation that during public health emergencies 
where the mitigation strategy is vaccination that a mechanism, such as a governor’s 
declaration, would permit dentists to perform intra-muscular injection. The process 
requires further analysis of current state statues that may prohibit the profession from 
practicing outside its scope of practice. Regulatory, governing and licensing boards are 
among those entities that should be included in the review process and the policy should 
describe this process. 
Another example of a topic that should be addressed is how technology is used to 
support distribution. Chapter IV suggested that a supply chain inventory management 
system was needed to distribute and track vaccine from its point of distribution 
throughout the provider network. While this would be relatively easy to accomplish, the 
greater challenge are vaccine ordering systems since they originate from states. While 
some states have made great progress, others still use paper, pen and fax machines. CDC, 
in cooperation with state DoHs, has made great strides with disease surveillance and 
syndromic surveillance systems. CDC has been instrumental in providing states with 
system architecture, compatible with the CDC system, to support the integration of state 
disease surveillance data with national surveillance data. Similar strategies should be 
adopted to encourage all states to upgrade their vaccine ordering to comply with current 
CDC projects such as VMBIP and Vaccine Tracking System (VTrcks). VTrckS is the 
vaccine ordering component of VMBIP. The projects were begun in 2004 and were not 
ready for H1N1 and efforts should be expended to expedite their implementation. These 
two topics are suggestive of the content to include in a policy strategy. In general, the 
policy should describe how these systems will be used in a pandemic and, specifically, 
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their role to support pandemic vaccine distribution. Furthermore, the analysis should 
describe gaps and actions being taken to move those toward a rapid response.  
2. Possible Legislative Solutions 
The USG should consider various legislative solutions to develop the PVD 
system—several of which have been used to develop supply side production limitations 
(CRS 2005). These include financial incentives, efforts to improve coordination, public 
private partnerships and identifying alternatives to the administrative bottlenecks that 




1. What makes the U.S. Pandemic Plan Executable 
a. A publicly funded campaign 
b. The staffing model strategy  
c. An implementation philosophy for an integrated system 
d. The use of new technology 
i. Vaccine Management Business Improvement Project  
ii. Supply Chain Inventory Management System 
 
2. The Scalability for Pandemic Response 
a. A robust vaccinator corps 
i. Physicians and the emphasis of the medical home 
ii. Allied health professionals ready to serve in new roles 
b. How the plan uses multiple venues to maximize public outreach 
i. Fixed facilities  
ii. Public facilities 
iii. Mobile facilities 
iv. Workplace clinics 
c. How Technology may offer vaccine production scalability  
 
3. Adoption of a client-centered approach to vaccination practices 
a. The medical home remains the first choice 
b. Point-to-Point service 
i. The workplace clinic for most Americans 
ii. Retail sector in-store clinics, pharmacies 
c. The role of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
 
4. Adoption of provider-centered approach to maximize vaccination rates 
a. Improved communication with an expanded provider network addresses issues 
of efficacy, safety and contraindications 
b. Insure a single vaccine ordering system compatible for states with electronic 
interfaces. 
c. Expand provider network by offering tax breaks for registered participants 
who administer vaccine during a public health emergency 
 
5. An integrated vaccine distribution system 
a. A single vaccination distribution system 
b. Exercised annually through the seasonal campaign 
c. Optimal readiness at all times 
i. Act of Bioterrorism 
ii. Emerging infectious disease 
iii. Influenza pandemic 
 
6. Federal Planning Guidance 
a. Vaccine Production: A policy for vaccine production self-sufficiency 
b. Vaccine Administration: A multidisciplinary, collaborative approach to 
provide guidance for safe and effective vaccine practices. 
c. Vaccine Distribution: A performance based system to transport vaccine from 
manufacturer to provider front door 
 
Figure 8.   Framework for U.S. Policy: Pandemic Vaccine Distribution 
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a. Financial Incentives  
Publicly-funded vaccine assures manufacturers that a volume of vaccine 
will be purchased by a primary purchaser, which is the USG. USG legislation has 
invested in expanding production capacity and new technologies. These investments have 
served the supply side of vaccine administration and have been directed toward private 
sector production manufacturers. The USG should consider complimentary investments 
for the administration of vaccine to the distribution side and its supporting provider 
network. A similar recommendation was made to Congress (CRS, 2007) that payment for 
vaccine administration be considered. This could come in the form of direct payments to 
providers who administer vaccine during a PHE or through a mechanism with insurance 
carriers to cover the insured. Financial reimbursements frustrated the administration of 
H1N1 vaccine as the USG worked through the issues of whether or not providers could 
charge an administrative fee for vaccine administration.  These issues should be reviewed 
and address in advance of a PHE.  
An alternative financial incentive could be tax breaks for members of the 
provider network who participate in a PHE and administer vaccine.  Congress has 
considered tax credits for certain vaccine research and distribution activities to effectively 
lower the cost to manufacturers (GAO 2006). Similar incentives should be considered for 
those providers who support a PHE.   
Consider, for example, the H1N1 response and marginal participation by 
one target group’s provider OB/GYN providers. OB/GYNs typically do not provide 
vaccination services. There were few incentives for them to gear up for H1N1 
vaccinations, yet their clients, who viewed them as their medical home, had to find 
vaccination elsewhere.  So how does government incentivize OB/GYNs to join the 
provider network for a PHE? As discussed previously, a provider-centered strategy would 
be to minimize administrative barriers by arranging reimbursement for the administrative 
fee or third-party reimbursement complimented with tax breaks during a PHE.  
Finally, the policy should include coverage under the National Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program (VICP), not unlike other vaccines used to protect children, 
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healthcare workers and DoD personnel. The smallpox vaccine was covered under the 
Smallpox Vaccine Injury Compensation Program established in 2003 (HRSA, 2006). 
b. Improve Coordination  
Congress has worked to improve coordination among vaccine industry 
representatives to advance vaccine research and development efforts. For example, this 
strategy was used in 2002 to avoid supply shortages intended for childhood vaccinations 
“among federal regulators, private manufacturers, government scientists, and purchasers” 
(GAO, 2006). Similar coordination efforts would expand the vaccinator corps by 
bringing together national and state health and medical associations, and state regulatory 
agencies. The desired outcome is to address restrictions to health professionals with the 
vaccination skill set but restricted by scope of practice. 
c. Procurement Justification and Accountability Requirement 
Alternatives 
The nation witnessed a record production time for H1N1 pandemic 
vaccine using several legislated mechanisms to expedite the production and approval 
process coordinated by BARDA.  The survey described a number of administrative tasks 
that were slowed or delayed due to adherence to bureaucratic compliance requirements 
by both state and federal officials.  These administrative requirements should be studied 
and identified. In addition, alternatives should be sought to expedite administrative 
bottlenecks that delay issues of readiness, response and capacity.  Administrative means 
such as “fast-track mechanism” or “accelerated approval” should be considered to 
expedite the logistics support requirements for a PVD campaign.  
D. BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION  
Three barriers to implementation of the proposed policy are discussed. Barriers 
include the labyrinth of statutory, regulatory and licensure issues, universal vaccination 
as a factor that supports development of an integrated vaccine distribution system and 
issues of trust that could obstruct public and private sectors working collaboratively 
toward a new model. 
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Some states acted on their own accord during H1N1 response and deputized 
dentists, pharmacists and paramedics (Smith, 2009). Other states required an executive 
order from the governor. Other state executives issued no declaration, and their state 
health professionals remained on the bench. But barriers remained even after executive 
intervention. The question is why, after years of pandemic plan exercises at national, state 
and local levels, were these issues not identified and corrective actions not taken?  The 
simplistic response is because exercise scenarios most often dealt with issues of limited 
supply, mass vaccination clinics, isolation and quarantine protocols and related vaccine 
administration issues but rarely addressed issues of distribution.  
Consider New York where dentists were not authorized to receive vaccine 
because they were not an authorized medical specialty, but Governor Patterson’s 
executive order authorized them to vaccinate those eligible for H1N1 vaccination.  
Under current state law, some health care professionals are prohibited 
from delivering the vaccine because of limits on their professional duties. 
The governor's order waives any law that would prevent these people from 
giving vaccinations, according to Claire Pospisil from the New York state 
department of health. (Solomon & Shin, 2009, p. 1) 
In addition, dentists who volunteered to administer vaccine “must do so at a New 
York state health department distribution center” (Solomon & Shin, 2009, p. 1). In effect, 
while the order taps dentists as manpower, the action reduces the number of vaccination 
venues and reinforces the traditional mass vaccination model directing clients to a 
centralized location.  It also reinforces the hub and spoke system of vaccination rather 
than encouraging a point-to-point service that would characterize a client-centered 
strategy. This serves as a brief example of barriers and disincentives to recruit non-
traditional vaccinators. H1N1 was declared a public emergency by HHS Secretary 
Sebelius, declared an emergency by President Obama, and yet neither declaration 
directed professionals with the vaccination skill set to vaccinate. States act on their own 
accord, and health professionals are licensed by a state. Issues of this nature must be 
worked at the state level and among those entities that represent the stakeholders. 
Dentistry is one medical specialty whose professionals could serve as vaccinators during  
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public health emergencies. They offer the nation an additional option to expand its 
vaccinator corps but scope of practice issues must be explored in advance of activation, 
deputizing and other executive order mechanisms (ASTHO, 2010).   
Issues of medical control will be a limiting factor when the discussion turns to 
expanding the scope of practice for health and medical disciplines, which was an issue in 
the use of dentists in New York described above. Scope of practice among New York 
dentists was limited, and they were required to be supervised by a medical physician. 
Therefore, dentists authorized to administer vaccine did so under standing orders signed 
by a public health physician. Physicians are authorized by state statue to maintain quality 
control of patient care and therefore provide oversight or supervision of other disciplines 
that provide medical care. Patient care is controlled through medical orders, such as a 
prescription, which instructs the nature of patient care by another professional. Using the 
example of pharmacists, even though the profession has prepared pharmacists for 
vaccination duties, tending to patients still required a physician’s order or prescription. 
As stated earlier, pharmacists that vaccinate were under a physician’s standing order. 
Administration of a vaccine by a pharmacist required a medical order.  
For example, the South Carolina General Assembly took up a resolution to 
change the scope of practice for pharmacists by permitting vaccination without a medical 
order. While it illustrates amending the scope of practice to permit pharmacists to 
vaccinate without a medical order, it shows the pharmacists scope of practice still limited 
to “adverse events.” 
Section 40-43-190. (A)(1) The Board of Medical Examiners shall issue a 
written protocol for the administration of influenza vaccines by 
pharmacists without an order of a practitioner. The administration of 
influenza vaccines as authorized in this section must not be to persons 
under the age of eighteen years.  
(2) The written protocol must further authorize pharmacists to administer 
without an order of a practitioner those medications necessary in the 
treatment of adverse events. These medications must be used only in the 
treatment of adverse events and must be limited to those delineated within 
the written protocol. (South Carolina General Assembly. [SCGA], 2010, p. 
1) 
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Paramedics are another group of professional who conduct needle sticks routinely 
but to vaccinate requires authorization by a medical control officer. Paramedics and 
patient care are supervised by physicians who define what specifically paramedics can 
do. Thus, a change to the scope of practice required modification of a paramedics’ scope 
of practice. States manage this differently state by state, but physicians are deemed the 
medical control officer for emergency medical services. These examples describe issues 
of medical control and the actions of state general assemblies, state licensure boards and 
state associations, both medical and non-medical, to change scope of practice.  
The strategy of a single integrated vaccine distribution system was introduced and 
Canada referenced as a nation that has implemented the concept. One key to its success is 
the publicly funded component of its universal vaccination program for the seasonal flu 
campaign. Although, PHAC (MOH, 2008) has conducted extensive studies that have 
demonstrated the cost effectiveness of the Ontario program, adoption in the U.S. would 
find legislators balking at such a proposal. The current economic and political climate 
and the recent passage of health care reform, all create circumstances in which 
government is not likely to implement a similar strategy in the near future. Other 
innovative solutions may need to be considered to adopt incentives that support the 
integration strategy.  
Finally, the issue of trust was identified in the survey from various perspectives. 
The distrust of government by the citizenry was fueled when the USG promise of H1N1 
vaccine for all in mid-October could not be met and then limited supply issues persisted 
through the holiday season (ASTHO, 2010). The public sector distrust of the private 
sector’s motives persisted when traditional providers were apprehensive to support the 
mass vaccination campaign. To some extent the use of non-traditional providers by 
public health delayed readiness and response.  These issues of trust will be present as the 
USG moves forward with a new strategy for pandemic vaccine distribution response. But 
these are the professions that have found common ground to form partnerships to address 




groups and tiers by population sector, which addressed a number of ethical issues yet 
found wide acceptance by both professionals and the general public.  A similar spirit of 
cooperation should be embraced to address the issues of distribution.  
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented a new model for pandemic vaccine distribution built 
around a comprehensive public private partnership. Six goals were delineated and 
accompanied by gaps that were identified from the analysis of two models of vaccine 
distribution. A policy strategy was recommended to establish a comprehensive public 
private partnership for pandemic vaccine distribution that achieves the HHS goal and 
facilitates a rapid response. A framework for development of a U.S. policy for pandemic 
vaccine distribution was outlined. The framework addressed the six goals of the new 
model and offered a context to differentiate three processes essential to pandemic 
preparedness. The GAO described these when it reiterated ongoing gaps for pandemic 
response and recovery “the availability of antivirals and vaccines could be inadequate to 
meet demand due to limited production, distribution, and administration capacity” 
(2009a, p. 16).  
The premise of this thesis is that progress has been made toward vaccine 
production self-sufficiency, and it has argued that vaccine administration guidance is well 
documented.  What has not progressed is the process of vaccine distribution for 
emergencies. U.S. pandemic response where vaccination is the mitigation strategy should 
be conceptualized to breakout these three distinctive processes as a triangular network,27 
each equal, but requiring a body of knowledge to support its execution. Figure 9 
illustrates the equivalency of relationships among these three vaccination processes.  
                                                 
27
 Triangulated irregular networks (TIN) are referenced in geospatial information systems (GIS) and 
supported by data digital structures.  Beyond the scope of this thesis, the concept of TIN offers a 
perspective to understand the dynamics of market relationships that drive mass vaccination. 
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Figure 9.   Vaccination: A Triangular Network of Interdependencies 
Each process is distinctive. Each warrants a body of work essential for success but 
all three are interdependent to achieve herd immunity during a public health emergency. 
The public private partnership for pandemic vaccine distribution is a model for 
development of the distribution process. It becomes the building block that compliments 
the HHS pandemic plan and contributes to a mass vaccination model that is executable. 
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis has argued that the current public health infrastructure cannot 
adequately manage emergency vaccine distribution and that the distribution model 
defined by existing federal planning guidance is flawed. Public Health distributes and 
administers seven percent of seasonal influenza (flu) vaccine  (HHS, 2005a), but in a 
public health emergency of national significance, it distributes 100 percent of the volume.  
Chapter IV survey results supported this argument by showing that the pandemic vaccine 
distribution model is not executable due to insufficient public health workforce capacity.  
Even as the nation works toward vaccine production self-sufficiency (CBO, 
2008), the issues of distribution remain unclear. In the midst of its first pandemic in 40 
years, a July 2009 GAO described gaps in responsibility for distribution that persisted: 
“One of these was a lack of clarity regarding the roles and responsibilities of federal and 
state governments on issues such as state border closures and influenza pandemic vaccine 
distribution” (GAO, 2009, p. 7). 
The current federal pandemic plan for distribution revealed its weaknesses as the 
nation responded to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Public Health did not have the 
infrastructure to support mass vaccination as expected in federal guidance to support the 
HHS goal. As a result, staffing limitations of state and local (DoH) were supplemented 
through the Public Health Emergency Response grants, and the private healthcare sector 
was recruited to assist with vaccination. This thesis proposed a new model for pandemic 
distribution that addressed problems inherent in the current model and implementation 
difficulties that came to light with the nation’s response to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Two research questions were poised at the beginning of this thesis: 
• What criteria should be used to evaluate a model to support pandemic 
vaccine distribution and drive policy development?  
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• How could a model be designed to support pandemic vaccine distribution 
for a public health emergency of national significance?  
The first research question developed model evaluation criteria that were used to 
evaluate two models of vaccine distribution. Chapter IV used two rounds of interviews 
with subject matter experts to identify, develop and validate the model evaluation criteria 
used in Chapters V and VI to evaluate the public health and private sector model.  Six 
model evaluation criteria resulted from the survey executable, scalable, client-centered, 
provider-centered, integration and federal planning guidance (see Table 4). Evaluation 
criteria identified strengths and weaknesses of each model.  
The second question sought to explore the development of a new model for 
pandemic vaccine distribution and used the results from the analysis in Chapters V and 
VI. Chapter VII proposed a new model for pandemic vaccine distribution and policy 
goals that should support a model for a public health emergency of national significance.   
Three recommendations resulted from the analysis support development of a new 
hybrid model for PVD, which leverages the use of a public private partnership.  The first 
recommendation targets the pre-pandemic period. Its aim is to extend the scope of 
practice among those disciplines whose professionals could serve as vaccinators during a 
public health emergency. The second recommendation is used during the inter-pandemic 
period and advocates for a single, integrated vaccination distribution system in which 
pandemic response is exercised through each seasonal flu campaign. The third 
recommendation targets pandemic response, using the nation’s health and medical 
professionals to respond to a public health emergency when the mitigation strategy is a 
mass vaccination campaign.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
States in cooperation with HHS and health and medical specialty 
associations should change scope of practice restrictions that block 
disciplines from serving as vaccinators in declared public health 
emergencies where vaccination is the mitigation strategy. 
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A staffing model is the critical path to accomplishing the goal of HHS to 
vaccinate 300 million citizens in six months. Neither states nor federal resources are 
sufficient to build a public health workforce capacity to accomplish the goal, but the 
nation has a corps of health and medical professionals with the skill set and desire to 
assist during emergency operations. This recommendation addresses the quagmire of 
legal, regulatory and licensure restrictions that limits health and medical professionals 
from serving as vaccinators and expands their scope of practice to include this skill set 
during public health emergencies. The scope of practice is a state responsibility, but HHS 
should serve as lead facilitator, which would be not unlike its role to upgrade state 
emergency health powers laws. The recommendation also supports states that deploy 
state pandemic preparedness plans and are challenged to adequately staff those plans.  
To achieve this recommendation requires collaboration among state and federal 
government authorities as well as private sector national and state professional 
associations to address these issues. As discussed throughout this thesis, even when a 
discipline, such as pharmacy, worked through this process and readied its licensed 
professionals for vaccination, it took a crisis for recognition by other disciplines that a 
discipline is ready to serve in this capacity. This crisis worked to remove the remaining 
barriers and permit pharmacists to vaccinate. Collaboration must occur before a crisis and 
not in its midst.  
The scope of this project scales the effort exerted to modernize public health 
statutes for states through the Model Emergency Health Powers Act (Center for Law and 
the Public’s Health [CLHP], 2001). The result would be a readily available corps of 
vaccinators with an expanded scope of practice during emergencies. A study of scope of 
practice is a first step but must be accompanied by clarifying medical control issues for 
the emergency. Who manages and supervises vaccinators must be equally considered as 
well and therefore, calls for the collaborative effort among the various stakeholders. The 
effect of this action is to build workforce capacity in local communities that can respond 
to, not only pandemic threats, but also emerging infectious diseases such as SARS and 
acts of bioterrorism. It permits immediate response by local communities to biological 
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threats without the encumbrances that currently exist from state and federal statues and 
licensure restrictions. Three specific actions are proposed to support the recommendation: 
• National health and medical specialty associations should conduct a gap 
analysis of its policies, scope of practice and those laws that block 
licensed professionals from serving as vaccinators. 
• State health and medical specialty associations should conduct gap 
analysis of its policies, scope of practice and those laws that block 
licensed professionals from serving as vaccinators.  
• State government, lead by the state public health authority in cooperation 
with regulatory counterparts should target those professions that could 
serve as non-traditional vaccinators and conduct a gap analysis of state 
statues that block scope of practice by those professionals.  
National health and medical specialty associations exist to represent and protect 
the scope of practice defined through law and codified by licensure for their membership 
base. Likewise, regulatory agencies represent the public interest and must ensure the 
public is protected. As learned by the H1N1 response, association interests may not 
always serve community’s best interests during public health emergencies. Health 
professionals watched while DoH, associations and advocates worked through these 
restrictions during the H1N1 incident.  
The impetus must come from the federal government as a strategy to develop a 
robust vaccinator corps and make pandemic plans executable. But it is the associations 
themselves that must adopt this body of work and serve the philanthropic good for which 
their association was formed. It should serve the profession but the profession serves the 
public and the association should serve this greater good.  
The USG should establish a pandemic implementation strategy that 
supports an integrated vaccine distribution infrastructure that works 
for both seasonal influenza and pandemic influenza.  
A policy of vaccine production self-sufficiency is being pursued by the USG to 
protect the nation against biological threats. This thesis has argued that while much 
attention, resources and effort have been expended on the supply side, similar 
commitments are required to develop a distribution network, consisting of both venues 
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and vaccinators, to get vaccine out and into arms and/or noses. However, is it necessary 
to erect a second infrastructure whose sole mission is pandemic vaccine distribution and 
whose sustainment is unpredictable?  
The strategy recommendation is to establish an integrated vaccine distribution 
infrastructure that works for both seasonal influenza and pandemic influenza. An 
integrated vaccine distribution infrastructure is a strategy that would be used each 
influenza season but equally is intended for use in a public health emergency that requires 
a mass vaccination strategy. Each flu season becomes an exercise for an infectious 
disease outbreak by using the seasonal campaign to test methods and procedures. It 
prepares all sectors to work together each season but prepares for an emergency when 
mass vaccination is the response strategy.  
This strategy also offers dual-purpose application and could be used for other 
public health emergency distributions including medical countermeasures whether those 
are vaccine shortages, smallpox or other biologics. 
The USG should adopt a policy strategy and establish a 
comprehensive public private partnership for pandemic vaccine 
distribution that achieves the HHS goal and facilitates a rapid 
response. 
Pandemic response should not stop at vaccine production self-sufficiency but 
incorporate distribution policy that supports the vaccine supply chain from production 
through distribution and into arms. A policy of vaccine distribution compliments the 
policy of vaccine production self-sufficiency. The limitations and barriers to deploy 
health and medical personnel in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina revealed the legal, 
licensure and practice constraints (Santiago, 2006). Yet these issues were visited once 
again in an attempt to deploy vaccinators for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.  
A framework for development of a U.S. policy for pandemic vaccine distribution 
was outlined in Chapter VII. The framework addressed the six goals of the new model 
and offered a context to differentiate vaccine production from vaccine administration 
from vaccine distribution. U.S. pandemic response, when vaccination is the mitigation 
strategy, should be conceptualized as a triangular network and mapped to breakout these 
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three distinctive processes. Yet while all three processes are distinctive, they are essential 
and interdependent to achieve herd immunity during a public health emergency.   
C. CONCLUSION 
Public health seeks to administer social justice exemplified through vaccination 
target groups, and its tier-allocation scheme. It is a masterful work of targeting those at 
greatest risk, whether citizens represent a critical infrastructure sector or a population 
group predisposed to viral threats.  Yet, while the tier system is based on the ethical 
principle of essential fairness, it falls short of equality in that most members of H1N1 
high-risk groups did not get vaccinated and lower priority targets were only offered 
vaccination once the wave of infection had passed. Six months previously, the public had 
grown weary of repeated attempts to get vaccinated because government determined it 
could not do it all. By the time it arrived at this conclusion, it was too late to mobilize the 
necessary resources. In the aftermath of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the government 
discarded 40 million vaccine doses or 25 percent of production (United Press 
International, 2010). The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center’s (UPMC) Center for 
Biosecurity, in a project of “why and how to catalyze the civic infrastructure for an 
extreme health event” (Schoch-Spana, Franco, Nuzzo, & Usenza, 2007, p. 1), called for 
community engagement in pandemic preparedness. The project presented examples of 
community engagement depicting a 1947 smallpox outbreak in New York City:   
During the 1947 smallpox outbreak, NYC health officials vaccinated more 
than 6.3 million people in 4 weeks (5 million alone in the first 2 weeks) 
using private physicians and volunteers from the Red Cross, teachers’ 
groups, women’s clubs, and civil defense groups; this partnership helped 
staff free clinics in 12 hospitals, 84 police precincts, and every public and 
parochial school. (Schoch-Spana, Franco, Nuzzo, & Usenza, 2007, p. 12) 
The scenario reflects a remarkable capacity and resiliency to squelch a smallpox 
outbreak in record time. It describes an incident where community members mobilized a 
campaign to inoculate fellow citizens. This was a time when citizens felt responsible to 
respond without the burdens of statutory, regulatory or licensure restrictions.  
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Can a nation continue to support emergency vaccination campaigns whose 
premise is based on flawed assumptions and when billions have been invested without 
results? Justice is not served if vaccine is wasted, citizens go unprotected and a nation 
vulnerable to a threat it spent public funds to mitigate. The National Health Security 
Strategy (HHS, 2010) is built on the foundation of community resiliency demonstrated by 
New York City’s ability to mobilize and respond with great urgency. This thesis 
recommended actions to empower communities to use its professional workforce and 
wage campaigns not unlike that of New York City in 1947. If communities are to achieve 
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APPENDIX C. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ROUND TWO 
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APPENDIX D. ANALYTICAL TOOLS TO SUPPORT PPP4PVD 
William Blake wrote, “Execution is the chariot of genius.” This thesis described 
the current HHS pandemic influenza plan as non-executable, and it recommended a 
comprehensive policy strategy to establish a public private partnership for pandemic 
vaccine distribution (PPP4PVD) that achieves the HHS goal and facilitates a rapid 
response. But to accomplish this policy, a strategy will require complex organizations 
with the will to collaborate and develop innovative strategies that will accomplish the 
policy goal. It is this execution that would make William Blake proud that his statement 
applies equally to pandemic response.  
How do complex organizations with missions, values and culture interact with 
complex organizations that are conservative, regulatory and cautious to innovation, 
collaborate in a way that they chart a new collective course? The ultimate objective and 
challenge is how to transform vaccination-avoidance behavior to vaccination-seeking 
behavior among citizens. Strategic innovation is inherent to American culture and the 
challenges described in this thesis deserve America’s best represented by both the public 
and private sector. But all will be for naught if we are unable to engage the consumer. 
The biosecurity we seek is dependent on consumer participation.  The H1N1 pandemic 
response and vaccination campaign demonstrated the difficulties in this respect. While 
the USG was able to produce a record volume of vaccine in a relatively short period of 
time using 60-year old technology, success was still measured by sleeves rolled up.  
To accomplish the policy goal this appendix explores three analytical tools to 
accompany the recommendations. These are 1) build execution into strategy, and 2) build 
trust relationships, and 3) build multi-disciplinary, multi-organizational structures.  
A. EXECUTION INTO STRATEGY 
This thesis has touched on innovation, but the policy goals proposed are 
significant “a huge lift” as described by one stakeholder and will require collaborations 
with a renewed spirit of cooperation. One concept that offers analytical tools that can 
graphically depict the concepts discussed in this thesis is Blue Ocean Strategy (BOS) 
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(Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). BOS is a strategic planning guide that describes how 
corporations are using innovation to create new consumer markets or “blue oceans” of 
opportunity. A few of the tools described in BOS are offered in this Appendix as a 
concept to display the relationship among strategies outlined in Chapter III through VII.  
 
Figure 10.   PVD Four Actions Framework  
The PVD Four Actions Framework in Figure 10 shows four actions of the 
PPP4PVD model and its’ policy, eliminate, reduce, raise and create. The policy strategy 
works to eliminate a non-executable PVD plan and offshore vaccine production 
dependency in the broadest sense. It plans to reduce vaccine wastage and reduce staffing 
limitations by strategies and goals outline in Chapter VII. It will raise the provider 
network through the use of multiple venues staffed by both traditional and non-traditional 
providers that will provide the basis for an executable plan and achieve greater herd 
immunity. Finally, it will create a new model for distribution (PPP4PVD) that integrates 
pandemic vaccine distribution with the seasonal flu vaccine distribution system while 
establishing a point-to-point service for clients. As a result, these systems are documented 
in federal planning guidance to assist state and local planners.  
Another analytical tool that builds from the PVD Four Action Framework is the 
Blue Ocean Strategy Canvas Map in Figure 11.  
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Figure 11.   Strategy Canvas: Comparing Vaccine Distribution Models  
Figure 11 illustrates the three models presented in Chapters V–VII and compares 
elements in the four actions framework (Figure 10) along a continuum (bottom) that 
underscores as value proposition and value innovation. On the left is the high to low axis. 
Value innovation results from the new strategies of the PPP4PVD model and the 
integration of point-to-point service and a single integrated vaccination system according 
to the BOS application. For example, look at vaccination rates along its vertical axis. The 
strategy canvas shows that the public health model (PHM) produces the least efficient 
vaccination rate followed by the private sector (PSM). The notion is that the new model 
given improvements will produce greater vaccination rates. Another example is the 
provider network. It depicts the PHM as the least staffed configuration, followed by the 
PSM, and shows that in an integrated model the nation should expect the greatest 
expansion to the provider network for public health emergencies.  
Given the assumption of vaccine production self-sufficiency, the value innovation 
is to create a model staffing component by expanding the provider vaccination network 
and using client-centered strategies such as point-to-point service. This will be achieved 
through partnering with the private sector and using core competencies of both sectors for 
public health emergencies of national significance.  
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B. BUILD TRUST RELATIONSHIPS 
Stakeholders referred to not only the pragmatics of pandemic vaccine distribution, 
but also discussed relationships, relationships with providers, relationships with patients, 
clients and consumers, relationships with the private sector, relationships with quasi-
private state and national professional associations. The emphasis in these discussions 
was relationships that did not exist, should exist, or could be improved between 
government and its constituencies. It became apparent that these relationships must be 
established before the emergency. Not a surprise, “relationship building” is a tenet of 
NIMS and is achieved through the mantra of exercise and training. It was these 
discussions with stakeholders that served as the impetus for development of evaluation 
criteria, such as provider-centered and client-centered strategies to improve vaccine 
distribution. The result was a comprehensive policy for pandemic vaccine distribution 
that incorporated relationship building strategies for providers and clients based on their 
needs. 
Establishing a policy that includes those strategies is step one, but how does an 
organization assess or measure “trust and relationship building” to ensure continued 
progress toward reaching the constituency, which is the target of the policy?  Much work 
has been done over the past decade by media organizations. For example, the Institute for 
Public Relations published a series of guides for developing relationships. Its most recent 
targets trust “Guidelines for Measuring Trust in Organizations” to assist organizations 
build effective relationships. Take trust for example, referenced frequently throughout the 
interviews. Did the USG, or specifically the public health system, lose the public’s trust 
when its promise to have 40 million H1N1 vaccine doses available for distribution by 
November 1, 2009 fell short? Paine (2003) describes six key components of relationships 
that can be measured, one of which is trust.  
There are three dimensions to trust: integrity: the belief that an 
organization is fair and just … dependability: the belief that an 
organization will do what it says it will do … and, competence: the belief 
that an organization has the ability to do what it says it will do.  
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The general belief is that the public health system has integrity as demonstrated 
by its priority vaccination scheme targeting high-risk groups. But when the other two 
dimensions are examined, dependability and competence, we may find the system falls 
short. The challenge is how to build a distribution system such that addresses these 
dimensions, but in such a way that its relationship with constituencies can be measured. 
Policy goals recommended strategies that target relationship building with constituents 
but how to measure progress? Relationship advocates recommend it is achieved by the 
numbers or by establishing performance measurements that target selected behaviors and 
then quantifying progress toward those performance measures.  
An approach to measure “trust relationships” in a crisis has been proposed by 
Paine (2007, p. 137) and describes three measures, outputs, outtakes and outcomes.  
• Measuring outputs and the effectiveness of the process: Pandemic or 
vaccination outputs refer to the monitoring of media to determine if 
messages are being communicated and to whom.  
• Measuring outtakes and impact: Are pandemic/vaccination messages 
believed and do they sway public opinion.  
• Measuring outcomes: the pandemic/vaccination outcome is herd immunity 
or assessing vaccination rates.  
Vaccination outputs: Today’s technology offers several methods to monitor the 
extent to which vaccination messages are published by media sources such as clipping 
services. This measure considers both volume and confirms message content reconciles 
with intended message and is straight forward. For example,  
• Volume of print media articles (newspaper) 
• Volume of broadcast messages (television) 
• Volume of electronic messages (webpages) 
Vaccination outtakes: Outtake measures whether messages are heard and found 
believable by the constituency. Whether an organization elects to conduct surveys using 
its resources or not, polling organizations typically poll major crisis events. Consider, for 
example, the H1N1 pandemic. Polls were conducted periodically by major polling 
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organizations throughout the event and offered insight into how the public perceived 
public health pandemic messages. For example, the Harvard Research Opinion Program 
(HORP) in a September 2009 survey reported that nearly 60 percent did not plan to get 
vaccinated and stated they would change their mind if “there were people in [their] 
community who were sick or dying from influenza A (H1N1)” Harvard Opinion 
Research Program [HORP], 2009, p. 1). Among those who stated that they would not get 
vaccinated, 87 percent believed H1N1 vaccine “very safe” or “somewhat safe.”   
• Overnight polling 
• Organizational based polling 
• Monitor the polling of national polling sources 
• Trend analysis polling data 
Another example of outtake is data gathered over several months or trend 
analysis. Public health authorities had the public’s ear early in the pandemic as 67 percent 
reported hand washing or using hand sanitizer and 55 percent reported they would stay 
home if sick. (Steelfisher, 2010). But as the campaign geared up for vaccination in mid-
October, interest waned. This table from HORP (2009, p. 2) shows trends from April 
through September 2009 in response to the question below. Note following events “very 
closely” the percentage declines modestly from 34 percent in April to 28 percent in 
September. Government authorities had the attention of the public, outtake data 
suggested this interest was waning and the vaccination campaign was about to 
commence. Yet government had thrown all the resources it had at its disposable to ready 
the nation for vaccination. All resources but private sector manpower and venues that 
would have overwhelmed the anticipated surge of vaccine which failed to show as 
expected. These relationships had yet to be established and state and local administrative 
protocol would delay their deployment until well into the campaign and after the virus 
attack had peaked.  
How closely are you following news about the recent outbreak of 
influenza A-H1N1?  Are you following the news very closely, somewhat 
closely, not too closely, or not at all? 
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Table 14.   Public Awareness of H1N1 Apr 2009–Sep 2009 (From HORP, 2009, p. 2) 
 CLOSELY NOT CLOSELY 
Don’t 
know Refused  Very Somewhat NET Not too Not at all 
9/20/09 73 28 45 26 18 8 * * 
6/28/09i, ii 72 27 44 28 23 6 * * 
5/6/09iii 76 31 46 23 17 7 * * 
4/29/09iv 77 34 43 22 15 7 * * 
Vaccination outcome: Vaccination outcome is measured by vaccination rates. 
Outcome data is a “post-mortem” assessment and measures behavior. It offers 
comparative norms from year to another or from one entity to another. For example, one 
stakeholder stated that only 22 percent of CDC workers were vaccinated with the H1N1 
vaccine. In contrast, the U.S. H1N1 vaccination average was approximately 27 percent 
compared to 46 percent for Canada.  Canada was reported to have the highest H1N1 
vaccination rate in the world (K. Scott, personal interview, April 9, 2010).  
C. BUILD MULTI-DISCIPLINARY, MULTI-ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURES 
The H1N1 vaccination campaign revealed both a problem and the solution. The 
solution is the use of non-traditional providers which was incorporated into the execution 
strategy described in this thesis. The problem is the legal, regulatory and licensure 
process that protects one profession while preventing another profession from practicing 
parallel skill sets. A skill set, such as vaccination, is common across several professions 
and not unique to physicians and nurses. For example, in South Carolina (until recently) a 
pharmacist required a doctor’s prescription to vaccinate. A pharmacist can distribute 
vaccine but cannot vaccinate without a physician’s order. Large franchise pharmacy 
chains (e.g., CVS, Walgreen’s) have standing orders that permit a pharmacist or contract 
nurse service to vaccinate in their retail outlets. A bill changed the scope of practice in 
“adverse events” recently by the South Carolina legislature and now permits pharmacists 
to vaccinate without a physician’s prescription. This is one state, but the web of legal, 
regulatory and licensure limitations for many non-traditional providers that could be 
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recruited to vaccinate in an emergency must be solved such as dentists, vetenarians, 
EMTs, phlebotomist or numerous other allied health professionals including students. 
These barriers persist throughout several profession associations but what will it take to 
address and overcome these barriers?  
The solution is the formation of collaborations or networks of associations at the 
federal, state and local levels of government, business (private sector healthcare 
providers) and professional associations. Each sector or community has issues and 
rationale for protecting its body of knowledge and it is the association that will protect 
those until its membership directs change. The discussion must be framed that in a 
declared public health emergency of national significance, than the professional scope of 
practice and standard of care rules change to protect the community.  While the USG 
should incentivize the process, these initiatives can start locally or statewide but must 
also be initiated at the national level. For example, this work had begun at the local level 
in South Carolina and, grew to a statewide task force with the same mission. But the 
collaboration described must occur in fifty states and national associations and serves as 
one example of how the problem was addressed.  
A task force was formed in South Carolina to look at the ethics of a pandemic 
influenza and the standard of care that must be altered in a pandemic (SCPETF, 2009, p. 
4). The task force consisted of public health, state medical association, state hospital 
association, medical university, private sector physicians and legal council from the 
various bodies represented. It made three legal recommendations and demonstrates the 
effort that must occur to change the standard of care. Two are referenced here: 
• The South Carolina Board of Medical Examiners under the Medical 
Practice Act should recommend and approve the South Carolina Pandemic 
Influenza Ethics Task Force Report as the clinical guidelines for 
implementation during a Pandemic Influenza Public Health Emergency. 
• The South Carolina Board of Nursing under the Nurse Practice Act should 
recommend and approve the South Carolina Pandemic Influenza Ethics 
Task Force Report as the clinical and nursing guidelines for 
implementation during a Pandemic Influenza Public Health Emergency. 
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As described in the discourse of pandemics and ethics, the definition for “standard 
of care” must be altered to reflect the limited medical resources and provide essential 
guidance to medical professional for making difficult judgment regarding who gets first 
rights to available care.  The current medical model of medicine is that the sickest 
patients get first claim on medical resources and system structures support this view such 
as legal, insurance and physician practice. Yet, in a pandemic the view shifts to patients 
with the best chance of recovery get first claim on limited medical resources. This same 
initiative must occur to modify the legal, licensure and credential barriers that prevent 
non-traditional providers from serving as vaccinations. 
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